The fast attack craft-missiles, a.k.a missile boats, are generally preferred for use in

littoral waters. The Hayabusa-class boats of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force,

shortly JMSDF, are an exception. These small surface combatants are one of the best examples

of how important missile boats can fulfil in modern blue-water navies. As the Weapon

Detective, we are investigating what the Hayabusa-class tell us.

Please don't forget to subscribe to our channel, before we start and give us a thumbs up if

you like our video. Before starting our analysis, let's take a

look at the history and technical features of the Hayabusa-class.

The JMSDF's interest in missile boats dates back to the 1970s to replace its obsolete

torpedo boat fleet. Deciding to build three missile boats in those years, Japan also started

studies on a hydrofoil boat. However, after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the

members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries decided an oil embargo

against some countries including Japan. Therefore, the Japanese economy suffered a

crisis. For this reason, there was a serious delay

in the programme and the JMSDF was able to commission the first missile boat only in

1993. It was originally planned to build six hydrofoil type boats called the PG 1-go-class.

However, the programme had yet the under delay again, because of budgetary savings caused

by Japan's contribution to the 1991 Gulf War. During this period, it was observed that the

seaworthiness and hull strength of the PG 1-go-class were insufficient. Also, as a problem

peculiar to hydrofoil design, these boats could be operated efficiently either high

speed or low speed, which made the PG 1-go-class difficult to operate in the medium speed range.

Therefore, Japan cancelled the building of the last three boats and decided to work on

an improved hydrofoil design. Initially, it was planned to equip the new

enlarged boats with two engines providing a maximum speed of 40 knots.

But, after an incident off the Noto Peninsula involving a North Korea spy ship, the required

speed was raised to 44 knots. Based on this requirement the number of main

engines installed was also increased to three. Due to the layout, it became difficult to

adopt the hydrofoil type. So Japan started to work on a conventional

design. JS Hayabusa, the first boat to give its name

to the class, was commissioned in 2002. A total of six boats have been built of this

class. The new missile boats called the Hayabusa-class,

have a deep V-type hybrid hull to prevent the bow from rising. The hull is made of aluminium

alloy. The bridge has a two-layer structure which

is reinforced by bulletproof plates made of flame-retardant composite materials.

The living and working areas concentrates near the centre of gravity of the ship near

the bridge structure. This design helps to reduce pitching.

Each part of the hull is sloped so that it does not directly reflect the radar wave.

The mast also has a shape that ensures the stealth of the tripod structure.

The 76mm gun on the front deck has a low radar cross-section too.

Also, the protective material for the handrails on the port side and the water jet nozzle

is not made of normal cylindrical material but is made of a rhombic cross-section like

the mast. These boats are equipped with a satellite

communication system and an infrared night vision equipment.

Managed by a crew of 21, the Hayabusa-class boats have a length of 50.1 meters, a beam

of 8.4 meters, and a draft of 1.7 meters. The standard displacement is 200 tons, while

the fully-loaded displacement is 240 tons. Three 5,400 horsepower General Electric LM500-G07

gas turbines can provide the boat with a maximum speed of 44 knots. The Hayabusa-class is equipped

with one 76mm Oto Melara Super Rapido gun as well as four locally developed SSM-1B anti-ship

missiles. Besides, these boats have two 12.7mm machine guns. The 76mm gun is directed by

the FCS-2-31C fire control system. The Hayabusa-class is equipped with the OPS-18-3 surface search

and the OPS-20 navigation radars. The boats also have two Mk 36 SRBOC decoy launchers

and NOLR-9B electronic support measure system. Thanks to its pump-jets, the Hayabusa-class

has high performance in shallow waters. The Super Rapido can fire 135 rounds per minute.

However, it has been tested that using the gun with such a high rate of fire decreases

the barrel life sharply. So Oto Melara advised that the maximum safe rate of fire speed for

the gun should not exceed 120 round per minute. The Super Rapido is controlled from the CIC

via console. The gun, which has an effective range of 20,000

meters against surface targets, is also very effective against air targets.

The SSM-1B, also known as the Type 90, has a range of 150 kilometres and a 260-kilogram

high explosive warhead. The launching is carried out with a solid fuel booster rocket engine.

The TJM2 turbojet engine used in flight enables the missile to cruise at a speed of 1,150

kilometres per hour. The SSM-1B, which uses inertial guidance system during the cruise,

activates active radar guidance system in the terminal phase for the final attack.

The OPS-13 2D surface search radar operates in C-band and can display up to 10 targets

simultaneously. The FCS-2-31C fire control system can detect

a target with a radar cross-section of 1 square meter at a range of 30,000 meters and an altitude

of 15,000 meters. It operates in X-band.

Now that we have looked at the characteristics of the Hayabusa-class, it will be useful to

look at the approach of NATO countries' navies to missile boats for a better analysis of

it. These platforms are not considered as important

in Western countries as in the East. NATO's main naval strategy is geared towards

control of the open seas. In order to control of the littoral water,

aircraft have replaced missile boats since while.

