Brighton have started the season brightly. Graeme Potter continues to grow his reputation as one of
the best younger English coaches, even though his side have fewer points than they probably deserve.
Last season, across the course of 38 Premier League fixtures,
Brighton only managed 15 games where they equalled or exceeded their opponent’s expected goals total.
What this means is that in 23 matches, Brighton’s opponents created better chances.
So far this season, with an admittedly small sample size, Brighton have created the better
chances, or exceeded their opponent’s expected goals, in three of the four games they’ve played.
And that includes matches against Chelsea and Manchester United – the only team to
have bettered them was Everton, although even here, the 4-2 score-line was perhaps unfair,
as Everton only outscored Brighton by 1.7 to 1.2 in terms of expected goals.
The difference is significant. Shown here to two decimal places,
we can see that Brighton are exhibiting a marked improvement, albeit after a small number of games.
In terms of formations, Potter has so far changed things around less. According to FBref.com,
using Statsbomb data, this season has seen a 3-4-3 three times and a 3-5-2 once, against Chelsea.
Last season, Brighton were more fluid.
This is partly because Potter is adaptive and changes his sides to match the opposition, and
was obviously affected by injury and availability too. But it is also possible that he’s decided
that 3-4-3, one of his most used set-ups in 2019/20, is the way forward this season.
So aside from potentially being more settled, what else are Brighton doing differently?
Last season, they generally deployed Martin Montoya on the right-hand side,
either as a full-back or wing-back. Though far from a bad player,
Montoya has been replaced by Tariq Lamptey, who carries a much more significant attacking threat.
Montoya generally looked to play balls into the wide areas or the
channels for a midfielder or striker to move wide towards.
While he did get forwards, his crosses were less commonly rapid overlaps crossed in from
quite near the goal-line, and more frequently from a deeper position in the right half space,
and as the result of several passes rather than a quick burst into space.
Lamptey is quicker and more direct. He’s able to get back to cover because of his speed,
something that Montoya couldn’t do and that kept him in deeper positions,
especially against teams with rapid wingers.
Lamptey is also able to stay wider, because Brighton’s back three can space across the pitch
and he doesn’t have to tuck in as much. This is especially the case because Ben White, who excels
at covering wide areas and bringing the ball out, is on the right of Brighton’s back three.
This means he generally has space to run into, and because he’s a better dribbler who can get
forwards and cross from more dangerous areas, Brighton’s midfield runners can continue to break
vertically, rather than needing to go wide to take a line pass, as was more common with Montoya.
This means Brighton can be more threatening down the right hand side
and, crucially, only really need one player to maintain that width,
rather than two. This means they can attack the box in greater numbers and, of course,
Lamptey himself can carry the ball infield when attacking and cause his own problems.
White has given Brighton another dimension, too. His ability to offer a passing option
from the deep right half space means that the excellent midfield pairing of Yves Bissouma and
Steven Alzate can push up a bit higher, or can stagger so that one is alongside White
and the other, usually Alzate, pushes up to make more of a diamond with the forward line.
White can also find Trossard with vertical passes, or switch play across to the left
hand side, where Alzate or, outside him, Solly March, can find space and attack
areas that have been vacated as Brighton drag opposition players to the right.
This passing from deep makes Brighton’s build-up more unpredictable and fluid than
they could be last season. This fluidity extends the forward line, where the trio of Neil Maupay,
Aaron Connelly and Leandro Trossard complement Brighton’s deeper build-up.
Maupay, who’s largely played as a left inside forward, and Connolly, who plays through the
centre, are mobile and quick, capable of nice interchanges. Trossard can drift in-field,
which opens space for Lamptey’s speedy forays down the right.
But they are capable of interchanging, although Trossard is more likely to hang back and able to
play intelligent through passes to the two other forwards. All three are astute pressers as well,
and Maupay in particular has an aggressive quality that makes him hard to defend. There is less of
a sense now that one striker is leading the line, and more of a fluid unit that works the channels,
drops off, and is supported centrally by runners from deep, which makes Brighton more of a threat.
Whether Brighton can sustain their encouraging start remains to be seen,
but the changes in expected goals are not enormous and could well be sustainable.
And Potter’s tactical shifts point to a considered integration of talents like White,
Lamptey, and Alazate – everything points to a successful season on the south coast.