Previously we covered the Wehrmacht's defeat in Stalingrad.

It was very costly in terms of the soldiers, material and morale, and also threatened the

positions of the German Army along the Eastern front of the WWII.

Liberation of Kursk, Rostov and Kharkiv by the Red Army in the February of 1943 put further

pressure on the German army and it was time to counter-attack to regain the initiative.

In February 1943 the German Field Marshall Mannstein got the approval of Hitler to launch

a counter-offensive on the Southern Front.

On Feb 21 the 4th Panzer Army started the offensive and reoccupied Kharkiv and Belgorod.

The Red Army fell back to Kursk and soon after that, military action stopped due to Spring

mud season known as Rasputitsa preventing the movement of armour and infantry.

On 15 April Hitler ordered the Operation Zitadelle (Citadel), which targeted encirclement of

5 Soviet armies in the Kursk area from the North and the South.

General Model’s 9th Army would attack from the North to connect with the 4th Panzer Army

of Hoth and Army Detachment Kempf under Werner Kempf, which would attack from the South.

These groups were supposed to meet in the East of Kursk with an aim to encircle the

Red Army defending it.

There was a significant disagreement among the German military leadership and Hitler

about the potential of the Operation Citadel.

Some were proposing to abandon the operation and prepare for strategic defense and wait

for a chance to pierce through weaker parts of the Soviet front in counter attacks, which

suited the German strength in mobile tank warfare much more.

Others indicated that, if Operation Citadel was to proceed, it must start as soon as possible,

since there was information that, the Soviets were actively building defensive constructions

around Kursk.

Despite the initial plan to start the offensive in May, Hitler decided to postpone it until

arrival of new tanks to the front.

As a result, the offensive started two months later than the initially planned date.

The Soviets possessed intelligence indicating that, the German Army was preparing for a

major offensive.

Zhukov persuaded Stalin to wait for the German offensive instead of striking first, wear

them out, knock out as many tanks as possible and then use the first chance for a decisive

counter-offensive.

So the Soviets proceeded in building construction of defense structures, fortifications, minefields

and anti-tank obstacles.

The Voronezh Front under Nikolai Vatutin was to defend the South of the Kursk salient,

while the North was to be defended by the Central Front under Konstantin Rokossovsky.

There was also the Steppe Front waiting in reserve commanded by Ivan Konev.

In preparation for the German offensive the Soviets employed partisan tactics behind German

lines to disrupt supplies and communication of the German armies.

This proved to be successful, since partisans were able to destroy 298 locomotives, 1222

railway wagons and 44 bridges, which delayed the German offensive.

In total Germans had up to 780.000 men and around 3000 tanks available for the Kursk

offensive, while the Red Army possessed up to 2 million men and over 5000 tanks.

The manpower and armour advantage for the Soviets was overwhelming.

The preliminary engagements started on 4 July 1943, when the German infantry started the

offensive in the South and proceeded to penetrate the first line of the Soviet defenses.

This was followed by the Panzer attack by the panzergrenadier division Grossdeutschland,

which succeeded in capturing of Butovo village and Gerstovka despite heavy losses due to

fierce Soviet resistance and minefields. 36 Panzer tanks were immobilized due to mines

just in one episode on the left flank of the attack.

Grossdeutschland reached Mikhailovka on the left and Tirechnoe on the right.

This created a wedge in the first line of the Soviet defence.

To the east the II SS Panzer Corps managed to break through the first line of defence,

but the Red Army resistance and inabilitity of the 3rd SS Division to advance together

with the rest of the II SS Panzer Corps, stopped the advance short of breaching the second

defence line and exposed the right flank of the offensive to the Soviet troops.

Parts of the Army Detachment Kempf succeeded in forcing the River Donets and advancing

up to 10 kilometers in parts of the front.

But again, Soviet resistance, defensive constructions, disadvantageous terrain halted the overall

progress of the Wehrmacht and they fell short of breaching the second line of Soviet defence.

Up North the 47th Panzer Corps started the advance on July 5.

Red Army’s 15th Rifle division, minefields and strong fortifications slowed the German

advance.

Information from an interrogated POW assured Germans that, there was a weak part in the

Soviet defenses and the Tiger tanks were sent there.

90 T34 tanks were sent by the Soviets to confront the Tiger tanks, but after a 3 hour battle

the Soviets lost 40 tanks, while Germans lost only 7.

But the lost time allowed the Soviets to seal the weak part of the defense.

The fierce resistance by the Soviets and defense fortifications allowed Germans only a minor

advance of 10 kilometres.

6 July saw back and forth action.

Initially the Soviet 16th Tank Corps went on a counter-offensive, and faced by the 505th

Heavy Tank Batallion of the Wehrmacht.

The Soviets had to retreat after losing 69 tanks.

