Soviet Union on the limitation of the anti-ballistic missile systems used in
Soviet Union on the limitation of the anti-ballistic missile systems used in

defending areas against ballistic missile-delivered nuclear weapons. Under
defending areas against ballistic missile-delivered nuclear weapons. Under

the terms of the treaty, each party was limited to two ABM complexes, each of
the terms of the treaty, each party was limited to two ABM complexes, each of

which was to be limited to 100 anti-ballistic missiles.
which was to be limited to 100 anti-ballistic missiles.

Signed in 1972, it was in force for the next 30 years. Following the dissolution
Signed in 1972, it was in force for the next 30 years. Following the dissolution

of the Soviet Union, in 1997 the United States and four former Soviet republics
of the Soviet Union, in 1997 the United States and four former Soviet republics

agreed to succeed to the treaty. In June 2002 the United States withdrew from the
agreed to succeed to the treaty. In June 2002 the United States withdrew from the

treaty, leading to its termination. Background
treaty, leading to its termination. Background

Throughout the late 1950s and into the 1960s, the United States and the Soviet
Throughout the late 1950s and into the 1960s, the United States and the Soviet

Union had been developing missile systems with the ability to shoot down
Union had been developing missile systems with the ability to shoot down

incoming ICBM warheads. During this period, the US considered the defense of
incoming ICBM warheads. During this period, the US considered the defense of

the US as part of reducing the overall damage inflicted in a full nuclear
the US as part of reducing the overall damage inflicted in a full nuclear

exchange. As part of this defense, Canada and the US established the North
exchange. As part of this defense, Canada and the US established the North

American Air Defense Command. By the early 1950s, US research on the
American Air Defense Command. By the early 1950s, US research on the

Nike Zeus missile system had developed to the point where small improvements
Nike Zeus missile system had developed to the point where small improvements

would allow it to be used as the basis of an operational ABM system. Work
would allow it to be used as the basis of an operational ABM system. Work

started on a short-range, high-speed counterpart known as Sprint to provide
started on a short-range, high-speed counterpart known as Sprint to provide

defense for the ABM sites themselves. By the mid-1960s, both systems showed
defense for the ABM sites themselves. By the mid-1960s, both systems showed

enough promise to start development of base selection for a limited ABM system
enough promise to start development of base selection for a limited ABM system

dubbed Sentinel. In 1967, the US announced that Sentinel itself would be
dubbed Sentinel. In 1967, the US announced that Sentinel itself would be

scaled down to the smaller and less expensive Safeguard. Soviet doctrine
scaled down to the smaller and less expensive Safeguard. Soviet doctrine

called for development of its own ABM system and return to strategic parity
called for development of its own ABM system and return to strategic parity

with the US. This was achieved with the operational deployment of the A-35 ABM
with the US. This was achieved with the operational deployment of the A-35 ABM

system and its successors, which remain operational to this day.
system and its successors, which remain operational to this day.

The development of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle
The development of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle

systems allowed a single ICBM to deliver as many as ten separate warheads at a
systems allowed a single ICBM to deliver as many as ten separate warheads at a

time. An ABM defense system could be overwhelmed with the sheer number of
time. An ABM defense system could be overwhelmed with the sheer number of

warheads. Upgrading it to counter the additional warheads would be
warheads. Upgrading it to counter the additional warheads would be

economically unfeasible: The defenders required one rocket per incoming
economically unfeasible: The defenders required one rocket per incoming

warhead, whereas the attackers could place 10 warheads on a single missile at
warhead, whereas the attackers could place 10 warheads on a single missile at

a reasonable cost. To further protect against ABM systems, the Soviet MIRV
a reasonable cost. To further protect against ABM systems, the Soviet MIRV

missiles were equipped with decoys; R-36M heavy missiles carried as many as
missiles were equipped with decoys; R-36M heavy missiles carried as many as

40. These decoys would appear as warheads to an ABM, effectively
40. These decoys would appear as warheads to an ABM, effectively

requiring engagement of five times as many targets and rendering defense even
requiring engagement of five times as many targets and rendering defense even

less effective. ABM Treaty
less effective. ABM Treaty

The United States first proposed an anti-ballistic missile treaty at the
The United States first proposed an anti-ballistic missile treaty at the

