Erwin Rommel’s first defeat - after he’d won the battle. The first victory against

the German land forces in the war - which has largely been forgotten. The first major

tank battle in the North African Campaign - won by the infantry. The first battle for

the new, and now famous, Eighth Army - who’s leader had to be replaced half way through

the battle, after he’d lost the battle which was ultimately won. And a swirling confusing

mess that really shouldn’t have been a victory for the British at all - and yet it was. Yeah,

contradictions and complexity is everywhere in this, which is perhaps why this battle has largely

been forgotten… until now. This is BATTLESTORM: the REAL Operation Crusader.

This is the first in a series of videos on Operation Crusader that will be coming out

(hopefully) every Monday for the next dozen or so weeks. So, make sure you’re subscribed

to be notified about the other videos. Sources, as well as additional notes, will be in the

Pinned Comment of the comment section below - not in the description because there’s

a character limit. In the description will be Timestamps to various parts of the video

and Links to other videos, including my other Battlestorms. I’ve already covered the North

African battles before this battle. So make sure you check them out.

Italy declared war on Britain in 1940 and invaded Egypt.

After taking Sidi Barrani, the British counterattacked and wiped out

the Italian 10th Army during Operation Compass. Fearing the loss of the entire Libyan colony

to the British, Hitler sent Mussolini some military support. This was Rommel and his

Afrika Korps. Rommel speedily defeated the British in his first desert offensive, but

couldn’t take the port of Tobruk, which was now under siege. The British tried twice

to break the siege, during operations Brevity and Battleaxe, but were unable to do so.

Battleaxe had been the last major battle fought in the desert, taking place in June of 1941.

Battleaxe was actually Rommel’s first real battle - one where he had had to defend, maneuver

and attack, against a determined enemy with their own battleplan.

“Up to this point it could be fairly said that, no matter how spectacular his achievements,

Rommel as a commanding officer had been something of a glorified military opportunist, at heart

still the young company commander exploiting the assault on Mount Matajur at Longarone,

albeit now writ overly large. Battleaxe was his first true test as a corps commander,

which he passed with full marks; after Battleaxe, Rommel would deploy and move his units with

far greater assurance and aplomb than he had previously displayed.” - Butler

In fact, one of the post-Battleaxe jokes going around the British Army was that Hitler had telephoned

Churchill and offered to remove Rommel from his command, if Churchill left all the British

generals in place.

However, just five days after Rommel’s victory at Battleaxe, Operation Barbarossa began.

This was the invasion of the Soviet Union - the largest invasion in the history of mankind.

As a result of this everyone quickly forgot about Battleaxe, and their attention went

to the Axis-Soviet Front. Barbarossa made it clear to everyone - even Rommel - that

North Africa was now just a sideshow to the main event.

However, that doesn’t mean that the North African Campaign was no longer important, or that it isn’t

interesting, or that it wouldn’t have an impact on the outcome of the war. For the

British, German strategy seemed to be - knock the Soviets out of the war quickly and then

turn their attention to tackling Britain once her eastern flank was secure. Therefore, the

attack on the Soviet Union actually threatened the Middle East. If the Soviets fell, German

panzers would roll through the Caucasus and drive to Basra, Palestine and Syria. It also

meant that Turkey may be persuaded to join the war on the Axis side. So the British deemed

it necessary to prevent the capture of the Anglo-Iranian oil fields, and the Abadan refinery.

To lose them would make it almost impossible to continue the war in the Middle East.

The defeat of Battleaxe and the invasion of the Soviet Union actually forced Churchill

and the War Cabinet to rethink their entire Grand Strategy. The Axis-Soviet Front was

now the main front for the Germans. And Britain wasn’t committing troops there. This meant

that, if the British made North Africa and the Mediterranean their main front, they would

drain German resources that would be better deployed on their Eastern Front. And because

of the invasion of the Soviet Union, forces could now be released from the British Isles

for use in the Middle East. So this made this plan a reality.

Wavell, now commander in Chief of India, but who still commanded forces in Iraq, launches

a joint operation with the Soviets to occupy Persia (or Iran). This was Operation Countenance,

and it aimed to take the Iranian oil fields, and secure British and Soviet supply lines

from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea. It would also prevent Iran from joining the

Axis, which was thought might be a possibility (even though it probably wasn’t). With the

capture of Iran, the fall of Syria, and the conclusion of the East African Campaign, British

effort could now be focused on the North African Campaign.

And this focus on North Africa would ultimately pay off. Taking a look into the future, we

have the Battle of El Alamein, the Torch landings, Tunisia, Sicily, Italy - and all this fighting

gives the Allies enough experience to the conduct the Normandy (or D-Day) landings - so

North Africa is definitely important, and would soon become a major strategic liability

for the Axis.

