In our first video covering the armies of the  Byzantine Empire, we outlined why and how the  

all-conquering legionary armies of Caesar  and Augustus transformed into the balanced,  

limited military of Justinian’s era. One of  the most symbolic qualities of the Byzantine  

military as it developed was the use of so-called  military manuals. Primarily aimed at preserving  

and proliferating sophisticated military  doctrine to army officers and commanders,  

these treatises played a formidable role  in retaining the Byzantine military as  

one of the most formidable, organised and  disciplined forces of war in the entire world  

despite Constantinople’s loss of hegemony.  Perhaps most notable among all military manuals  

is the main subject of today’s video, the large  compendium known as Maurice’s Strategikon.

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Clinical, analytical writing on the topics of  tactics and strategy are truly ancient in the  

Hellenic tradition, with the oldest surviving  work being that of Aeneas the Tactician,  

authored in the fourth century BC. His  work, and many more lost works besides,  

were followed by a slew of other pieces on  subjects as diverse as archery, proper use of  

siege machines, spies and secrecy, and every other  aspect of what might be called military science.  

By the late antique Byzantine era then, the  libraries of Constantinople and the eastern empire  

were stocked with a vast array of material to  which the Byzantines themselves continued to add.  

Notable among their pre-Strategikon  military works are those of Syrianos,  

Urbikios and a Justinianic era  writing whose author is not known.  

Some of them just repackage the contributions of  ancient authors, while others are suspiciously  

theoretical. The piece of instructive military  literature which can in no way be accused of being  

an armchair general’s inexperienced fantasy,  however, is the aforementioned Strategikon,  

perhaps the single most influential  handbook of war in all Byzantine history.

The first thing of note about this text  is that despite being known popularly as  

‘Maurice’s Strategikon’ it was not necessarily  written by the eponymous reformist emperor.  

Most historians concur that the Strategikon was  broadly penned in the rough half-century between  

575, when the Eastern Romans renewed hostilities  with Sassanid Persia, and 628, when the Sassanids  

were finally defeated after a long war. Using  information within the text which can be dated,  

such as battles, sieges and document convention  the time of authorship can be narrowed down even  

further to between 592 and 610 - late in the reign  of Maurice and into the following tenure of the  

usurper Phokas. Even though the Strategikon was  referred to definitively as being of ‘Maurice’,  

that was a common practice possibly implying that,  as emperor, Maurice instructed that it be made. It  

might even be that a prominent general or veteran,  such as the emperor’s brother-in-law Phillipicus,  

wrote the piece and then dedicated it to Maurice.  Equally, however, there are many personal touches  

and bits of literary flair which makes it  seem directly planned and written by Maurice.  

Whatever the answer to this mystery, we know  that the author was an experienced soldier,  

educated in ancient history and had commanded  troops on at least two fronts. He is intimately  

familiar with weaponry, armour, martial laws,  as well as the daily life of a soldier on the  

march and in camp. More telling is that he also  knows Byzantium’s enemies and how they fight.

Rather than tediously listing every single  book, chapter and point of the Strategikon from  

detailed battle formations to sieges, it is worth  considering the attitude shown by Maurice towards  

war and how that contrasts to the bold, warrior  ethos of Rome in earlier centuries. Appropriate  

to their diminished military position, war to  the Byzantines was not a means of demonstrating  

superiority or expanding, but the least  desirable way by which the empire could achieve  

its goals. Whereas earlier Roman Republican and  Imperial armies were notoriously bad at scouting,  

regarding the ambush and irregular fighting as  not a proper battle, Maurice’s pragmatic Byzantine  

army promoted by the Strategikon was precisely  the opposite. Costly all-in battles were to be  

avoided if at all possible, and trickery as well  as cunning employed at every opportunity. In that  

way, the Strategikon is very much fashioned in the  mould of Sun Tzu. So prominent are these aspects  

of war in the mind of the author that two out of  the twelve books making up the Strategikon - books  

IV and IX, cover the topics of ‘Ambushes’  and ‘Surprise Attacks’ in considerable depth.

Even the books not especially concerning  misdirection and deviousness, such as those  

detailing cavalry and Tagma formations, are laced  with advice on how to mask one's strength and  

deceive an enemy. In a section on the prescribed  depth of a Tagma formation, for example, the  

text advises that any reading officer or general  avoids arraying all of his forces for inspection  

in lines of an identical size. This was because  such a uniform deployment made it simple for enemy  

spies or scouts to quickly extrapolate the size  of the entire Byzantine field army by counting the  

size of one rank, and the number of ranks, rather  than having to trawl through the entire throng.  

