The warships and submarines of the Second World War weren't built overnight. Their construction
used up resources, manpower, and precious time. Losing one naval vessel, let alone the men on
board, was not something to be taken lightly. But letting a warship or sub fall into the hands of
the enemy was even worse. With the latter outcome, you become weaker while your enemy grows stronger.
It's two points to him, instead of just one. It's understandable, then,
why so many belligerent naval forces decided to pull the plug on their own vessels rather than
see them sporting a paint-job and enemy flag. In this video, we'll be discussing one of the largest
naval self-destruction operations of World War II — the scuttling of the French fleet at Toulon.
After the Germans, with a little help from the Italians, creamed France in 1940,
they occupied a large chunk of the country, mostly in the north and north-west.
The Italians snagged a piece of the south-east, but a significant chunk of southern France
was left unoccupied. This area, deemed Zone Libre or the Free Zone, was administered by
the collaborationist Vichy government, with French Marshal Philippe Pétain at its head.
As part of the Armistice of 22 June 1940, which pretty much laid out the terms of France's
surrender, French naval vessels were supposed to stay in or return to France, where they would
remain in French control. Some French vessels had fled to Britain during the Battle of France,
and some were already stationed a good distance away, such as in the French West Indies,
though a large portion of the French Navy remained or ended up in Toulon and in French
North Africa. The armistice also stipulated that many of these vessels had to be disarmed
and could keep their fuel tanks only a fraction full — so they couldn't open fire or just book it.
Largely unscathed by the Battle of France, the French Navy was still, at this point history,
the fourth largest navy in the world. The Allies were well aware of this, too.
Doing the maths, they realised they would have a serious problem on their hands
if the Germans decided to seize France's warships and subs.
On the 3rd of July 1940, the British bit the bullet and acted on this fear.
While Toulon might have been a juicier target, the French naval vessels stationed in Mers-el-Kébir in
French Algeria weren't as well defended. After what British Prime Minister Winston Churchill
would go on to describe as "the most hateful [...], unnatural[,] and painful [decision] in
which [he had] ever been concerned," the British attacked the French in Mers-el-Kébir. In this
tragic engagement, the British ended the lives of nearly 1,300 French sailors, destroyed a handful
of warships, and royally frakked Anglo-French relations. Though, despite the appalling loss off
life, the British operation was largely a success and also stressed the lengths they were willing
to go to to deny the Germans. Similar logic inspired what happened in Toulon later in the war.
After the Allies, working with the Free French, invaded French North Africa in November 1942,
the commander of the Vichy French Navy, Admiral François Darlan, defected to the Allies. With
Darlan gone and the Allies having invaded North Africa, the Germans were taking the threat of
a French naval defection or Allied attack on Toulon pretty seriously. The French initially
bolstered their defences at Toulon and even made preparations to scuttle the 164 ships and subs
stationed there. While the grand admiral of the German Kriegsmarine believed the French
at Toulon would remain loyal to the armistice and to Germany, the Führer wasn't convinced.
Anti-German and Italian sentiment was growing in Toulon, and was only exacerbated when our
defected friend Darlan called on the French forces in Toulon to join the Allied cause.
In an attempt to nip it in the bud, the Führer set in motion Case Anton, an Axis invasion of
the French Free Zone. He mustered four German combat groups to deal with Toulon specifically,
and some of those men were tasked with one thing above all — preventing the French from scuttling.
On the other side of the coin, Admiral François Darlan's replacement, Admiral Gabriel Auphan,
told his admirals Jean de Laborde and André Marquis to get ready to hold off the Germans
and Italians without resorting to violence, find somewhere safe to move their ships and subs,
and, if that failed, scuttle the hell out of them — just as the Führer had feared.
Early in the morning the 27th of November 1942, the Germans rolled into Toulon with
very little opposition. They captured the French admiral André Marquis in his fort, but one of his
men was able to get the word out to the other French admiral, Jean de Laborde, who was aboard
the flagship Strasbourg and gave an order that denied everyone the French Navy. In other words,
if the French couldn't have the vessels at Toulon, no one could. And so the mass-scuttling began.
Largely, the French achieved this by opening sea valves and setting demolition charges
on fuel stores, guns, and vital machinery. The Germans managed to board some vessels and diffuse
some charges, but the French were determined. Throughout the day, they managed to destroy 77
of their 164 vessels, including three battleships, seven cruisers, 15 destroyers, 13 torpedo boats,
six sloops, nine patrol boats, 19 auxiliary ships, one school ship, 28 tug boats, four crane boats,
and 12 submarines. Some of the larger vessels burned for days, with the Treaty Cruiser Algérie
staying alight for a ridiculous 20 days. The oil released into the harbour from the mass-scuttling
was in such abundance that no one could swim there for the next two years. All in all, only forty-six
vessels were captured by the Germans — most of them small — while several submarines and one
surface ship were able to escape Toulon despite the German ships prowling the mouth of the port.
The French Navy had been all but deleted from the game. But that was kind of a win for everyone,
except France, and especially the 79,000 French naval personnel captured by Axis.
The Germans couldn't have the French Navy, but neither could the Allies. Hitler shrugged, deeming
Case Anton a win. On the other hand, Charles de Gaulle, the leader of the Free French in exile,
was understandably a little peeved. He would definitely have preferred it if the French
admirals had sent the fleet to safety and maybe even joined the Free French and Allies.
What we're interested in, though, is if you think the scuttling was worth it.
Would the war have ended differently if the Germans made full use of those warships and subs?
Was it a bigger loss for the Axis or the Allies? Lastly, what are your thoughts
on the British attack on the French vessels stationed at Mers-el-Kébir in French Algeria?
Was that worth it? Please feel free to share your thoughts in the comments.