In our previous video on modern warfare, we discussed the Yom Kippur War’s southern

front in Sinai, but this wasn’t the only arena in which the armies of Israel and the

Arab nations fought. The Golan Heights, a buffer zone between Syria and Israel gained

in 1967, was the site of a more urgent clash. Welcome to our second video on the Yom Kippur

War, in which we will cover the northern front. If you are interested in the history of this

era, don’t forget to check out our second channel – The Cold War – the link is in

the top right corner.

Territorially, Syria’s grievances against Israel revolved around the geographical region

known as the Golan Heights - a strategic high-ground in Israel’s northeast, which had been a

part of Syria before the 1967 war. Much like on the Suez canal, the Israelis had also built

a fortified defensive front on the Golan Heights, known as the ‘purple line’. It consisted

of anti-tank ditches, 17 evenly spaced strong points known as mutvazim, and other obstacles,

all of which cleverly used the inhospitable volcanic terrain as a force multiplier. Each

of the 17 fortifications were garrisoned by 10 to 30 men. High-elevation volcanic cones

were used as observation points and tank firing platforms, while debris from digging the anti-tank

ditches was reused to form embankments, shielding the strong points from direct enemy hits.

It’s also worth noting that while the northern part of the Golan Heights was extremely bad

terrain for tanks, the south was far more open. Movement of troops in this bulwark was

facilitated by a network of tracks and roads built by the IDF. Two of them ran north to

south, functioning as the main artery. Under the cover of their standard saber-rattling

rhetoric, Syria began to mass a large force on its border with Israel, whose government

was complacent. In total, around 40,000 Syrians were positioned against Israel’s northeast

flank - defended initially by only 200 Israelis. In terms of armour, Syria had 1,400 tanks

against 177 Israeli, and 115 artillery batteries against the IDF’s 11. Assad had also taken

the lead of his ally, Egypt, and possessed a formidable Soviet-supplied anti-aircraft

umbrella, which it would use to repel the overwhelming effectiveness of Israeli warplanes.

At 1:45PM on October the 6th, just as Egyptian forces were about to cross the Suez on the

southern front, spotters on Mount Hermon saw the Syrians removing camouflage nets from

their artillery. Minutes later, a 50 minute long preliminary barrage of shells began to

fall all along the Israeli front on the Golan Heights. It was particularly intense in the

sector between Rafid and Kuneitra in the south, where the main thrust was planned. This bombardment

was supported by airstrikes from Syrian planes - mostly Russian-made MiG 23s, which hit Israeli

command centres and defensive positions. By 3PM, IDF Centurion tanks had mounted their

firing ramps, preparing to engage the densely packed Syrian armoured columns now heading

towards them. Three of the Syrian divisions - the 5th, 7th and 9th - moved forward along

the entire line, under the cover of a creeping barrage. From the start, however, the central

and northern divisions became disorganised in unfriendly terrain. Israeli tanks were

ready and waiting for them to come across the entire front, firing accurately from their

ramps at ranges up to 2000 metres. They concentrated withering fire on the gaps that Syrian mine

clearers had made in the minefields, and inflicted horrific casualties on the funnelled enemy.

Worthy of particular mention was the initial fighting for a vantage point known as ‘Booster

Ridge’, from which the IDF’s 188th Armoured Brigade fired down onto the plains below.

Burned out Syrian T-55s slowly began to litter the battlefield, which would become known

as the ‘Vale of Tears’. Despite inflicting heavy casualties, head

of Israeli Northern Command, Major General Hofi, realised that his outnumbered armour

could not hope to hold back all of Syria’s weight along the front by itself. So, he began

to reorganise and reinforce them, while Lieutenant Colonel Kahalani’s infantry companies occupied

blocking positions in the area of Booster Ridge. He was facing a numerically superior

force which outnumbered him 15:1. Meanwhile in the northernmost sector, Syrian

mountain commandos managed to breach and eventually capture Israeli-held Mount Hermon. A subsequent

attempt to retake the station failed with heavy losses, when the attackers fell into

a Syrian ambush. The mountain rangers who had ascended the mountain and captured the

post would occupy it for almost the remainder of the war. All along the line, IDF forces

were by now under immense pressure. In the south, by 5pm it was becoming increasingly

clear that Syria’s 5th infantry division was going to break through the Rafid Gap towards

Juhader. That part of the line eventually crumbled as survivors from the region’s

strong points concentrated on slowing the Syrian push north up the TAP road, a push

which if successful could roll up the entire Golan defensive line.

The Syrian 5th infantry continued to make progress after nightfall, fanning into three

columns. The northernmost advanced along the TAP line before pushing west to Yehudia and

the Arik Bridge, while the southernmost moved down the road from Rafid to El Al. The third

split off and drove west from Ramat Magshimim. At this point, the purple line had been totally

bypassed - four of the strongholds in the region of the breakthrough were evacuated

in time, while the other half was encircled and isolated. Throughout the night, the three

columns exploited the gains they had made, particularly in the centre. Those forces advancing

toward Ramat Magshimim were pushing so quickly that they would soon descend unopposed into

Israel’s heartland. Victory in the south, it seemed, was almost near.

