Foreign policy is often a
balancing act where leaders weigh competing priorities.
Should they practice idealism promoting their country's internal values
abroad to try to change how other countries govern themselves?
Or should they be guided by realism, focusing on influencing
what other countries do externally with their foreign policies?
These approaches are frequently in tension, and leaders must balance
the two when making foreign policy decisions,
as demonstrated by the United States' response to China's deadly crackdown
on pro-democracy protesters in Tiananmen Square in 1989
Since 1949,
China has been ruled by its authoritarian Communist Party.
But in the late 1970s, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping,
the country began a series of reforms
increasing the market's role in the economy
and allowing for more open discussion of political and social issues.
In the mid 1980s, groups of university students started advocating for even more
political reforms and protested corruption within the Communist Party.
In the spring of 1989, many of those students started
demonstrating against the government at Tiananmen Square.
A public plaza in the center of Beijing, the country's capital.
The Government
publicly criticized the students for creating disorder,
but initially let the protests continue, even meeting with student leaders
to try to convince them to peacefully return to school.
At the same time, many foreign reporters were covering the protests from Beijing,
broadcasting sympathetic coverage of the students
out to millions of viewers across the world.
There was a debate within the Chinese government
about how to handle the protests.
But by early June, the hard liners won out.
The government decided to send in the military
to clear the square by any means necessary.
Chaos broke out across Beijing
as the military killed hundreds, if not thousands of students.
And civilians throughout the city.
News of the massacre spread and people around the world were outraged,
with countries criticizing the Chinese government and calling on it
to stop the bloodshed and to release the activists it had arrested.
The United States, led by President George H.W.
Bush, quickly suspended its weapons contracts
with the Chinese government, stopped meetings between U.S.
and Chinese military leaders and made it easier for Chinese students in the U.S.
to extend their stay in the U.S..
But some American politicians called
for even tougher actions against China, such as withdrawing the U.S.
ambassador from Beijing or imposing economic sanctions.
President Bush tried to resist this pressure to come down
harder on China, even though the massacre was a clear violation of human rights
because he believed such an idealist leaning response
would undermine his administration's more realist goals.
At the time, the U.S.
was still competing with the communist Soviet Union in the Cold War.
And despite China also being a communist country,
it had poor relations with the Soviet Union and was working
with the United States to counter the Soviet Union.
Also, the U.S.
benefited economically from trade with China, which had grown
dramatically during the 1980s.
So Bush preferred to prioritize realism in his approach to China,
preserving positive relations with the country to benefit the U.S.
strategically and economically.
However, while Presidents lead U.S.
foreign policy, Congress has the ability to limit
their choices and complicate their decisions.
And after the Tiananmen Square massacre,
the American public and Congress were outraged.
And they clamored for more idealistic actions that they hoped would force China
to grant its citizens more political rights and freedoms.
Bush realized there was little chance the U.S.
could convince Chinese leaders to stop repressing the activists
who the leaders viewed as a grave threat to their continued rule
and to the stability of the country.
Nevertheless, Bush recognized his domestic political reality and attempted
to move forward with some idealism while still emphasizing realism.
This would prove difficult, though,
because Chinese leaders were angry at the U.S.
for the initial sanctions
Bush had already announced in response to Tiananmen Square.
They argued the U.S.
was interfering in China's internal affairs.
Bush tried reaching out to Deng directly, and while at first he refused Bush's
calls, Deng eventually agreed to receive Bush's national security
adviser, Brant Scowcroft, who carried a message from the president.
Scowcroft communicated that
Bush still wanted to preserve good relations between the U.S.
and China.
But he also attempted to explain that China's actions affected U.S.
public opinion, which in turn affected Bush's ability to preserve good relations.
At first, Deng dismissed Bush's message.
But in the following months, Bush continued to make friendly overtures
to China and the two countries privately agreed to a series of steps
to de-escalate tensions which would result in the U.S.
withdrawing its sanctions against China.
Bush tried to protect this process from Congress, successfully
vetoing one bill that would have made it easier for Chinese students in the U.S.
to apply for new visas or permanent residency.
However, it soon became clear
that China continued to persecute political activists
and American anger toward China continued to grow.
So Bush yielded to congressional pressure and signed a bill
that reinforced the existing sanctions against China
The move deeply angered Chinese leaders and halted efforts
to resolve the tensions over Tiananmen Square.
Even as the two countries maintained a productive relationship on other matters
when making foreign policy, leaders often face
tough decisions and must weigh competing priorities and goals,
But whether they're trying to influence another country's
internal behavior or external relations, even the most powerful countries
often do not have the ability to force another country to change course.
And even the most considered approach can come up short.