“It was one of the pivotal decisions in the war and a major blunder, for while the

Axis chose not to commit larger forces to North Africa, the British were now committed

to making the whole of the Mediterranean a major theater of war.” - Butler

Rommel realised that he would no longer be receiving more troops than he already had

(by now, 3 divisions). This is often seen as a bad thing because some historians are

of the opinion that if Rommel had been given just one more panzer division, he may have

won North Africa and taken the Suez Canal. This would have made the Mediterranean an

Axis lake, and may have even persuaded Franco in Spain, as well as possibly Turkey, to join the war

on the Axis side.

However, the simple counter to this argument is - how would they supply this extra panzer

division? They couldn’t supply the three German divisions in North Africa now, so they

had no chance. And this is why the failure to take Tobruk would haunt Rommel for several

months, because without that port he could not supply his forces properly, and he could

not advance further. So supply was a major issue for Axis forces in North Africa - even

now - without additional forces.

The British on the other hand, knew that Tobruk had to be held, but also saw that it

was a liability to them. Tobruk was costly in shipping, and they knew Rommel was building

up forces to take it out. This would then allow Rommel to advance further into Egypt

- which they obviously didn’t want. Their conclusion was that the sooner an offensive

into Libya happened the better their prospects would be. Therefore the British had to act

before Rommel did.

Sir Claude Auchinleck arrived on the 2nd of

July to take over from Wavell as Commander in Chief of the Middle East. Most historians

see the relief of Wavell as ‘unfair’, since he had performed exceptionally well

over the past several months, with few resources. For example -

“There was no valid case for relieving Wavell. In his two years in the Middle East he had

built a base and a command structure from nothing. He had conquered the whole of Italian

East Africa, had captured two hundred thousand prisoners, including the Duke of Aosta, Viceroy

of Ethiopia. Under his strategic aegis, O’Connor had taken Cyrenaica and another two hundred

thousand prisoners. Between February and June 1941 he had conducted six major campaigns,

never less than three at a time, and in May five at a time. No other British soldier of

the day had the strategic grasp, the sagacity, the cool nerves and the immense powers of

leadership to do all these things and steer a course free of total disaster. Certainly

Wavell’s career had been latterly clouded by defeat - Greece, Cyrenaica, Crete. Yet

Greece and Cyrenaica, the most serious of the three, were the Prime Minister’s responsibility.

“Dismissal of Wavell, in fact if not in intention, made him a scapegoat for Churchill’s

own mistakes.” - Barnett

And, according to another historian (Butler), Churchill bore the blame for the flawed command

structure that forced both Wavell and Auchinleck to command forces across the entire Middle

East. It wouldn’t be until the summer of 1942 before this changed and the North African

Campaign had its own separate command. So again, not really Wavell’s fault.

Now, it is normally at this point that I say this is up for debate and I offer you a counter

argument, but there really isn’t one. The reality was that Churchill had pressured Wavell

into starting his battles early, and had stretched what little resources he had across up to

five campaigns. Churchill’s own defence is that he thought that Wavell was a tired

man and that he had failed recently, which is why he needed to be replaced with someone

fresh. But even this argument comes unstuck by the person sent to replace him.

“Wavell showed no signs of tiredness at all. He was always the same. I think he was

first class; in spite of his silences, he made a tremendous impact on the troops. I

have a very great admiration for him… but he was given impossible tasks.” - Auchinleck

So, yeah, Churchill takes the blame here. Now, this Prime Minister was good at grand

strategy, and he was a great politician and a great figure head, but he was terrible at

operational art of warfare, and actually self-sabotaged the British Army on several occasions.

The good news was that Wavell’s career was not over - Wavell and Auchinleck would just

swap roles. Wavell would replace Auchinleck as Commander-in-Chief of India, and Auchinleck

would become Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East. So, at the very least, Wavell wasn’t

demoted.

Anyway, with Wavell gone, let’s take a look at his replacement: General Sir Claude Auchinleck,

also known as “the Auk” by the troops.

“Auchinleck was a modest and somewhat austere man who shied away from publicity. His unpretentious

style set him close to the soldiers under his command.” Ford P12

He’d fought throughout the Middle East during First World War, and had served as a commander

of 4th Corps during the Anglo-French invasion of Norway. But, while Norway was a failure,

nobody blamed Auchinleck for that campaign. Overall, Auchinleck had plenty of experience

under his belt.

But Auchinleck was a soldier from the Indian Army, which was different to the British Army.

This meant two things - Auchinleck did not know the officers he was about to command,

and had few friends in England. Therefore, he didn’t know which officers were good

or bad - and this would lead him to appoint several bad commanders into positions of authority.

He knew the commander and officers of the 4th Indian Division, commanded by Frank Messervy,

but apart from the personal staff he brought from Delhi, Auchinleck was surrounded by strangers

in Cairo.

Also, being part of the Indian Army, he had little knowledge of armoured warfare because

the Indian Army didn’t have tanks at the time. In fact, they only had an incredibly

small amount of armoured cars, so he was completely new to this state-of-the-art form of warfare

- which happened also to be a trait shared by every senior officer in both the British

and Indian armies at the time. Arguably then, Auchinleck was not really the man for the job.