In contrast to their successes in the south, Syrian forces in the north - who had a technological

advantage in the form of night vision - were met with ferocious resistance during the previous

night. At 10PM, the Syrian 7th infantry division had launched another heavy attack in the Vale

of Tears, but this was driven away after three hours of brutal close-quarters tank fighting.

Despite the weight of Syria’s numbers, by dawn they were stuck, trapped in the Vale,

and could not advance further. As the sun rose on October 7th, Syrian forces

in the south thought that they had won. In the north the view was far more grim - over

100 burned out, damaged or destroyed T-55s. This 15 kilometre wide, 3 kilometre deep patch

of land would be held by the Israelis, who suffered heavy casualties but knocked out

500 Syrian vehicles, including 300 tanks, losing only 100.

Wanting to take as much advantage as they could as quickly as possible, Syrian High

Command threw its armoured weight to the south, ordering reserves to bolster their armies

in the form of the 15th Mechanised Brigade and 3rd Armoured Division. Attempts by Israeli

air power to make a difference during the first days on the Golan Heights were swept

away, with heavy losses inflicted by Syrian SAM batteries. During two attempted airstrikes

in the centre of the line, for example, the IAF lost six out of eight planes. By the third

day of the war in the north, 23 Israeli planes had been destroyed.

During subsequent fierce fighting for the town of Nafekh - where the IDF had a base

- commander of southern Golan, Colonel Shoham was killed. Only the hastily rushed in 679th

Reserve Armoured Brigade, whose men had been civilians just hours before, blunted the Syrian

assaults and protected the line’s integrity. Realising that the situation in the north

was far more urgent than that in the Sinai, the IDF high command decided to prioritise

the Golan front, and began transferring new tank crews and additional units to the north

from the battle against Egypt. These units gradually started to trickle in starting on

the afternoon of October 7th. At that point, there was only a thin screen of Israeli forces,

commanded by Brigadier General Laner, between the Syrians and Galilee, and they were almost

completely backed up against the slopes. Nevertheless, they managed to fight off enemy attempts to

push them further, destroying 150 Syrian tanks in the process. The outcome of the war in

the north hung by a thread, but Syrian high command realised that they had to reorganise

before any further push, and ordered their forces to halt at 5PM. In the southernmost

sector, armoured Syrian elements and parts of the 5th infantry division halted on the

road to El Al - and the way was completely open.

It proved to be a catastrophic decision, allowing Israel’s reserves to amass. On the evening

of October 7th, the 146th Reserve Armoured Division moved up the El Al road and prepared

for battle. Only 36 hours after the war had begun, Israel was ready to launch a decisive

counterstrike. Israeli forces in the south counterattacked through October 8th and, despite

being struck by an enemy counterattack on the morning of October 9th, managed to push

the Syrians back to their starting positions a day later. By nightfall on the 10th, there

was not a single Syrian unit on territory west of the purple line. With this knowledge,

Israel’s cabinet had to decide whether to exploit its success against Syria or to concentrate

forces against Egypt. Eventually, they decided to advance towards Damascus, hopefully close

enough for long range artillery bombardment, but not enough to provoke Soviet intervention.

Major General Hofi didn’t intend to give the Syrians any time to recover, and began

to quickly plan his assault. It would be launched as a concentrated thrust in the northern area

of the front, which he correctly predicted would be less heavily defended than the south.

The thrust’s left flank and spearhead would rest on the slopes of Mount Hermon, while

the right was just north of Kuneitra. In the centre and south, Israeli armies would remain

on the defensive, so as to focus all offensive strength in one area.

The Syrians were now facing a reinvigorated enemy with their own badly mauled army. Moreover,

the IAF was gaining advantage by destroying parts of the anti-air umbrella. The consequence

was dire, enabling Israeli jets to inflict heavy strategic damage on Syrian infrastructure,

hampering the Soviet effort to resupply its Arab ally. Other allied military support however,

such as that from the Moroccans, Saudis, Iraqis and Jordanians, was being hurriedly assigned

to sections of the front, in order to delay the predicted Israeli attack.

Two Brigades held the sector which was to come under the main assault, one Syrian and

the other Moroccan, supported by 75 tanks. Built under Soviet supervision after 1967,

the Syrian defensive zone across the front was around 15km deep, with closely integrated

concrete bunkers and trenches. It was anchored on the right to Mount Hermon and on the left

to the impassable basalt rock field known as The Lajat.

The northern division under Brigadier Eitan’s command began its attack at 11AM on the 11th

of October under artillery cover, with the 7th Armoured Brigade as its spearhead. This

force struck northeast beside the foothills of Mount Hermon towards the settlements of

Hader and Mazrat Beit Jan. Advancing a few kilometres to the south were remnants of the

Barak Brigade - which had been mauled in the prior Syrian advance. It pushed east through

Jubat el-Hashab and neared the operationally valuable heights of Tel Shams.

