French armor has a long history of tanks cooperating closely with light vehicles. These
days it's Leclerc main battle tanks and VBL scout cars. But back in the day it was literal Willys
Jeeps. This approach comes off as suspicious to the average American maneuverist because of
the inferior protection and mobility compared to tanks. The US Army even sees comparatively
well-protected vehicles like the Stryker to be non-optimal in supporting tanks. But
from the French perspective, there are genuine tactical benefits to mixing heavy and light,
and the practice may have ironically been adapted from the Americans.
armor. The tracked Leclerc main battle tanks, part of its three tank and two combined arms regiments,
and the wheeled AMX-10 RC armored car in its seven light cavalry regiments. The second platform will
eventually be replaced by the EBRC Jaguar. The company team or sous-groupement tactique
interarmes is the basic deployable unit built from platoons from multiple regiments. Those
can then form battalion task forces, or groupement tactique interarmes, but not always. Brigade size
deployments are rare, and often composed of task forces from all over the place. The French cavalry
in practice is more like a force of 55 combat and 12 HQ squadrons than it is 12 regiments,
or so I've seen it described. At the basic level is the platoon. In wheeled units they consist
of three AMX-10RCs in an armor group and three VBL scout cars in an investigation group. Back
in the 80s the AMX-10RC was serving alongside Peugeot P4s in this capacity, and going back
to the 1950s their new Panhard EBRs served in platoons of five supported by a protection group
and a mortar support group mounted on the good old American Jeep. So entrenched in the Cold War
French Army was the jeep that they domestically produced them to supplement American Willys
and Fords. Their version was designated the Hotchkiss M201 and it acted as the primary
off-road car until the Peugeot P4 came along in the 80s. The French picked up the practice
of pairing Jeeps with armored cars from the American doctrine of World War II. In 1943,
with French North Africa taken out of the Vichy government's hands and the Allies preparing to
liberate Northwest Europe, the French army was rebuilt in the image of the United States. In
particular the French 2nd Armored Division under General Leclerc was the spitting image
of an American Armored Division. Just with French traditions. For example, the Mechanized Cavalry
Squadron was the U.S Armored Division's main reconnaissance element. In the French 2nd Armored,
this role was taken by the 1st Moroccan Spahi March Regiment. Their recon platoons were the
basic unit that could complete a reconnaissance mission. It consisted of an armored car section
with three M8 Greyhounds and a scout section with six Jeeps, with three of those Jeeps carrying 60mm
mortar teams. The Jeep's low silhouette speed and open architecture made it ideal for the stealthy
reconnaissance role, as did its cross-country mobility which was superior to the Greyhound.
Platoons would operate as teams, a generic example being one armored car and two Jeeps. The Jeeps
would support the cars with their situational awareness, mobility and stealth to make sure the
path was clear while the Armored Cars supported the Jeeps with limited direct fire support using
its onboard 37mm, and by acting as a command and control platform with a long range radio.
Another influence was American tank destroyer doctrine. France's 2nd Armored Division included
the Armored Naval Infantry Regiment (RBFM) with its M10 tank destroyers. At the most basic level
tank destroyer platoons consisted of four tank destroyers plus a [security section]. The American
doctrine was for two M20 armored cars and one Jeep supporting each platoon, although in the French
2nd Armored this would often get up to five Jeeps per platoon. You don't have to look much farther
than American TD Doctrine to justify the Jeeps. The Army's 1942 manual on the subject states the
success of tank destroyer combat depends on the ability intelligence and aggressiveness of the
scout. As well as on the surprise of enemy tank forces. Without timely information surprise is
unattainable. Jeeps and armored cars would take up leading and flanking positions to provide
early warning for the tank destroyers. Both to protect them and to get the first shot advantage
over the enemy. This was demonstrated during the 1944 Battle of Dompaire involving French tank
destroyers. Around the same time a tank destroyer platoon with a Jeep escort scouts out the road to
Damas. Upon making chance contact with a company of German tanks just outside of Damas, the four
Navy tank destroyers knock out two Panthers and force a German retreat... Realizing the threat
to the south, Verdier reinforces the defensive line within a fruit orchard at Epang overlooking
route D6. This includes two Shermans and 2 tank destroyers hastily moved south from Minjonnet
at Damas, an additional Sherman, and 3 machine gun-armed jeeps. In their first main attack,
the Germans deploy a company of Panzer IVs on the west side of route D6. However, the French,
with their dominating position, destroy 5 Panzer IVs. With the armor attack pushed back,
the Germans try an infantry attack, hitting the French right flank with Panzergrenadiers. However,
the inexperienced infantry are stopped cold by the two jeeps DILIGENTE and VIGILANTE positioned
in a wood west of the hamlet. In essence, the performance of the tank destroyer's armament
was really the last piece of the puzzle. Finding the enemy without being seen,
scouting routes and setting up firing positions came first. Considering in tank combat,
knowledge of the terrain, situational awareness and getting the first shot off were the keys to
winning tank-on-tank engagements, it's not hard to see where there could be some lateral transfer
of thought. By contrast, French tank destroyer platoons prior to Americanization didn't have
