One of my Patreons, Slayer (interesting avatar) has asked this question:
“hi TIK, could you discuss the Syria-Lebanon campaign in 1941, why was it necessary from
the Allied point of view?”
Yes, no problem, but I just want to apologize for the slowness of my reply. I’m two years
behind with some of these questions, so sorry about that. I also want to point out that
while this region is called “the Levant”, I’m just going to call it “Syria”, because
it’s just easier to say than “the Levant”, or “Syria and Lebanon”. So “Syria”
it is. Also, while some of the information in this video comes from Playfair’s Official
British History on the Mediterranean and Middle East, most of the information comes from “Invasion
Syria 1941” by de Wailly. It’s a very good book, well written, and studies the motivations
of both sides very well, so if you want more details on the Syrian situation in 1941 than
what I’m going to provide today, this is the book you need to get.
Anyway, after the fall of France in 1940, the French colonies of Syria and Lebanon were
isolated from mainland Vichy France. While they did have some ships, the Mediterranean
itself was a warzone, and the British warned the French ships not to leave the ports. It
was a full blockade, and the situation soon turned bad enough that food supplies inside
Syria began to dwindle. Unemployment spiked, as did price rises, and rationing was introduced
in a hopeless attempt to control the situation. It didn’t work, and riots and demonstrations
occurred, turning violent in some cases.
For a time, it looked like the Arab nationalist faction within Syria would rise up and take
over. And even though the British and French in Syria maintained neutral relations, the
British understood that an Arab take-over would be bad for everyone. You see, the Arabs
were pro-German. Why? Because they were anti-British. ‘The enemy of my enemy is my friend.’
The Arabs wanted independence from the French and British, and because Germany was seen
as a power that could help them do that, they were pro-German. Thus, since Germany was seen
to be beating Britain in 1940 and 1941, the Arabs were looking to exploit that success.
The British believed that an Arab success in Syria would cause turmoil throughout the
Middle East, further undermine their rule, and perhaps invite German forces into the
region as well.
“An Arab success would therefore be a German success.”
It also helped that both the Arabs and the Germans were Anti-Semites. In the February
of 1941, therefore, the British contacted the French government in Syria and negotiated
in secret. The blockade was lifted and the domestic crisis was abated. The British no
longer needed to worry about Syria.
Except, De Gaulle had declared his intent to keep fighting, and by August 1940 had agreed
with Churchill that he would set up a Free French force to fight the Axis. The problem
was, De Gaulle was a man without an army or a base.
“Without a territorial base, almost without an audience, he was still a cause without
a base. Only the possession of a capital and a large territory would give credibility to
his cause. It alone would show that he was not a pawn in the British game but an independent
reality.”
He therefore set his sights on Syria. This wasn’t the only consideration though. The
Germans had occupied Greece, and if they landed aircraft in Syria, they would be in range
of both the Suez Canal and Port Said. This couldn’t be allowed to happen. Of course,
Wavell opposed the idea of striking into Syria because he was already fighting on three fronts
(North Africa, East Africa, and the Mediterranean). That was until there was a coup d'etat in
Baghdad in March and April 1941. After this, the British wanted to station troops in Iraq,
but Rashid Ali refused. Iraq became hostile to the British, and a jihad was declared against
them. Muslim troops in the British Indian Army began to desert, and the oil fields of
Iraq were now in enemy hands. British oil supplies to the front line in North Africa
were suddenly cut off, and American Lend Lease wouldn’t be able to compensate due to the
lack of tankers. So this was a bad situation for the British.
Unfortunately for Rachid Ali, leader of the coup, he had surprised everyone - including
his potential allies, Germany, Italy and Turkey. They were in no position to help out as Hitler
was planning Barbarossa, Italy was committed in the Mediterranean, and Turkey was neutral.
Nevertheless, Hitler ordered that arms be shipped to Iraq, and some Italian aircraft
reached them too. In order to get the Luftwaffe to Iraq, the aircraft needed to be pulled
out of France, and sent via Syria, forcing the Germans to negotiate with the French.
And as this was going on, the British responded by sending troops to Iraq from India, and
later another mobile unit of 2,000 men from Palestine called Habforce, under the command
of Major-General Clark, were sent as well. But they were aware that Germany might invade
Cyprus, Syria, and possibly even Iraq. And even if they didn’t invade, they could use
the Syrian airfields to support the revolt in Iraq if they got cooperation from Vichy
France. Therefore, the British realized that they would have to solve the Syrian question.
At the same time, De Gaulle announced that he would invade Syria with his Free French
Division, partly to take it over for his own reasons, but also to prevent the Luftwaffe
from using Syrian airfields.
The problem was that the British, who were now committed in Iraq, couldn’t support
De Gaulle’s operation at that moment, and so there was a delay. It also didn’t help
that the Free French had to pretend to be separate from the British.
“Understrength, ill-equipped and not homogeneous, almost without artillery, without engineers,
without a medical corps, and without trucks, [the Free French Division] did not form a
force that was easily usable in the British order of battle. Unlike the Poles, the French
refused to enlist in the British forces. They claimed a total independence that they could
not maintain. Their language, organisation, weapons and procedures were quite different.”
