In our first video covering the armies of the Byzantine Empire, we outlined why and how the
all-conquering legionary armies of Caesar and Augustus transformed into the balanced,
limited military of Justinian’s era. One of the most symbolic qualities of the Byzantine
military as it developed was the use of so-called military manuals. Primarily aimed at preserving
and proliferating sophisticated military doctrine to army officers and commanders,
these treatises played a formidable role in retaining the Byzantine military as
one of the most formidable, organised and disciplined forces of war in the entire world
despite Constantinople’s loss of hegemony. Perhaps most notable among all military manuals
is the main subject of today’s video, the large compendium known as Maurice’s Strategikon.
Sponsor of today's video MagellanTV is the favorite documentary platform of the Kings and
Generals! We have been enjoying our MagellanTV subscription and hope that our viewers love
it too. MagellanTV is a documentary streaming service, run by filmmakers, that has over 3,000
documentaries among them hundreds of historical documentaries. The fans of Roman history will
surely enjoy the 6-episode I, Caesar: The Rise and Fall of the Roman Empire series! We also recommend
The Hidden History of Rome and Meet the Romans, as both of these titles provide so much fun knowledge
of Roman history. You can watch both anytime, anywhere, on your television, laptop, or mobile
device and it is compatible with most devices. Our viewers can now take advantage of an exclusive
offer: 30% off an annual membership - this gives you an entire year for less than $3.50 a month!
Every documentary I've watched has been worth double that and there are now 3000 in the
MagellanTV collection! This offer is available to the returning users, too! Simply click on the link
in the description to claim your discounted annual membership today. Support our channel and do that
at try.magellantv.com/kingsandgenerals. Start your free trial today!
Clinical, analytical writing on the topics of tactics and strategy are truly ancient in the
Hellenic tradition, with the oldest surviving work being that of Aeneas the Tactician,
authored in the fourth century BC. His work, and many more lost works besides,
were followed by a slew of other pieces on subjects as diverse as archery, proper use of
siege machines, spies and secrecy, and every other aspect of what might be called military science.
By the late antique Byzantine era then, the libraries of Constantinople and the eastern empire
were stocked with a vast array of material to which the Byzantines themselves continued to add.
Notable among their pre-Strategikon military works are those of Syrianos,
Urbikios and a Justinianic era writing whose author is not known.
Some of them just repackage the contributions of ancient authors, while others are suspiciously
theoretical. The piece of instructive military literature which can in no way be accused of being
an armchair general’s inexperienced fantasy, however, is the aforementioned Strategikon,
perhaps the single most influential handbook of war in all Byzantine history.
The first thing of note about this text is that despite being known popularly as
‘Maurice’s Strategikon’ it was not necessarily written by the eponymous reformist emperor.
Most historians concur that the Strategikon was broadly penned in the rough half-century between
575, when the Eastern Romans renewed hostilities with Sassanid Persia, and 628, when the Sassanids
were finally defeated after a long war. Using information within the text which can be dated,
such as battles, sieges and document convention the time of authorship can be narrowed down even
further to between 592 and 610 - late in the reign of Maurice and into the following tenure of the
usurper Phokas. Even though the Strategikon was referred to definitively as being of ‘Maurice’,
that was a common practice possibly implying that, as emperor, Maurice instructed that it be made. It
might even be that a prominent general or veteran, such as the emperor’s brother-in-law Phillipicus,
wrote the piece and then dedicated it to Maurice. Equally, however, there are many personal touches
and bits of literary flair which makes it seem directly planned and written by Maurice.
Whatever the answer to this mystery, we know that the author was an experienced soldier,
educated in ancient history and had commanded troops on at least two fronts. He is intimately
familiar with weaponry, armour, martial laws, as well as the daily life of a soldier on the
march and in camp. More telling is that he also knows Byzantium’s enemies and how they fight.
Rather than tediously listing every single book, chapter and point of the Strategikon from
detailed battle formations to sieges, it is worth considering the attitude shown by Maurice towards
war and how that contrasts to the bold, warrior ethos of Rome in earlier centuries. Appropriate
to their diminished military position, war to the Byzantines was not a means of demonstrating
superiority or expanding, but the least desirable way by which the empire could achieve
its goals. Whereas earlier Roman Republican and Imperial armies were notoriously bad at scouting,
regarding the ambush and irregular fighting as not a proper battle, Maurice’s pragmatic Byzantine
army promoted by the Strategikon was precisely the opposite. Costly all-in battles were to be
avoided if at all possible, and trickery as well as cunning employed at every opportunity. In that
way, the Strategikon is very much fashioned in the mould of Sun Tzu. So prominent are these aspects
of war in the mind of the author that two out of the twelve books making up the Strategikon - books
IV and IX, cover the topics of ‘Ambushes’ and ‘Surprise Attacks’ in considerable depth.
