Last season, Swansea escaped relegation after Paul Clement arrived and the team, and Gylfi
Sigurdsson in particular, rallied under the new boss’s stewardship to claw the Swans
away from the drop zone.
The Swans faced 185 shots on target last season, the seventh worst in
the league: This season, after five games, the Swans are
actually doing worse, but managed an excellent 0-0 away at Spurs despite conceding a large
number of shots.
So how did Swansea do it?
Clement’s side lined up effectively as a 5-3-1-1, with Jordan Ayew
nominally behind Tammy Abraham , but in actual fact often breaking forwards of the striker,
whose aerial ability was Swansea’s long ball get out.
Spurs played as a 3-4-1-2, but with Dele Alli dropping back to assist Eriksen and both wide
men pushing high up.
Spurs clustered a lot around the right half-space, as Harry Kane , who has a tendancy to drift
wide before cutting back in, moved towards the same areas as Alli and Eriksen.
Swansea, who had a spare man, or two, at the back could if required push Mike van der
Hoorn up into this space in support of the midfield three of Renato Sanchez, Sam Clucas,
and Tom Carroll.
Clucas and Sanchez, both very astute summer signings, can screen energetically
and Sanchez especially dropped off into the horizontal gaps between Spurs’ midfield
and forward line to press or mark.
This meant that Swansea’s midfield three could play narrowly, as Spurs also congregated
in the centre, while the back five could drop
off into a wide line; Spurs’ wings-backs always
push high and by leaving full-backs fairly deep, Swansea could mark the Spurs wide men
but keep a narrow line higher up the pitch to
flood the number ten space and the area behind it.
The midfield three moved sideways as a unit, covering across to match Spurs’ switching
of the play left and right; while the Swansea
full-back pushed up a little when Spurs had ​
possession wide around the box, the Swansea defence were otherwise fairly fixed in
position, with three men in front of goal, the other full-back tucked in somewhat but
with an eye on the switch of play, and the midfield
three trying to cut off passing lines back inside,
rather than rushing to press.
This allowed Swansea to invite the cross, knowing they had at
least a one man advantage in the box, while cutting off the chance to pass back inside.
Sometimes, the Swansea midfielder nearest the ball would drift out, but the other two
were good at initially holding their position,
and then tracking runs.
This meant that Swansea were often defending their box with as many as six players in the
middle, and two wide, but as Spurs look to cross to players making late runs, Swansea
were able either to track those runs or, better
yet, have defenders looking at the players making
them, rather than being caught on the back foot.
It’s also worth noting, though, that for all
Swansea’s excellence in defensive organisation, the goalkeeping of Lukasz Fabianski did dig
them out of a hole or two as well.
Last season, despite losing at home 2-0 and drawing away 1-1, Burnley also defended well
against Spurs; Burnley played two narrow lines of four, compacting the space into which
Spurs’ midfielders could run and congesting the centre of the pitch.
This, and Swansea’s performance at Wembley, show that for all their undoubted attacking
ability, Spurs can be frustrated by teams who deny them the space in between the lines
particularly in the half-spaces.
This is where Spurs’ ability to link quick passing moves and burst beyond the defensive
line is evident; it’s what Dele Alli especially
excels at.
By contracting the space between the defensive and midfield lines and owning the
central space, teams can frustrate Spurs.
The Swans’ performance was disciplined, well-coached,
and entirely thought out, exactly as Sean Dyche’s teams had played last season.
Whether other teams will have taken note remains to
be seen, but Paul Clement and his staff can be pleased with the results of their work.