Such advice is also given regarding the size  of deployed Byzantine cavalry units. This is  

a particularly illustrative example because it  shows starkly just how deadly a mistaken advance  

caused by bad intel could be. If a foe is  advancing with 4,000 cavalry, and their scouts,  

deceived by the Byzantines’ obfuscation tactics,  report 3,000 cavalry opposing them, that foe  

might decide to attack and only then would  realise they faced 5,000, and were outnumbered.

Another characteristic of the type of  warfare championed by the Strategikon  

is its extreme carefulness and balanced nature, a  theme which is clear throughout the entire text.  

‘A ship cannot cross the sea without a helmsman,  nor can one defeat an enemy without tactics and  

strategy’ begins Book VII - Strategy, and this  analytical approach to warfare is prominent in the  

entire piece. To engage in rash, albeit ‘glorious’  battle is the mark of a bad Byzantine general,  

and `’it is ridiculous to try to gain a victory  which is so costly and brings only empty glory.’ A  

keen sense of caution is also shown in the section  concerning war against unfamiliar foes. ‘If we  

find ourselves at war with a powerful people and  one whose ways are strange to us, and the army,  

not knowing what to expect becomes nervous, then  we must be very careful to avoid getting into  

an open battle with them right away’ This kind of  approach brings to mind the approach of Achaemenid  

king Darius the Great recorded at Behistun  - ‘First I will think, and then I will act.’

Even in the face of defeat and humiliation, this  practical and cautionary approach to warfare  

dominates. Adroitly acknowledging the often overly  superstitious and religious nature of common  

soldiers, the author recommends that a general  does not immediately attack again right after  

he is defeated, even if the general understands  why the defeat occurred. The soldiers, he says,  

are likely to view the loss as God’s will and  therefore have their morale devastated. In such  

a situation, the Byzantines are to unashamedly  leverage their equally powerful weapons to gain  

some kind of benefit. If emissaries are  sent by a victorious enemy for terms,  

and those terms are reasonable and easily  accomplished, then they should be enacted  

without hesitation to conclude the fighting.  But, Maurice relates, such conversations ought  

to be kept private from the rank and file  soldier unless it is an absolute emergency.

A nitpicky but important consideration is  also made in this sense when the author  

speaks concerning the polishing of weapons  and armour, something that the majority  

of people would never even think about. But  the point isn’t to keep equipment polished,  

but to conceal it on the march so that the army  can’t be picked out easily by enemy scouts,  

who might see the sun reflecting from  the point of a lance, or a ring of mail.

It would be easy to also list the 101 maxims  listed by the Strategikon for use by any reader  

who might find himself commanding an army on  campaign, but that is not necessary. These  

range from such personal matters as exercising  mental self control and balance at all times,  

to operational considerations such  as maneuvering with the cover of sun,  

wind and dust to their advantage of one’s  army, and the detriment of the enemy’s.

Compared to the other militaries of its age,  especially in the later part of the first  

millennium, that of the Byzantines is regarded  as professional and almost futuristic by the  

standards of the time. The Strategikon has a  section dedicated entirely to what we in the  

21st century might call intelligence-gathering  and counterintelligence operations, and how enemy  

attempts to gather information about imperial  forces might be diminished or stopped entirely.  

Men who are chosen to be the army’s spies, the  text states, ‘should be reliable, they should look  

very manly and be a cut above the other soldiers  in physical appearance, morale and equipment,  

so they may project a noble image in confronting  the enemy and if captured, make a good impression  

on him’. These enterprising, ancient 007s  were, then, expected to serve as paragons  

and representatives of the emperor’s armies -  formidable and intimidating even if captured,  

capable of influencing the enemy into doubt by  their robust demeanor. More broadly, scouting  

and patrol parties, mounted on swift horses and  clad in light armour were to be dispatched in  

quantities depending on the situation. When the  enemy force was at a distance, scouts should  

only be sent out when specific information is  necessary, such as the nature of roads, the  

properties of a nearby fortification, and other  such things. However, when the enemy army is near,  

the entire area surrounding the imperial army  should be swarming with scouts, instructed and  

able to take prisoners for interrogation if  discovered. So crucial was this duty that the  

Strategikon’s author recommended that patrols be  regularly inspected by capable officers. Any among  

the reconnaissance parties found to be negligent  ‘should be punished for seriously endangering the  

whole army’. It is worth noting that this is  one of the only occasions in which the author  

attributes such grave responsibility to soldiers,  further emphasizing the importance of scouting.  