“The danger of mistaken choice at all critical levels was therefore present from the moment

he accepted appointment as Commander-in-Chief.” - Pitt, P5

But to be fair to Auchinleck, he was a capable officer, and not all the problems he was about

to face were his fault. Even before Auchinleck had taken office, Auchinleck received a warning

from General Dill, Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Dill made it clear to Auchinleck that

he was about to receive a ton of pressure from Churchill to start his battles prematurely.

“It was Auchinleck’s first acquaintance with that special anxiety which dwarfed all

the other mammoth anxieties of the Middle East Command. Auchinleck was not as diplomatic

a man as Wavell; his instinct was to oppose the Prime Minister’s interference bluntly

and resolutely. The battle between them was soon under way.” - Barnett

This battle started even before Auchinleck had had chance to take his office. Churchill

wanted to know when Auchinleck was going to attack, and Auchinleck replied that he would

attack when he had adequate forces of at least two but possibly three armoured divisions

and a motorized division. He estimated that this would be in three months time. And this

was understandable, since equipment losses during Battleaxe had been heavy, and morale

amongst the troops was at an all-time low.

Of course, Churchill also had good reasons for wanting an early offensive. The Soviets were

scrambling to stay alive and it was vital that Britain take as much pressure off them

as possible. And it also seemed like a golden opportunity to strike now while German attention

was in the East - which is fine. But the way Churchill went about it was poor.

“The urgency of these issues will naturally impress itself upon you. We shall be glad

to hear from you at your earliest convenience.” - Churchill’s first cable.

“No further offensive in the Western Desert should be contemplated until base is secure.” - Auchinleck’s reply.

Yeah, there was an instant clash of personalities between Churchill and Auchinleck. And Churchill

being Churchill, he kept up the pressure. A barrage of messages from London rained down

on Auchinleck’s Headquarters. They were all sharp in tone and heavy in their insistence

for the new Commander of the Middle East to launch his attack now.

“To launch an offensive with the inadequate means at present at our disposal is not, in

my opinion, a justifiable operation of war… To gain results risks must be run, and I am

ready to run them if they are reasonably justifiable.” - Auchinleck

Auchinleck needed to close the Syrian Campaign, as well as others, before he would attack

Rommel - although that would close relatively quickly. So, with Syria in his hands, an attack

would be mounted soon, right? Well, no. On the 15th of July, Auchinleck sent a message

to Churchill saying that he needed both time to train his tank crews; and forge a strong

cooperation between the tanks, infantry and air forces for the upcoming offensive.

Of course, Churchill being Churchill, he assumed that, as soon as a tank reached Egypt,

it would be shipped to the front line and be used in combat. This was far from the case

- since many required essential modifications to their air systems and lubrication systems

to allow them to run in the desert. In fact, this process took weeks. But you try telling

that to the Prime Minister.

And because British tanks had a habit of breaking down all the time (regardless of modifications),

Auchinleck wouldn’t attack until he had a 50 percent reserve in tank numbers. This

was also why he wanted at least two, if not three, armoured divisions, plus a motorized

infantry division - not just to beat the Axis on the field of battle - but so he could get

enough tanks to the field of battle in the first place. This meant that the 500 tanks

that Churchill was promising he’d have by the end of July would only be half of the

number he actually needed.

“Generals only enjoy such comforts in Heaven,” - Churchill’s reply.

So frustrated was Churchill that he asked Auchinleck to come to England for consultation.

But when Auchinleck arrived by air on the 29th of July (with Air Marshal Tedder) he

refused to budge on his decision, saying that the 1st of November was the earliest Operation

Crusader could begin. Auchinleck explained that he was fighting on two fronts - the Western

Desert, and in Iraq and Syria. And he knew he couldn’t fight Rommel if he didn’t

have superiority in armour over him. Only once Cyprus, Syria and Iraq were secured could

they contemplate an attack against Rommel. Effectively, therefore, Auchinleck refused

to bow to Churchill.

“He certainly shook my military advisers with all the detailed argument he produced.

I was myself unconvinced.” - Churchill

Auchinleck had been in his office less than a month, and already Churchill was not happy

by his appointment. And Auchinleck for his part returned to Egypt convinced that he would

never allow himself to bow to the personal pressure set upon him by Churchill. Political

demands would not interfere with military decisions.

In addition, the new army that would be created in North Africa would be commanded by Lieutenant-General

Alan Cunningham - even though Churchill wanted Lieutenant-General Wilson to be 8th Army’s

commander instead.

“The Prime Minister was beginning to regret that Auchinleck had ever been appointed Commander-in-Chief

Middle East.” Ford P8

Auchinleck wasn’t the only person Churchill wasn’t happy with. Next Monday we will look

at the Eighth Army prior to Crusader, including the new Commanders, new units, and the good

old British doctrines. And, my video on the invasion of British Somaliland will explain

why Churchill really disliked one of the commanders. I have also covered several other battles

in the North African Campaign, including Operation Compass - the first battle - so be sure to

check them out. Thank you to my Patreons for supporting me - you made this video, and are

making the rest of the Crusader videos possible, so thank you. And to all of you, thanks for

watching, bye for now.