- [Narrator] On the heals of the Civil Rights Movement,
it was initially unclear how the United States Supreme Court
would handle gender-based classifications
under the Equal Protection Clause.
Enter Ruth Bader Ginsburg, then an attorney
for the American Civil Liberties Union,
Ginsburg helped win the case that would give the Court
its modern approach to gender-based classifications.
What was at the center of this landmark case?
Beer.
An Oklahoma statute permitted the sale of beer
with an alcohol content of 3.2% to 18-year old women.
But the same beer couldn't be purchased by men,
like Curtis Craig, who was over 18, but younger than 21.
If you were a man in Oklahoma,
you had to wait until you turned 21.
Along with a beer vendor, Craig challenged the beer statute.
Craig argued that the law's unequal treatment
of male and female beer drinkers was a gender-based
classification in violence of the Equal Protection Clause.
The district Court upheld the statute, and Craig appealed
directly to the United States Supreme Court.
The issue before the Court was whether a statute
that permits the sale of alcohol to women of a certain age,
but not to men of the same age,
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.
In an opinion authored by Justice Brennan, the Court held
that the statute's gender-based classification
violated the Equal Protection Clause.
Prior to this case, the Court generally used one
of two standards of review in equal-protection cases,
rational basis, a differential standard,
or strict scrutiny, a highly demanding standard.
In Craig's case, the Court held
that gender-based classifications must be evaluated
by a standard of review
that is in between rational basis and strict scrutiny.
This test is called intermediate scrutiny.
To satisfy this new standard,
the law must be substantially related
to furthering an important governmental objective.
Oklahoma argued that the important governmental objective
was to promote traffic safety.
In support, the state provided statistics to show
that the law furthered this objective.
The statistics showed that men between the ages of 18 and 20
were more likely than women of the same age
to drink and drive, be arrested for drunk driving,
and be killed in car accidents.
The Court recognized that promoting traffic safety
was an important governmental interest.
However, the statistics were inadequate to support
the state's claim that the gender-based classification
was substantially related to furthering that interest.
The Court noted that 2% of men and 0.18% of women
in the relevant age group were arrested
for driving violations involving alcohol.
According to the Court, this difference wasn't large enough
to justify a categorical classification based on gender.
Further, the state didn't present any statistics
focusing on the dangers presented by 3.2% beer,
as opposed to other types of alcohol,
further weakening the connection between the statute
and the state's interest.
The Court reversed the judgment of the district Court,
and struck down the law as unconstitutional.
Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion to argue
that the correct standard of review
for gender-based classifications should be strict scrutiny
rather than intermediate scrutiny.
Applying strict scrutiny, Powell concluded
that the statute wasn't narrowly tailored
to the state's interest in promoting traffic safety.
Justice Burger wrote a dissenting opinion,
arguing that because gender-based classifications
aren't specifically prohibited by the constitution,
the standard of review should be rational basis.
Under this more deferential standard,
Justice Burger would have upheld the Oklahoma statute.
He reasoned that there was a rational relation
between the state's interest in promoting traffic safety
and the challenged classification because men
in the relevant age bracket were more likely
to drink and drive.
Justice Burger accused the majority of striking down
the statute simply because the majority found it unwise.
Justice Rehnquist also dissented, stating that
the rational basis standard is the proper standard
of scrutiny for gender-based classifications.
Justice Rehnquist explained that nothing
in the Court's previous cases, or the text
of the Equal Protection Clause,
or anywhere else in the constitution supported
the application of an intermediate standard of review
for gender-based classifications.
Craig versus Boren meaningfully altered
Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence
by introducing a third intermediate standard of review
for quasi-suspect classifications, such as gender.
The Court later expanded the intermediate scrutiny
to laws involving illegitimate children.
(pencil scratching)