1967 Glassboro Summit Conference during discussions between U.S. Secretary of
1967 Glassboro Summit Conference during discussions between U.S. Secretary of

Defense Robert McNamara and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet
Defense Robert McNamara and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet

Union Alexei Kosygin. McNamara argued both that ballistic missile defense
Union Alexei Kosygin. McNamara argued both that ballistic missile defense

could provoke an arms race, and that it might provoke a first-strike against the
could provoke an arms race, and that it might provoke a first-strike against the

nation fielding the defense. Kosygin rejected this reasoning. Following the
nation fielding the defense. Kosygin rejected this reasoning. Following the

proposal of the Sentinel and Safeguard decisions on American ABM systems, the
proposal of the Sentinel and Safeguard decisions on American ABM systems, the

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks began in November 1969. By 1972 an agreement had
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks began in November 1969. By 1972 an agreement had

been reached to limit strategic defensive systems. Each country was
been reached to limit strategic defensive systems. Each country was

allowed two sites at which it could base a defensive system, one for the capital
allowed two sites at which it could base a defensive system, one for the capital

and one for ICBM silos. The treaty was signed during the 1972
and one for ICBM silos. The treaty was signed during the 1972

Moscow Summit on May 26 by the President of the United States, Richard Nixon and
Moscow Summit on May 26 by the President of the United States, Richard Nixon and

the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid
the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid

Brezhnev; and ratified by the US Senate on August 3, 1972.
Brezhnev; and ratified by the US Senate on August 3, 1972.

The 1974 Protocol reduced the number of sites to one per party, largely because
The 1974 Protocol reduced the number of sites to one per party, largely because

neither country had developed a second site. The sites were Moscow for the USSR
neither country had developed a second site. The sites were Moscow for the USSR

and the North Dakota Safeguard Complex for the US, which was already under
and the North Dakota Safeguard Complex for the US, which was already under

construction. = Missiles limited by the treaty =
construction. = Missiles limited by the treaty =

The Treaty limited only ABMs capable of defending against "strategic ballistic
The Treaty limited only ABMs capable of defending against "strategic ballistic

missiles", without attempting to define "strategic". It was understood that both
missiles", without attempting to define "strategic". It was understood that both

ICBMs and SLBMs are obviously "strategic". Both countries did not
ICBMs and SLBMs are obviously "strategic". Both countries did not

intend to stop the development of counter-tactical ABMs. The topic became
intend to stop the development of counter-tactical ABMs. The topic became

disputable as soon as most potent counter-tactical ABMs started to be
disputable as soon as most potent counter-tactical ABMs started to be

capable of shooting down SLBMs, nevertheless both sides continued
capable of shooting down SLBMs, nevertheless both sides continued

counter-tactical ABM development. After the SDI announcement
counter-tactical ABM development. After the SDI announcement

On March 23, 1983 Ronald Reagan announced the Strategic Defense
On March 23, 1983 Ronald Reagan announced the Strategic Defense

Initiative, a research program into ballistic missile defense which would
Initiative, a research program into ballistic missile defense which would

be, "consistent with our obligations under the ABM Treaty". The project was a
be, "consistent with our obligations under the ABM Treaty". The project was a

blow to Yuri Andropov's so-called "peace offensive". Andropov said that "It is
blow to Yuri Andropov's so-called "peace offensive". Andropov said that "It is

time they [Washington] stopped... search[ing] for the best ways of
time they [Washington] stopped... search[ing] for the best ways of

unleashing nuclear war... Engaging in this is not just irresponsible. It is
unleashing nuclear war... Engaging in this is not just irresponsible. It is

insane". Regardless of the opposition, Reagan
insane". Regardless of the opposition, Reagan

gave every indication that SDI would not be used as a bargaining chip and that
gave every indication that SDI would not be used as a bargaining chip and that

the United States would do all in its power to build the system. The Soviets
the United States would do all in its power to build the system. The Soviets

were threatened because the Americans might have been able to make a nuclear
were threatened because the Americans might have been able to make a nuclear

first strike possible. In The Nuclear Predicament, Beckman claims that one of
first strike possible. In The Nuclear Predicament, Beckman claims that one of

the central goals of Soviet diplomacy was to terminate SDI. A surprise attack
the central goals of Soviet diplomacy was to terminate SDI. A surprise attack

from the Americans would destroy much of the Soviet ICBM fleet, allowing SDI to
from the Americans would destroy much of the Soviet ICBM fleet, allowing SDI to

defeat a “ragged” Soviet retaliatory response. Furthermore, if the Soviets
defeat a “ragged” Soviet retaliatory response. Furthermore, if the Soviets

chose to enter this new arms race, they would further cripple their economy. The
chose to enter this new arms race, they would further cripple their economy. The