any scouts, but their armored cavalry did have something similar. Generally speaking light
armor and motorcycles were paired one to one so in a Mechanized Division's (DLM) reconnaissance
regiment there were two squadrons of armored cars and two squadrons of motorcyclists which
would combine to form Discovery Detachments. However combining light vehicles and light
armor isn't particularly uncommon, especially in recon units. The US actually continued doing
this well after the war. Their 1960s armored cav platoons had two like tanks, an armored infantry
squad and a mortar squad to allow the otherwise Jeep-mounted scouts to carry out a wider range of
missions. Like conducting limited shock attacks and taking up defensive positions. And then you
have the modern day Italian Recon Squadron with its B1 Centauros supporting the lighter Linces
with protected direct fire. But why did France in particular keep this arrangement? I suppose
we should start with their current role. Although the AMX-10RC is a reconnaissance vehicle of sorts,
their regiments shouldn't be thought of as strictly the same as an American Cavalry Squadron
for example. The AMX-10RC regiments actually fulfill a dual role similar to the tank regiments,
providing a mobile protected maneuver force that can destroy stuff and support
infantry with speed and direct fire while also collecting information. Since the early 1980s,
tank regiments did this for Armored Divisions, while AMX-10RCs were for the VAB mounted
Mechanized Divisions and Panhard AMLs and later ERC-90s were for lighter Motorized Divisions.
Although it's a superficial observation, the French don't use NATO's reconnaissance
symbol to describe the AMX-10RCs, just wheeled armor. For planning purposes, their platoons are
sometimes referred to interchangeably as Canon Cavalry Platoons, or Peloton canon-cavalerie.
The wheeled units are favored over the Leclercs when there's a heightened need for operational
mobility. Basically driving around a lot. When terrain isn't too difficult. When stealth is
necessary, the enemy doesn't have strong anti-tank capabilities, or the political
situation makes deploying a tank seem a bit much. For this reason the AMX-10RC and the ERC-90 have
had a more storied deployment history, involved in every conflict France has fought since the
80s. But the tank is still preferred for high intensity combat where more capable armament,
protection, and off-road mobility is required. The Leclerc provides an additional deterrent
against powers with a modern MBT threat. To effectively combat the most well-protected tanks,
AMX-10RCs require augmentation from VBLs equipped with anti-tank guided missiles. Each Cavalry
Regiment has one or two Recon and Intervention Squadrons (EEI) that include VBK missile patrols.
These have traditionally complemented the wheeled cannons. However, ATGMs are inherently more static
or defensive weapons than the tank cannon, which partially surrenders one of the platform's chief
advantages: mobility. But consider the AMX-10RC brought the same thing the Leclerc would have
brought to the table in almost every conflict France has fought since the end of the Cold
War. Exceptions including peacekeeping missions where the belligerents being deterred had tanks,
like in Kosovo and Lebanon. For example, in September 2006, French Leclercs confronted
an Israeli incursion into Lebanon that used Merkavas. But in general, both types of units
are doctrinally capable of gathering intelligence, providing security and early warning to the higher
unit, supporting infantry with direct fire and maneuvering in the face of at least autocannon
fire. But depending on the specific circumstances of the mission, one or the other might be
preferable. The relative interchangeability between regiments could be because of a push
to simplify France's cavalry organization and a move towards modularity. Prior to 2008, tank and
wheeled cannon regiments had more pronounced differences than they do today. Tank platoons
for example traditionally had four tanks, but in 2008 moved to three tanks and three VBL scout cars
like in the wheeled cannons. The VBL replaced the Peugeot in the platoon level scouting role,
with some armor against small arms fire and a medium MG, .50 cal or ATGM. This was somewhat
altered in 2014 with a so-called "densification" of the tank regiments. Tank platoons went up to
four tanks and four VBLs, which is the only real difference between the tank and wheeled
cannon regiments today. This simplification wasn't without controversy in the cavalry community it
seems and an American veteran has already probably commented why. VBLs have inferior tactical
mobility compared to an MBT, both in terms of not being able to handle certain terrain and not being
able to maneuver in the face of enemy fire. But French doctrine accounts for this. In assessing
the armored recon role, it's helpful to know what the French mean when they use certain words. Under
French doctrine, reconnaissance often involves combat with the enemy, so it's normally the job
of the wheeled cannons, tanks or VBLs equipped with missiles. Sometimes to observe the enemy,
recon units have to destroy the screen the enemies put in front and move under fire. The US term
for this is "fighting for information" but the French would call it "offensive reconnaissance."
Meanwhile, scouting or "éclairage" is stealthy and avoids combat except in self-defense, or at
most to fix the enemy. Doctrinally scouting is a job for task organized Reconnaissance Intervention
Company Teams. Basically two reconnaissance platoons reinforced by cannon (armor), infantry
and engineer platoons, and artillery forward observers. Tank-dominant task forces are more
well suited for combat-centric reconnaissance. The role of the VBL scout group is to provide
reconnaissance and security to the tank platoon. They scout routes, make sure terrain is passable,
locate the enemy using stealth, and provide early warning so the enemy doesn't surprise the tanks.