Later that day, the Germans tried to break Soviet defence in Okhlovatka and Ponyri, but

the Red Army stood firm.

Over the next three days, the German army continued its attack on strategically important

Okhlovatka and Ponyri.

The Soviets reinforced the defence in those areas too.

By July 10 after heavy house-to-house fighting Germans were able to capture most of Ponyri,

but were not able to penetrate the Soviet defence in Okhlovatka.

Still the Soviets were suffering heavy losses in attempts to halt German advance.

As a consequence forces of the reserve of the Steppe Front were sent to reinforce the

defence against the XLVIII Panzer Corps, which was one defensive belt away from breaking

through to the Soviet unfortified rear.

The 5th Guards, 2nd Guards, 2nd and 10th Tank Corps of the Soviet Army were ordered to move

towards Korocha, 40 kilometres Southeast to Prokhorovka to confront the II SS Panzer Corps

on 8 July.

The Soviet counter-offensive ended in a failure due to poor coordination.

50 Soviet tanks were destroyed by Luftwaffe, which was the first time in history, when

the whole tank formation was destroyed by airstrikes alone.

This counter-offensive slowed down the German advance, but by 11 July Army Detachment Kempf

managed to break through while the II SS Panzer Corps was order to move towards Prokhorovka.

German success here would potentially mean encirclement of the Soviet forces protecting

Kursk.

The Germans had 294 tanks, while 616 were in disposal of the Red Army for the battle

of Prokhorovka.

On 12 July about 500 tanks and self-propelled guns of the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army started

its attack on the II SS-Panzer Corps.

430 of them were in the first echelon and 70 in the second.

They attack the positions of the Liebstandarte division.

1st SS-Panzer Regiment were sent to confront them.

Here they faced Soviet tanks of the 31st and 32nd Tank Brigades of the 29th Tank Corps'

and a tank battle started.

The tactic of the Soviet tank commander Rotmistrov to close in and fire at high speed negatively

affected the coordination and accuracy of the Soviet tanks.

After 3 hour battle the 1st SS Panzer regiment reported destruction of as many as 62 Soviet

tanks and repulsed their attack.

Nevertheless, later in the afternoon of that day tanks from the 31st Tank Brigade and the

53rd Motorized Brigade defeated elements of the 1st SS-Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion

and reached Komsomolets State Farm, which put the Leibstandarte's communication lines

and overall operations in grave danger.

Four Tiger tanks engaged in battle with the Soviet’s 181 Tank Brigade in attempt to

protect the left flank of Liebstandarte.

They successfully repelled the Soviet attack, inflicted heavy losses and managed to stay

unharmed in this skirmish.

After that elements of the Soviet 170th Tank Brigade attacked the 1st SS-Panzer Regiment,

which was already engaged with the 31st and 32nd Tank Brigades.

Despite losing its commander and about 30 tanks in the fight the 170th Tank Brigade

pushed the 1st SS-Panzer Regiment and reached the position of the 1st SS-Panzer Reconnaissance

Battalion.

Soon the 170th and 181st Tank Brigades breached the German line connecting Totenkopf and Leibstandarte,

but were eventually pushed back to the village of Andreevka.

Towards the end of the day Liebestandarte fell back from the Oktyabrskiy State Farm

due to heavy Soviet attack.

Soviets suffered heavy tank losses in the battle of Prokhorovka.

The estimates of permanently or temporarily damaged tanks were between 330 and 650, while

the Germans lost 60-80 tanks.

There is a staggering difference in this biggest tank battle in the history of the military

and it might look like Wehrmacht gained from it.

But despite heavy losses the Soviets were able to stall the German advance, significantly

drain its resources and create ground for a successful counter-offensive.

Battle of Prokhorovka, along with the Allied invasion of Sicily led to abandoning of Operation

Citadel and offensive operations and Germans went to defensive.

To the North of Kursk Soviets launched the Operation Kutuzov on 12 July.

As a result the German Army Group Center was pushed back by the Bryansk Front and by the

Western Front.

It was followed by the Operation Rumyantsev conducted by the Voronezh Front and Steppe

Front in attempt to destroy the 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf, and cut off

the extended southern portion of Army Group South from the rest of the German Army.

Soviets liberated Belgorod on 5 August and Kharkiv on 23 August.

The battle of Kursk was the first instance of Wehrmacht being unable to make a significant

breakthrough in its offensive in the Eastern Front.

Despite, relatively successful start by the Germans, the vast manpower resources and increasing

military-industrial potential of the Soviets proved to be too much for the German Army.

Despite heavy losses the Red Army was able to push back and liberate some of its territories.

Emerging problems in Italy forced Hitler to further weaken his troops in the Eastern Front

and transfer some of them to the Western Front.

The noose was getting tighter…

Thanks for watching our documentary on the battle of Prokhorovka and the Kursk operation.

We are going to continue our series on the modern conflicts.

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