By late afternoon, the 7th Armoured Brigade controlled the Hader crossroads and, on the

morning of October 12th, managed to swat away an armoured counterattack and resume its advance,

subsequently taking Mazrat Beit Jan after a six-hour long battle. The southernmost of

Eitan’s forces were making progress too, with the crucial Maatz crossroads being taken

at about the same time the 7th Armoured repelled the Syrian counterattack. An attack on the

heights of Tel Shams itself, by tanks under Yossi Ben Hannan, was repelled with heavy

losses after Syrian anti-tank fire knocked the commander out of his turret - he was only

rescued by paratroopers after darkness had fallen.

To the south of Eitan’s advance, Brigadier General Laner’s division - consisting of

the 9th, 17th and 679th Reserve Armoured Brigades - began its own attack on the 11th at 1PM

- two hours after their companions to the north. They advanced up the Kuneitra-Damascus

road, but ran into trouble due to Israeli overreliance on unsupported armour when it

encountered well coordinated Syrian defences. At the Khan Arnaba crossroads, the 17th Reserve

Armoured Brigade under Colonel Sarig came under a barrage of heavy artillery and anti-tank

fire. When tanks at the rear of the column left the road in an attempt to get out of

the way, they ran into minefields and suffered heavy losses. By the day’s end, the 17th

was down to a mere 5 tanks. Attempting to bypass the heavily defended crossroads, the

9th Armoured Brigade was ordered south through Jaba, but that night the units at Khan Arnaba

were briefly cut off by Syrian infantry, only to be saved by a battalion of Israeli paratroopers.

On the morning of October 12th, Laner launched a wide outflanking maneuver to the south through

Nasej and towards Knaker kanakir which would hopefully avoid the terrible lava-fields blocking

his armour’s path. His aim was to take Sasa from the south.

Laner himself was positioned at his headquarters at Tel Shaar - an elevated location which

allowed him to watch his division advance over the Syrian plain. From there, however,

he also noticed huge dust clouds being kicked up about 10 kilometres to the south. It was

clear to any experienced tanker that a major armoured formation was gearing up for action,

and it turned out that this formation was the Iraqi 3rd Armoured Division, two armoured

brigades and a mechanised brigade, totaling 180 tanks.

To counter this threat, Laner ordered the 679th Reserve Armoured Brigade to deploy south.

The 205th was deployed between Tel Maschara and Tel el Mal, while the 17th and 9th were

to return from Knaker and take up defensive positions facing south, at opposite ends of

a formation which would look like U-shape, with its points facing the Iraqis - it was

a lethal trap. At around 3am on October 13th, the Iraqi forces

advanced into the area between Maschara and Nasej, directly into the maw of Israel’s

armoured might - 200 tanks and 50 artillery pieces trained on them from three sides. As

light first dawned that day, devastating concentric fire from all sides of Laner’s so-called

‘open box’ formation utterly annihilated Iraqi’s 8th Mechanised Brigade within a

matter of minutes. 80 tanks were destroyed and the rest were sent reeling back in disarray,

while not a single unit of IDF armour was even struck. To take advantage of his flattening

of the Iraqi tanks, Laner then ordered his 9th Reserve Armoured Brigade to seize the

Tel Antar and Tel el-Alakieh hills throughout the 13th.

The next morning, a hesitantly deployed Jordanian 40th Armoured Brigade counterattacked after

crossing into Syria to help, but was repelled after losing 20 Centurion tanks in much the

same way as the Iraqis did. Nevertheless, the Israelis acknowledged that Jordanian armoured

units were far more technically sophisticated than their other enemies.

A series of attempted Arab counterattacks followed, but all of them were misconducted

or were cancelled before being launched. This, in combination with the IDF switching its

focus to the Sinai front, meant that a relative calm descended in the north beginning on the

17th. In that calm, Laner’s division was relieved in the salient by Moshe Peled, who

had been guarding the southern part of the front on the 1967 ceasefire line.

In the far north, Eitan’s units had managed to push doggedly forward despite increasing

Syrian resistance. Israel’s long-range M107 self-propelled artillery batteries began their

bombardment of a military airfield near Damascus on the night of October 13th, strikes which

would only intensify as the days went on. After a few days of stalemate, the Golan front’s

closing action was one designed to maneuver for position when the inevitable ceasefire

came into effect - the recapture of Mount Hermon, lost at the beginning of the war.

Men of the Golani Brigade, some in halftracks and others slogging up the slopes on foot,

managed to dislodge the entrenched Syrians by 1100 hours on the 22nd. At the same time,

paratroopers landed near the Syrian observation post at the summit, repulsed a Syrian heliborne

counterstrike, and then overran the station. Syria accepted a ceasefire proposed by the

UN on the evening of October 22nd, but low-intensity fighting would continue well into the next

year, as Israel refused to relinquish the Golan Heights. Finally, on May 31st 1974 the

two nations signed a peace agreement with Israel relinquishing a thin strip of territory

west of the purple line. Syria lost 3,100 dead and 6,000 wounded, while Israel’s losses

were around 772 dead and 453 wounded. Unfortunately, the wars in the region would continue.

We are planning to cover more modern conflicts both on Kings and Generals and our second

channel The Cold War – the link to which you can find in the description or in the

top right corner, so make sure you are subscribed to both. We would like to express our gratitude

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This is the Kings and Generals channel, and we will catch you on the next one.