The World Cups of 2010 and 2014 were won by Spain and Germany.
Both nations strove to create a sort of footballing DNA, much as
England, late as ever to the party, are now doing;
focussing on developing touch and creativity in young players, Spain and Germany were able
to develop well-oiled sides who played tight, controlling football that could be both exciting
and suffocating to the point of sterile.
While club football had been playing 4-2-3-1 for some years, 2010 heralded the arrival
of the formation on the global stage.
Spain’s 4-2-3-1 was, at times, a 4-2-1-3, with a double pivot of
Sergio Busquets and Xabi Alonso protecting the back four, Xavi the link, and Andres Iniesta
, David Villa , and Pedro a mobile, deft front
three.
Benefitting from the use of a very Barcelona-like style with a heavily Barcelona-flavoured
line-up, the tight passing triangles, bewildering movement, and heavy dominance of
possession, Spain looked as familiar to viewers of the Champions League or La Liga as a
cobbled-together international team can do.
The full-backs pushed up, Sergio Ramos somewhat more than Joan Capdevila, allowing
the wide players in the attacking trident to
cut inside.
Busquets patrolled the area in front of the back four, while Xabi Alonso pushed up to
assist with a press that was consistent, if not as
manic as sometimes assumed.
The striker, either Fernando Torres or David Villa , pressed lightly
but stayed up rather than dropping into the midfield to defend; most of the ball-winning
energy came from Xavi, Iniesta, and the other wide player, supplemented by the full-backs.
While Spain’s fluidity was mesmerising, with even the shaggy haired stopper Carles
Puyol a deft passer of the ball, many sides used the
4-2-3-1 to create two blocks, a back six and a
front four.
Spain’s opponents in the final, Holland, were an example of this, although in 2010
Argentina, who used a 4-3-1-2, Germany, and Brazil, there
were other examples.
Holland used two sitting, destructive midfielders, Nigel de
Jong and Mark van Bommel, to win the ball back
and feed Wesley Sneijder , who had a wonderful tournament.
While Dirk Kuyt was a willing runner out wide on the left, Arjen Robben was less defensively
minded, and so Holland’s full-backs pushed up less than Spain’s, again creating the
sense of a team divided into an attacking block and
a defensive block.
Sneijder did drop in and was a creative player who actually got through a greater degree
of defensive work than he’s often credited
with, and Kuyt helped out too, which allowed Robben and Robin van Persie to drift and find
space.
Against Spain, Holland tried to press high and unsettle Spain with their physicality,
de Jong especially, but found it hard to get the ball
for extended periods of time.
The game was ​ essentially won as Holland tired and the introduction
of Cesc Fabregas for Xabi Alonso allowed Spain to play more of a 4-1-2-3 and
force Holland back.
Spain’s “beautiful attrition”, as Jonathan Wilson called it, won the day with an Iniesta
goal, and the tiki-taka 4-2-3-1 had become the most
admired style in world football.
In some ways, Germany’s 2014 triumph was another victory for the possession-based 4-2-3-
1, although it could be argued that Germany’s shape in 2014 had evolved from their 2010
system and was more of a 4-3-3.
Toni Kroos , one of the world’s most intelligent midfielders,
was a playmaker but sat deeper than a traditional number 10, flanked by Bastien
Schweingstiger and the ball-winning Christoph Kramer; ahead, Miroslav Klose was a fairly
traditional number 9, but Mesut Ozil was another playmaker who dropped off, while Thomas
Muller was almost a false nine but playing in a wider position.
The midfield axis of Schweinsteiger and Kroos was formidable and influential.
The former dropped deeper, recycling possession wide
to the advancing full-backs Phillip Lahm and Benedikt Howedes, while Kroos pushed up to
link with the attacking trident.
Howedes’ advanced position also helped negate the threat of Lionel Messi , whose Argentina
lined up in a 4-4-1-1, but one that saw the left wide midfielder, Ezequiel Lavezzi, push
very high and central when Argentina attacked,
with right midfielder Enzo Perez much more inclined to tuck in and make a midfield three,
often having to push left to help Marcos Rojo out against Lahm and Muller.
In this way, as Sam Tighe has pointed out, the system could resemble a fluid 4-3-3, with
Messi given a free role on the right, Gonzalo Higuain leading the line, and Lavezzi wide
on the left.
However, against Germany, Argentina opted to sit deeper, cede territory and
possession, and leave Messi and Higuain isolated.
When Higuain was able to occupy one or both centre-backs, Messi and Lavezzi could also
push up on to the opposition full-backs, cut inside, and generally make a nuisance of
themselves, with Perez getting forwards from midfield to assist.
But the final showed the danger of conservative, reactive football when it goes wrong: while
sitting off and looking to counter against teams like Spain or Germany, who like to hog
possession, can be effective, it’s a gamble.
A low, narrow block makes a side hard to break down, as Argentina were in the final, but
it also makes transitional attacks hard.
Germany finally got the breakthrough from a combination
of Andre Schurrle and Mario Gotze combining on the German’s left flank, and
won their fourth World Cup.
International football had caught up with the successful model seen in European football
ever since Barcelona won the Champions League in 2008-09, a methodical, possession-
based game that built sustained pressure before accelerating into quick interchanges of
short passes.
The means of thwarting such an approach also gained traction, sitting deep,
doubling up on threat players, and playing reactive, counter-attacking football.
It made sense for international sides to adopt systems prevalent
in club football, given the limited time and​ opportunities that international managers
have to work with players, but it also meant that
the homogeneity between international football and club football, tactically at least, was
pretty much complete.
International football had become a less fluid, less well-rehearsed
version of the club game to an extent never previously seen.
Spain and Germany, with squads based around two major domestic sides
in both instances, could exploit this; both nations had wonderful players too, but they
were clever with it.