Soviets could not afford to ignore Reagan’s new endeavor, therefore their
Soviets could not afford to ignore Reagan’s new endeavor, therefore their

policy at the time was to enter negotiations with the Americans. By
policy at the time was to enter negotiations with the Americans. By

1987, however, the USSR withdrew its opposition, concluding the SDI posed no
1987, however, the USSR withdrew its opposition, concluding the SDI posed no

threat and scientifically "would never work."
threat and scientifically "would never work."

SDI research went ahead, although it did not achieve the hoped-for result. SDI
SDI research went ahead, although it did not achieve the hoped-for result. SDI

research was cut back following the end of Reagan's presidency, and in 1995 it
research was cut back following the end of Reagan's presidency, and in 1995 it

was reiterated in a presidential joint statement that "missile defense systems
was reiterated in a presidential joint statement that "missile defense systems

may be deployed... [that] will not pose a realistic threat to the strategic
may be deployed... [that] will not pose a realistic threat to the strategic

nuclear force of the other side and will not be tested to... [create] that
nuclear force of the other side and will not be tested to... [create] that

capability." This was reaffirmed in 1997.
capability." This was reaffirmed in 1997.

US withdrawal Although the Soviet Union ceased to
US withdrawal Although the Soviet Union ceased to

exist in December 1991, in the view of the U.S. Department of State, the treaty
exist in December 1991, in the view of the U.S. Department of State, the treaty

continued in force. An additional memorandum of understanding was prepared
continued in force. An additional memorandum of understanding was prepared

in 1997, establishing Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and
in 1997, establishing Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and

Ukraine as successor states to the Soviet Union, for the purposes of the
Ukraine as successor states to the Soviet Union, for the purposes of the

treaty. On December 13, 2001, George W. Bush
treaty. On December 13, 2001, George W. Bush

gave Russia notice of the United States' withdrawal from the treaty, in
gave Russia notice of the United States' withdrawal from the treaty, in

accordance with the clause that required six months' notice before terminating
accordance with the clause that required six months' notice before terminating

the pact—the first time in recent history that the United States has
the pact—the first time in recent history that the United States has

withdrawn from a major international arms treaty. This led to the eventual
withdrawn from a major international arms treaty. This led to the eventual

creation of the American Missile Defense Agency.
creation of the American Missile Defense Agency.

Supporters of the withdrawal argued that it was a necessity in order to test and
Supporters of the withdrawal argued that it was a necessity in order to test and

build a limited National Missile Defense to protect the United States from
build a limited National Missile Defense to protect the United States from

nuclear blackmail by a rogue state. The withdrawal had many critics as well as
nuclear blackmail by a rogue state. The withdrawal had many critics as well as

supporters. John Rhinelander, a negotiator of the ABM treaty, predicted
supporters. John Rhinelander, a negotiator of the ABM treaty, predicted

that the withdrawal would be a "fatal blow" to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
that the withdrawal would be a "fatal blow" to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Treaty and would lead to a "world without effective legal constraints on
Treaty and would lead to a "world without effective legal constraints on

nuclear proliferation." The construction of a missile defense system was also
nuclear proliferation." The construction of a missile defense system was also

feared to enable the US to attack with a nuclear first strike.
feared to enable the US to attack with a nuclear first strike.

Russia and the United States signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty in
Russia and the United States signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty in

Moscow on May 24, 2002. This treaty mandates cuts in deployed strategic
Moscow on May 24, 2002. This treaty mandates cuts in deployed strategic

nuclear warheads, but without actually mandating cuts to total stockpiled
nuclear warheads, but without actually mandating cuts to total stockpiled

warheads, and without any mechanism for enforcement.
warheads, and without any mechanism for enforcement.

References Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty [1] 1974
References Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty [1] 1974

Protocol [2] External links
Protocol [2] External links

US Announcement of withdrawal Global Security Institute
US Announcement of withdrawal Global Security Institute