Even the books not especially concerning misdirection and deviousness, such as those
detailing cavalry and Tagma formations, are laced with advice on how to mask one's strength and
deceive an enemy. In a section on the prescribed depth of a Tagma formation, for example, the
text advises that any reading officer or general avoids arraying all of his forces for inspection
in lines of an identical size. This was because such a uniform deployment made it simple for enemy
spies or scouts to quickly extrapolate the size of the entire Byzantine field army by counting the
size of one rank, and the number of ranks, rather than having to trawl through the entire throng.
Such advice is also given regarding the size of deployed Byzantine cavalry units. This is
a particularly illustrative example because it shows starkly just how deadly a mistaken advance
caused by bad intel could be. If a foe is advancing with 4,000 cavalry, and their scouts,
deceived by the Byzantines’ obfuscation tactics, report 3,000 cavalry opposing them, that foe
might decide to attack and only then would realise they faced 5,000, and were outnumbered.
Another characteristic of the type of warfare championed by the Strategikon
is its extreme carefulness and balanced nature, a theme which is clear throughout the entire text.
‘A ship cannot cross the sea without a helmsman, nor can one defeat an enemy without tactics and
strategy’ begins Book VII - Strategy, and this analytical approach to warfare is prominent in the
entire piece. To engage in rash, albeit ‘glorious’ battle is the mark of a bad Byzantine general,
and `’it is ridiculous to try to gain a victory which is so costly and brings only empty glory.’ A
keen sense of caution is also shown in the section concerning war against unfamiliar foes. ‘If we
find ourselves at war with a powerful people and one whose ways are strange to us, and the army,
not knowing what to expect becomes nervous, then we must be very careful to avoid getting into
an open battle with them right away’ This kind of approach brings to mind the approach of Achaemenid
king Darius the Great recorded at Behistun - ‘First I will think, and then I will act.’
Even in the face of defeat and humiliation, this practical and cautionary approach to warfare
dominates. Adroitly acknowledging the often overly superstitious and religious nature of common
soldiers, the author recommends that a general does not immediately attack again right after
he is defeated, even if the general understands why the defeat occurred. The soldiers, he says,
are likely to view the loss as God’s will and therefore have their morale devastated. In such
a situation, the Byzantines are to unashamedly leverage their equally powerful weapons to gain
some kind of benefit. If emissaries are sent by a victorious enemy for terms,
and those terms are reasonable and easily accomplished, then they should be enacted
without hesitation to conclude the fighting. But, Maurice relates, such conversations ought
to be kept private from the rank and file soldier unless it is an absolute emergency.
A nitpicky but important consideration is also made in this sense when the author
speaks concerning the polishing of weapons and armour, something that the majority
of people would never even think about. But the point isn’t to keep equipment polished,
but to conceal it on the march so that the army can’t be picked out easily by enemy scouts,
who might see the sun reflecting from the point of a lance, or a ring of mail.
It would be easy to also list the 101 maxims listed by the Strategikon for use by any reader
who might find himself commanding an army on campaign, but that is not necessary. These
range from such personal matters as exercising mental self control and balance at all times,
to operational considerations such as maneuvering with the cover of sun,
wind and dust to their advantage of one’s army, and the detriment of the enemy’s.
Compared to the other militaries of its age, especially in the later part of the first
millennium, that of the Byzantines is regarded as professional and almost futuristic by the
standards of the time. The Strategikon has a section dedicated entirely to what we in the
21st century might call intelligence-gathering and counterintelligence operations, and how enemy
attempts to gather information about imperial forces might be diminished or stopped entirely.
Men who are chosen to be the army’s spies, the text states, ‘should be reliable, they should look
very manly and be a cut above the other soldiers in physical appearance, morale and equipment,
so they may project a noble image in confronting the enemy and if captured, make a good impression
on him’. These enterprising, ancient 007s were, then, expected to serve as paragons
and representatives of the emperor’s armies - formidable and intimidating even if captured,
capable of influencing the enemy into doubt by their robust demeanor. More broadly, scouting
and patrol parties, mounted on swift horses and clad in light armour were to be dispatched in
quantities depending on the situation. When the enemy force was at a distance, scouts should
only be sent out when specific information is necessary, such as the nature of roads, the
properties of a nearby fortification, and other such things. However, when the enemy army is near,
the entire area surrounding the imperial army should be swarming with scouts, instructed and
able to take prisoners for interrogation if discovered. So crucial was this duty that the
Strategikon’s author recommended that patrols be regularly inspected by capable officers. Any among
the reconnaissance parties found to be negligent ‘should be punished for seriously endangering the
whole army’. It is worth noting that this is one of the only occasions in which the author
attributes such grave responsibility to soldiers, further emphasizing the importance of scouting.
