Colonel John Frost led 2nd Battalion of the British 1st Airborne Division to Arnhem bridge
on the 17th of September 1944.
His was the only battalion to reach the objective, and he was widely acknowledged as the most
experienced paratroop commander in 1st Airborne Division.
In his book “A Drop Too Many”, which was published after Cornelius Ryan’s book, A
Bridge Too Far, and after the film of the same name, A Bridge Too Far, Frost gives his
reasons for the failure of Operation Market Garden.
He states-
“The same voice that had so firmly said to Roy Urquhart: ‘Arnhem Bridge. And hold
it,’ said to James Gavin, G.O.C. of the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division, ‘The Groesbeek
Heights. Nijmegen Bridge later.’”
Nijmegen Bridge was not taken on day 1, leading to a critical 36 hour delay, by which point
Frost’s battalion was annihilated and Arnhem was solely in German hands.
The 36 hour delay was caused because the 82nd Airborne Division delayed their advance on
the Nijmegen Bridge on day 1.
By the time they got going towards the bridge, after seven and a half hours of sitting around
at the Groesbeek Heights, it was too late.
Part of a German panzer division arrived and dug in at Nijmegen, preventing the two platoons
of American paratroopers that did eventually go to Nijmegen from taking the bridge.
The next day, these platoons were withdrawn back to the Groesbeek Heights to protect it
from the German 406th Division, which was neither a division nor a threat to the 82nd
Airborne.
When XXX Corps arrived at Nijmegen at the beginning of day 3, with the whole day to
go the last 8 miles to Arnhem, it had to fight for the city and bridge at Nijmegen, with
the help of the 82nd Airborne.
After a 36 hour delay, it was too late to save Frost’s battalion and Market Garden
ultimately failed.
Frost places the blame on the person who prioritized the Groesbeek Heights, a small hill to the
East of Nijmegen, over the critical Nijmegen Bridge.
That person was General Frederick “Boy” Browning, the commander of 1st Airborne Corps.
In Frost’s version of events, Browning ordered General Gavin of the 82nd Airborne not to
go for the Nijmegen Bridge until the Groesbeek Heights were secure.
The main reason Frost gives for this was because Browning wanted to set up his HQ on the Heights.
He also mentions that there was a rumour about German armour in the Reichswald - a forest
slightly further east from the Groesbeek Heights.
This was only a rumour and never confirmed, and in reality there was nothing in the Reichswald
at all.
Frost does not lay the blame of the failure of Operation Market Garden on Gavin of the
82nd Airborne, instead praising him and his division for their crossing of the Waal river in boats as “one
of the bravest feats of all time.”
Frost places the blame for the most critical error in the Market Garden operation on Browning.
“However, by far the worst mistake was the lack of priority given to the capture of Nijmegen
Bridge. The whole essence of the plan was to lay an airborne carpet across the obstacles
in southern Holland so that the Army could motor through, yet the capture of this, perhaps
the biggest and most vital bridge in that its destruction would have sounded the death-knell
of the troops committed at Arnhem, was not accorded priority. The capture of this bridge
would have been a walk-over on D-day, yet the American 82nd Airborne Division could
spare only one battalion as they must at all costs secure a feature called the Groesbeek
Heights, where, incidentally, the H.Q. of Airborne Corps was to be sited. It was thought
that the retention of this feature would prevent the debouchment of German armour from the
Reichwald in Germany. This armour was there by courtesy of rumour only and its presence
was not confirmed by the underground. In fact, as a feature it is by no means dominating
and its retention or otherwise had absolutely no bearing on what happened at Nijmegen Bridge.”
Frost goes on to say that Browning and his HQ were “nothing more than a nuisance”
and should have remained back in Britain, out of the way.
Noticeably, he doesn’t call out Browning by name.
But he makes it very clear who he’s on about.
Now, in my documentary on Operation Market Garden - links everywhere - where I went into
detail about every aspect of the battle, I concluded by blaming General Gavin of the
82nd Airborne.
And I did that because some historians think he was ultimately to blame for not taking
the Nijmegen bridge, and he himself admits it was his decision.
But he also says he got permission to prioritize the Groesbeek Heights from his Corps commander
- which was Browning!
So was Frost right?
Was Browning ultimately to blame for the failure to take Nijmegen bridge, and ultimately the
person we need to blame for the failure of Operation Market Garden?
I’d love to hear your thoughts in the comments below.
Thanks to my Patreons, I’ve just purchased a biography on General Frederick Boy Browning,
and I cannot wait to make a video on this bad boy.
And I know a lot of people hate Montgomery - mainly Americans - but I don’t think Monty
is the big bad guy of this battle.
That honour definitely goes to Browning.
His treatment of Sosabowski - the Polish general - is just … unforgivable.
But I’m going to try and remain as neutral as possible - even though all the evidence
I have from every other source is damning - and I will give him and his biographer a
chance to set the record straight.
And this is the challenge of history - trying to remain balanced, open-minded, calm, collected,
and willing to consider all views before making a decision.
I’m going to make a video on Browning.
I’m going to leave it there, thanks for watching guys, bye for now.