The text later goes on to detail a trick or  scheme which can be used to capture enemy  

spies roaming around busy Byzantine encampments.  Every few hours, a trumpet could be sounded at  

which the soldiers, informed beforehand must  immediately return to their own assigned tents  

or face punishment. Naturally, the enemy spy  would either be captured for being outside alone  

or, if he entered one of the tents, be recognised  as a stranger and arrested by the squad inside.

It might be said of the Strategikon, based on its  general nature and emphasized content, that it  

describes the final formalisation and readjustment  of a Late Roman Army into its typically Byzantine  

form. As we introduced last episode with  Procopius’ prominent display of mounted  

archery in his History of the Wars, Maurice or  whichever imperial servant wrote the Strategikon  

emphasized first and foremost the training  and drill of archers, both mounted and foot.  

If the text was followed in future  generations, which it seems to have been,  

every single ‘Roman’ man up until the age  of forty, and perhaps even beyond, would’ve  

been required to possess a bow and a quiver.  Swords, lances, spears and other instruments  

of melee combat are, in comparison, barely even  mentioned. Those men who are ‘unskilled’ in  

archery were to be given a light bow, so that  they could practice this ‘essential’ skill.  

Interestingly, the book also contains even  further evidence that this transformation  

of the Byzantine army was heavily driven by  contact with nomadic nations from the steppe,  

partly because Maurice saw the sheer efficiency of  their way and means of war, or in order to counter  

steppe cavalry armies who were bearing down on  the empire at the time. Such ‘Hunnish’ peoples  

included the Gokturks and the Avars, which  are grouped with all nomads as ‘Scythians’.

The ‘scoundrel’ Avars, as Maurice describes  them, are particularly important in the realm  

of Byzantine equipment and materiel. Throughout  the entire piece, the reader is advised to supply  

items of the ‘Avar type’, such as tunics cut in  the Avar manner, round and spacy Avar-style tents,  

Avar-inspired cavalry lances and even Avar  scarves made of linen on the outside and  

wool on the inside. This, much like with the  adoption of the gladius, shows just how eager the  

Romans always were to draw in aspects of other,  hostile civilisations for their own benefit.  

Furthermore, the chapter on ambushes contain small  tips on how to perform complex surprise attacks  

in the Hephthalite and ‘Scythian’ manner. The  so-called ‘Scythian Ambush’ essentially describes  

the infamous feigned flight, a tactic so common  among mounted nomadic tribes. Maurice recognises  

this frequency of use, justifiably pointing out  that ‘The Scythian peoples do this all the time’.

Among other terms, the post-Maurice  Byzantine army described and brought  

about by the doctrines of the Strategikon  might be described as calculating, pragmatic  

and limited in its action. There was very little  of the heroic, glorious flair of battle remaining,  

just a relentless desire to gain victory by any  means necessary and to, through that victory,  

enhance the prospects of the Byzantine Empire.  Among the myriad of military manuals in the  

Hellenic tradition, the Strategikon is  particularly important because of its  

profound influence on later generations. In its  general form, the military of Constantinople  

would remain moulded by this most weighty  of texts for almost half a millennium,  

even inspiring a slew of updated editions from  later authors of similar texts. Approximately  

three centuries after Maurice’s overthrow  and death, for example, Byzantine emperor  

Leo VI ‘the wise’, who was a prodigious author on  many topics, penned or sponsored the penning of a  

famous military treatise known as Taktika. This  particular text is essentially a carbon copy of  

the Strategikon in style, if not in content, even  quoting the earlier text verbatim in many areas.

Had the Strategikon been  written half a century later,  

we might think there would be a key characteristic  missing. In the book’s later sections, there is a  

fascinating segment detailing the various enemies  which might be confronted by imperial armies.  

Included in this roster are Lombards, as  well as other Germanic peoples, the Persians,  

Slavs and others. The insignificant and peripheral  Arabs, meanwhile, were barely worth a mention.  

Next time in our series on the Byzantine armies,  we will examine how the empire responded to the  

crippling blows inflicted by an ascendant Muslim  caliphate, and particularly the notorious theme  

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