The text later goes on to detail a trick or scheme which can be used to capture enemy
spies roaming around busy Byzantine encampments. Every few hours, a trumpet could be sounded at
which the soldiers, informed beforehand must immediately return to their own assigned tents
or face punishment. Naturally, the enemy spy would either be captured for being outside alone
or, if he entered one of the tents, be recognised as a stranger and arrested by the squad inside.
It might be said of the Strategikon, based on its general nature and emphasized content, that it
describes the final formalisation and readjustment of a Late Roman Army into its typically Byzantine
form. As we introduced last episode with Procopius’ prominent display of mounted
archery in his History of the Wars, Maurice or whichever imperial servant wrote the Strategikon
emphasized first and foremost the training and drill of archers, both mounted and foot.
If the text was followed in future generations, which it seems to have been,
every single ‘Roman’ man up until the age of forty, and perhaps even beyond, would’ve
been required to possess a bow and a quiver. Swords, lances, spears and other instruments
of melee combat are, in comparison, barely even mentioned. Those men who are ‘unskilled’ in
archery were to be given a light bow, so that they could practice this ‘essential’ skill.
Interestingly, the book also contains even further evidence that this transformation
of the Byzantine army was heavily driven by contact with nomadic nations from the steppe,
partly because Maurice saw the sheer efficiency of their way and means of war, or in order to counter
steppe cavalry armies who were bearing down on the empire at the time. Such ‘Hunnish’ peoples
included the Gokturks and the Avars, which are grouped with all nomads as ‘Scythians’.
The ‘scoundrel’ Avars, as Maurice describes them, are particularly important in the realm
of Byzantine equipment and materiel. Throughout the entire piece, the reader is advised to supply
items of the ‘Avar type’, such as tunics cut in the Avar manner, round and spacy Avar-style tents,
Avar-inspired cavalry lances and even Avar scarves made of linen on the outside and
wool on the inside. This, much like with the adoption of the gladius, shows just how eager the
Romans always were to draw in aspects of other, hostile civilisations for their own benefit.
Furthermore, the chapter on ambushes contain small tips on how to perform complex surprise attacks
in the Hephthalite and ‘Scythian’ manner. The so-called ‘Scythian Ambush’ essentially describes
the infamous feigned flight, a tactic so common among mounted nomadic tribes. Maurice recognises
this frequency of use, justifiably pointing out that ‘The Scythian peoples do this all the time’.
Among other terms, the post-Maurice Byzantine army described and brought
about by the doctrines of the Strategikon might be described as calculating, pragmatic
and limited in its action. There was very little of the heroic, glorious flair of battle remaining,
just a relentless desire to gain victory by any means necessary and to, through that victory,
enhance the prospects of the Byzantine Empire. Among the myriad of military manuals in the
Hellenic tradition, the Strategikon is particularly important because of its
profound influence on later generations. In its general form, the military of Constantinople
would remain moulded by this most weighty of texts for almost half a millennium,
even inspiring a slew of updated editions from later authors of similar texts. Approximately
three centuries after Maurice’s overthrow and death, for example, Byzantine emperor
Leo VI ‘the wise’, who was a prodigious author on many topics, penned or sponsored the penning of a
famous military treatise known as Taktika. This particular text is essentially a carbon copy of
the Strategikon in style, if not in content, even quoting the earlier text verbatim in many areas.
Had the Strategikon been written half a century later,
we might think there would be a key characteristic missing. In the book’s later sections, there is a
fascinating segment detailing the various enemies which might be confronted by imperial armies.
Included in this roster are Lombards, as well as other Germanic peoples, the Persians,
Slavs and others. The insignificant and peripheral Arabs, meanwhile, were barely worth a mention.
Next time in our series on the Byzantine armies, we will examine how the empire responded to the
crippling blows inflicted by an ascendant Muslim caliphate, and particularly the notorious theme
system, so make sure you are subscribed and have pressed the bell button to see the next video in
the series. Please, consider liking, commenting, and sharing - it helps immensely. Our videos would
be impossible without our kind patrons and youtube channel members, whose ranks you can join via the
links in the description to know our schedule, get early access to our videos, access our discord,
and much more. This is the Kings and Generals channel, and we will catch you on the next one.