The diamond formation, or 4-3-1-2, has significant benefits for certain teams. Its finest
exponents – Carlo Ancelotti’s AC Milan and Chelsea sides, Brendan Rodger’s 2013/14 Liverpool team,
and even Louis van Gaal’s 94/95 Ajax side – showed that the diamond can afford significant control of
central areas and produce football that benefits from having a number of central playmakers.
The diamond is most usually seen in its 4-3-1-2 version,
but it’s worth quickly sketching out two other variants.
Ajax’s 94/95 side used a diamond with a deep playmaker and a pressing, goal-scoring ten,
but maintained their width by unusually playing two wingers either side of one central striker.
Jorge Sampaoli’s Chile team, who were hugely exciting at the 2014 World Cup,
also played with a diamond, with width coming in part from the wing-backs,
Mauricio Isla and Jean Beausejour, but also from playing two wingers as centre forwards.
Alexis Sanchez and Eduardo Vargas were genuine wide attackers who would start
wide and then cut infield, while Arturo Vidal was the late-arriving, central attacking midfielder,
contributing goals and pressing, much like Bergkamp or Litmanen for van Gaal’s Ajax.
These variants aside, the standard diamond sees two central strikers,
who may drift wide but are essentially there to attack the box,
two shuttling midfielders, and width in attack coming largely coming from the full-backs.
The strikers may move wide or stay central, but generally one will drift ball-side while
the other stays central, if either move wide. The shuttlers have to do a huge amount of work,
getting forwards into the channels to support the full backs, or covering across in defence.
The advanced midfielder and the deep midfielder fulfil different roles: sometimes both are
playmakers, as with Andrea Pirlo and Rui Costa or Kaka at Milan; sometimes the 10 is a playmaker
and the deeper midfielder sits and screens as a pure defensive anchor, or the 10 role presses,
hassles, and tries to arrive late in the box, while creativity comes from deep.
The benefits of the diamond are central superiority and the ability to create
from various parts of the pitch – from full back, from the central shuttlers moving wide,
or from one or two creative players in the spine of the team.
The weakness is the enormous amount of work required by full backs and the two flanking
midfielders, as well as the enormous tactical discipline required to make the system work.
The formation is probably at its best counter-attacking – while van Gaal’s
Ajax dominated possession, they were very much an oddity. In general, the formation allows teams to
contract and flood central areas in defence, and then expand and counter-attack at pace,
especially if the side is blessed with dominant full backs and a strong deep-lying playmaker or
athletic, industrious central midfielders who can get the ball towards the 10.
Given that Manchester United now have Paul Pogba and Donny van de Beek,
does it not make sense to shift to a formation that gets both talents into the side? After all,
many managers who have shifted to a diamond have done so to accommodate central attacking talents.
And Manchester United have used a diamond under Ole Gunnar Solskjaer before.
In the 61 league games he’s overseen so far, starting with Cardiff in December 2018,
Solskjaer has used a diamond formation, according to FBref.com,
nine times. But on a points-per-game basis, there is a negligible difference.
There are strong reasons to consider a diamond,
though. Van de Beek is a runner who can get into channels and do damage from a flanking role,
and has the athleticism and positional intelligence to flourish.
Pogba played the role at Juventus and excelled. In Marcus Rashford and Antony Martial, United
have two forwards used to operating in wide areas who could attack the channels at pace and who have
already done this for United successfully, especially when set up to counter-attack.
But there are flaws, too. Bruno Fernandes is not a dynamic presser – that’s why
Jesse Lingard was largely used when Solskjaer deployed the diamond before Fernandes arrived,
for his pressing and positional intelligence as much as his creativity.
Nemanja Matic is a clever reader of the game, but is he quick enough to play the holding role
in such a demanding system, especially if Pogba and van de Beek are being used to get forwards?
When Solskjaer played a diamond previously, Luke Shaw and Ashley Young were the full backs on all
but one occasion, when Aaron Wan-Bissaka played right-back. Shaw would tend to tuck in more,
while Young offered width in attack on the right, creating a lop-sided effect.
But neither full-back pushed that high. United’s width was largely a result of the
attacking midfielder and forwards roaming across.
This works fine when United are counter-attacking and looking to expose the opposition full backs
by attacking the channels between them and the centre backs, or the space in behind,
but what about teams who sit deep and defend? United’s worst results with the
diamond came against lesser sides – Cardiff City, Huddersfield – or against teams who
sat off like Everton at Goodison Park or Chelsea at Old Trafford in April 2019.
Against teams who sit deep, United need to impose themselves,
to stretch the opposition defence by getting players forwards and having a plan of attack.
This is arguably Solskjaer’s weakest facet as a coach anyway – but it’s why the diamond works
well against stronger sides looking to push on, because United can rely on the pace and
creativity of Rashford and Martial, and the passing of Pogba. But lacking high quality
attacking full-backs, United would struggle to take the game to sides in a low-block,
content to shut them out and offer little in the way of space behind the defensive line.
United can play with a diamond and, at times, probably will. Tactics and systems are tweaked
on a game by game basis and Solskjaer has shown an awareness of this flexibility.
There may well be matches where van de Beek, Matic,
and Pogba all start in a diamond – but it’s not the quick fix United need for every scenario.