When the platoon is moving, they ride ahead of or on the flanks of the tanks. Sometimes even behind
the tanks with the company trains (TC1) if it's an aggressive tanks-front maneuver. When halted,
VBLs provide local security to the tanks,. And if the tanks need to do a hasty withdrawal,
the VBLs can scout out avenues of retreat and new firing positions, streamlining the
process and allowing the tanks to focus on the fight. So it's not intended as tanks riding
alongside scout cars under fire. They still have dedicated infantry fighting vehicles, the VBCI,
to form tank-infantry teams with the Leclercs. But French doctrine doesn't consider VBLs as separate
entities from the armor they support. They're a single platoon that should be treated as such when
attached to the infantry. There's also indirect benefits to this setup. For example, an extra
12 or so VBL crews gives more personnel to help with tank maintenance. This is one of the biggest
gripes people have with autoloaders on tanks. Even if you could accept that an autoloader can improve
the technical characteristics of a tank, you still lose the fourth crewmen who helps with pulling
security and conducting intensive maintenance. Except you don't have to, provided the Army plans
for it. The VBL's own maintenance is likely a lot less time consuming than such engaging activities
as breaking down track or replacing a road wheel, so it's still extra hands for the Leclercs.
Before the mixed VBL-tank platoons, tank squadrons each had a direct support or protection
platoon (PAD) equipped with [20mm] armed VABs for providing security to the tanks. When halted,
one VAB with a small dismount squad would be given to each tank platoon to ensure its
security. This practice has its ancestor in the mounted platoons (peloton portee) allotted the
tank and armored car squadrons in the 1950s. Back then mounted on Jeeps or American half tracks.
Although this is a function that is sometimes done by attached infantry as well, giving tanks organic
security allows infantry to be used by the higher commander for something else. Instead of eating up
manpower to provide close security to the tanks, the infantry could be the core of an assault
force in a maneuver while dedicated recon units screen the wider formation. Additionally, with
small drones being more widely proliferated to the force, the VBL crews do seem like prime candidates
for manning them to improve the tank platoon's situational awareness. Having tank crews do it
is a little troublesome in terms of task overload, especially with a three-man crew like the Leclercs
have. As to why this light-heavy mix is so common in French armored forces when compared to other
militaries, like the US, we can infer from the history. First, at the foundation, the French
favor mobility over protection. Speed is the key. But this means French commanders are more willing
to accept greater risks. An example was Operation Serval in Mali (2013) where it was really fought
with speed and logistical leanness, albeit against an inferior enemy. If one is highly dispersed and
moving fast, security becomes a bigger problem, which might explain its decentralization.
Second, during a conventional war a big emphasis is placed on maximal dispersion before rapidly
concentrating. Back in the 1950s this was to avoid being a juicy target for a tactical nuke.
Today it's to avoid detection and presenting a target that the enemy can mass artillery on.
France's manuals read, "The brutality of fires is an amplifying factor of surprise..." Security for
those pockets of companies becomes a challenge, so security has to be decentralized. Whether
recon is attached to a task force like in the US case or made more organic in the French case.
And lastly, most of the conflicts France has been fighting have been low intensity or otherwise
asymmetric conflicts. These types of conflicts demand dismounts for certain tasks. As well,
France with its limited resources when compared to the land of abundance US of A is limited
in the forces it can bring to bear. The US experienced COIN dispersal with many Brigade
Combat Teams (BCT) deployed to one country. For France it's been more like company teams
or battalions spread over hundreds or thousands of kilometers. Immediately after World War II ended,
France embarked on its failed reconquest of Indochina. During this conflict, cavalry units
dismounted because of the chronic shortage of infantry. Those that didn't often acquired
new vehicles out of austerity, such as American amphibious amtracks, Humber armored cars and Bren
carriers left behind by the British, and Jeeps left behind by the SAS which got their windshields
replaced by armored plates and the French somewhat euphemistically called "Armored Jeeps."
In Algeria, mounted platoons and squadrons allowed cavalry units to do a wider range
of missions. They could defend roadblocks more effectively, cordon off areas, sweep towns with
armored cars acting as fire support, help escort convoys and provide close security to armored
vehicles. Even in 1999 Kosovo France formed a combined arms platoons with its new Leclercs
for patrols. An example was two Leclercs, two VBLs and a mechanized infantry squad.
The need for joint Leclerc and VBL patrols in rough terrain was also a thing in Lebanon. Given
that France is a uniquely expeditionary power with its post-colonial sphere, asymmetric and
stability operations are a significant factor that competes over resources with conventional
warfare. If you'd like more details about modern changes to France's tank units you
can learn more with the second channel video on their recent evolution. We'll see over there!