When you're considering the powers of the President to fire officers of the United States,
the seminal case in this area today is probably the case of Humphrey's Executor.
Uh. William Humphrey was the, uh, appointed to be the head of the Federal Trade Commission.
He was first appointed to that role by Calvin Coolidge, was then reappointed to it by Hoover.
And, when FDR got elected, he had some policy, uh, disagreements with, uh, Mr. Humphreys.
Uh.
He asked Humphreys to resign, twice.
So, at that point, FDR fired him.
Well, there was a little problem with that, and that was that the Federal Trade Commission
Act said that the commissioners of the FTC could only be fired for inefficiency, neglect,
or malfeasance in office.
And FDR didn't cite any inefficiencies, neglect, or malfeasance in office that had been committed
by Humphreys.
He fired him purely because of a policy disagreement.
And FDR essentially asserted that he thought he had a constitutional right to do so.
Uh, notwithstanding this restriction that Congress had purported to impose on removing Mr. Humphreys.
And in support of that view, uh, FDR cited to a decision from the 1920s, just about a
decade old in the Myers case.
Where the president had removed a Postmaster General from office.
And the Supreme Court determined that the Postmaster was a purely executive function,
and there could be no restrictions placed on the President's ability to remove him.
With respect to a purely executive official, Myers establishes that the President, to
the extent that the President has the power to appoint them, the President also has the
power to remove them.
Fast forward to Humphrey's Executor, the Supreme Court rejected FDR's argument that Myers
applied under the circumstances.
Supreme Court said, "Yes.
This is an officer of the United States."
But, unlike Myers, the postmaster, Mr. Humphrey, as a commissioner on the FTC, is not purely
executive in nature.
He is quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial in the nature of the powers that the FTC is
exercising.
And for that reason, the Supreme Court held that is was permissible for Congress to restrict
the conditions under which Mr. Humphrey's could be fired.
So, whether Humphrey's Executor was correctly decided is hotly debated amongst constitutional
law scholars today.
There are significant debates as to whether the so-called independent administrative agencies
really can be viewed as exercising anything other than executive powers.
Clearly, they're not legislatures.
They're not Congress.
Clearly, they're not courts.
They're not the Judiciary.
So what else can they be but the executive?
There is, of course, the other side of the constitutional strain of thought that thinks
it's perfectly fine for Congress to able to impose all kinds of removal restrictions on
officers who are exercising significant government authority.
And, those who adhere to that position tend to emphasize the importance of the, what they
view as the policy goals of independence from political accountability.
They think it's a bad idea, uh, for those people to be responsive to political pressures in
the people.
And generally, they tend to be suspect of, uh, the kinds of pressures that can be exerted
on those officials, uh, to, in wielding their authority.
And so, uh, that camp is very supportive of Humphrey's Executor, is supportive of even extending
Humphrey's Executor to a wide range of executive branch positions.
So, if you are a unitary executive advocate, you believe that Humphrey's Executor should
be overturned, or at least substantially limited to more narrow kinds of powers that the FTC
of the mid-1930s was exercising.
If, on the other hand, you are a robust advocate of independent agencies and the use of, uh,
statutory restrictions on the removal of officials to insulate them from the political process,
then you're a big fan of Humphrey's Executor and want to extend it.
So, Humphrey's Executor really stands as the lynchpin foundation for, uh, how separation
of powers applies in the context of the ability to fire high-ranking government officials.