Greece and Turkey, the only two NATO countries, although having more than 10 major surface

combatants also use the missile boats. This type of platforms is still used by Bulgaria,

Norway, and Romania. But these countries define their ships as corvettes, not missile boats.

Croatia and Poland are other NATO countries that still have missile boats.

Due to the different perceptions of maritime security, things are different in the Far

East than in Europe. Although South Korea and Japan are similar

to Western countries in terms of technology, they continue to use missile boats alongside

many major surface combatants. When we start to talk specifically about Japan,

maritime security perceptions and historical heritage reveal themselves as two important

points. First of all, if we touch the historical heritage;

In the second half of the 19th century, Japan, which launched a programme to have a modern

navy, started to be interested in the Jeune École by following the fashion of the time

in the 1880s. Jeune École, in other words young school,

doctrine depends on small and fast surface combatants, especially cruisers and torpedo

boats versus bigger units. At that time, The Meiji government which found

this doctrine suitable for its own security perceptions decided to build 48 warships,

of which 22 were to be torpedo boats. This was a suitable model for Japan with limited

resources. The correctness of this decision proved itself

during the 1905 Battle of Tsushima. In the night battle on May 27, 1905, Japanese

torpedo boats and destroyers managed to sink two battleships and two armoured cruisers

of the Imperial Russian Navy. In light of this success, the Japanese have

established a tradition of using small boats in narrow waters.

Besides, Japan has a different perception of maritime security than NATO's member states

with major surface combatant fleets, due to its geographical location.

The Russian Northern Fleet must travel a long distance from Murmansk to the North Sea.

For this reason, NATO warships must have a long-range to patrol on this wide area and

monitor the Russian ships. The requirement of long-endurance naturally requires ships

to increase in size. However, in the Pacific, Chinese, North Korean,

and Russian ships may reach a position that could threaten Japan soon after leaving their

home bases. So, the JMSDF needs ships that can quickly monitor the naval elements that

may pose a threat. Continuous patrolling with major surface combatants

for this task is costly. Also, large ships have a high reaction time

because they are not as fast as missile boats. The maritime patrol aircraft cannot operate

long time in the region as much as boats. Their high speed is too much for such monitoring.

Therefore, although their unit costs are lower, the use of maritime patrol aircraft in this

mission is not cost-effective. On the other hand, these six boats can be

directed towards Chinese, North Korean, and Russian ships in different locations in a

short time. This is cheaper than using six large ships

for the same mission. Another factor is, for example, deploying

a small-size vessel to monitor a ship leaving Vladivostok seems less aggressive than sending

a destroyer. In this way, Japan has managed to keep the

risk of experiencing tension with its neighbours to a minimum until today.

Also, Hayabusa-class, thanks to its speed of 44 knots, is more successful than large

ships in monitoring and intercepting North Korean spy boats.

The operational use of these boats to date also supports the arguments we mentioned.

If we talk about some significant example, on June 19, 2015, in cooperation with a Japanese

P-3 Orion aircraft, JS Wakataka, one of this class, detected and monitored the Russian

Navy destroyers RFS Admiral Vinogradov and RFS Marshal Shaposhnikov at the 100 kilometres

west-northwest of the Cape Sōya. The same boat detected and monitored a Chinese

Navy task force near the Aomori Prefecture in February 2016.

In June of the same year, in one day, near the Sōya Strait, JS Wakataka detected and

monitored separately an Akula-class nuclear attack submarine, one Udaloy-class and one

Sovremennyy-class destroyers, four Tarantul-class, three Nanuchka-class, two Grisha-class corvettes,

and a Boris Chilikin-class fleet oiler. Similarly, on November 4, 2015, JS Otaka detected

and monitored the Slava-class cruiser RFS Varyag, Sovremennyy-class destroyer RFS Bystryy,

and Boris Chilikin-class fleet oiler RFS Boris Butoma of the Russian Navy, 75 kilometres

northeast of Kamitsushima Town. A year later, the boat detected and followed

three landing ships advancing in the same area accompanied by the Udaloy-class destroyer

RFS Admiral Panteleyev. Many more patrol and monitoring missions performed

by other boats of the class, JS Hayabusa, JS Kumataka, JS Umitaka, and JS Shiritaka,

can be added to these examples. Despite these successes, In 2018, to replace

the Hayabusa-class, the Japanese Government has approved the construction of four 3,900-ton

frigates and the development of a new patrol boat.

However, this approval is not meaning the end of these vessels. The Philippines is known

to want to procure the Hayabusa-class boats that will be decommissioned in the future.

The Hayabusa-class has played an important role in the detection and monitoring of naval

elements that could pose a threat to the Japanese islands for many years. These boots are indications

that the Jeune École doctrine, which has lost its popularity for large navies today,

is still important. Our analysis as the Weapon Detective that it would be a premature decision

for the JMSDF to give up on them now. The missile boats will continue to take on important

tasks in these days as the Second Cold War rises.

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