On the 3rd of May 1941, the Germans asked the French if they would send over 50 aircraft
via Syria to Iraq, which would be flying Iraqi colours and the crew would be in civilian
clothes. But when the French leader of Syria, Henri Dentz, was informed of this proposal,
he replied that he would fire on all foreign aircraft that flew over Syria. He was ordered
to accept German planes in Syria, and was told that the interests of France were at
stake. Dentz, therefore, gave in.
But he also informed the British. When the Germans arrived, though, almost everything
went wrong. Dentz was told to supply a lot of weapons and ammunition, which he was forced
to hand over. The planes needed refuelling, which sapped Dentz’s fuel supplies. Then
the British reacted by tightening the diplomatic screws, especially when the German fighters
went into action in Iraq on the 13th of May 1941. RAF fighters responded on the 14th by
attacking Luftwaffe aircraft on Syrian airbases.
“Until the 24th of May, British air attacks were only aimed at German aircraft.”
But this didn’t last. On the 20th of May, the Germans landed on Crete. And Rommel’s
first offensive was in full-swing. Baghdad fell on the 30th of May, but it appeared to
the British that the Germans might land in Syria, or Rommel might link up with them,
therefore something had to be done. Interestingly though, the Germans thought that a landing
in Syria wasn’t possible, but it was the British concern for this (and a giant pincer
in the Middle East, that finally persuaded Churchill to do something about Syria. He
ordered the withdraw of 30,000 men from Libya and sent them to Syria.
We’ve got to bear in mind that this was during the time of things like the Siege of
Tobruk, Operation Brevity and Battleaxe, so if you were wondering why the British had
sent very few men for those operations, you now know why. They had to actually pulled
men away from the front with Rommel to send them to Syria.
Wavell wasn’t happy, blaming Churchill, and saying:
“Why do politicians never learn the simple principle of concentration of forces for the
main target and the necessity to avoid dispersion of efforts?”
He also understood that Vichy Syria had displayed no hostile intentions towards the British
(apart from the German bombers), and that there was a chance that, if they defeated
the Germans in North Africa, these Frenchmen might come over to the British side.
“Against the advice of Wavell in Cairo, against that of Dill, Alan Brooke and the
Defence Committee in London, Churchill, thumping the table, gave the order to get ready to
invade the French mandate, with or without the Free French.”
While not mentioned in the sources regarding Syria specifically, it was the case that Churchill
was looking for quick and easy victories. He was trying to prove to the United States
that British was seriously fighting this war, and that they could win it. That’s part
of the reason they went Greece, and Crete, and why they were eager to take out Italian
East Africa and hold onto Tobruk - they were trying to convince the USA to join the war.
De Gaulle jumped on the opportunity, though, declaring that Vichy had handed Syria to the
Germans. He also said that Dentz wouldn’t stop German troops if they decided to land
in Syria, and exaggerated the facts in order to convince everyone that Syria was a genuine
threat (even though it really wasn’t). Both Churchill and De Gaulle sent orders to Wavell
at the same time, telling him to provide transport and support to the Free French in their move
towards Syria. Wavell, having already had poor relations with the Free French, and frustrated
with the strategic situation, offered his resignation, which Churchill refused at the
time. Although he did warn Auchinleck to be ready to replace him.
There’s also some speculation that Churchill viewed Syria as a potential British colony.
If true, he might have wanted to conquer it and retain it after the war. Either way, both
Churchill and De Gaulle wanted this war, and even threw out the idea of potential diplomatic
options to resolve the crisis.
In the end, General Maitland ‘Jumbo’ Wilson took command of the forces that would invade
Syria. He started to gather a force that would end up being 34,000 men strong, consisting
of 18,000 Austrialians, 9,000 British, 2,000 Indians and just 5,400 Free French. Yes, just
18% of the total were Free French units. Unfortunately, Wilson wasn’t given any decent tanks. He
was left with just Vickers Mark VI light tanks, which wouldn’t be able to tackle the modern
Renault tanks of the Vichy French. The infantry anti-tank rifles couldn’t stop them either,
with only the 25-pounder field artillery pieces actually being capable of stopping them. Of
course, the Vichy French had some old Renault FT tanks from the First World War, which were
almost completely useless in this conflict, but a lot of the French tanks were modern.
Wilson had naval support, and a bit of air support, consisting of just 70 aircraft. Their
intelligence was faulty, and they didn’t even have decent maps of the region. So this
was a rag-tag force that was poorly equipped, and was going up against a Vichy French force
of 37,000 men.
The propaganda campaign was intense, going so far as to claim that two German panzer
divisions had already landed in Syria. This wasn’t true. But while there were doubts
about whether Wilson’s force could actually conquer Syria, and while the Vichy French
force was well equipped, the reality was that they were already surrounded and couldn’t
be resupplied. Some of the French generals were of the opinion that they would only survive
about 4 days. So regardless of whether the Allied forces were ready or not, the Vichy
French were going to be in a lot of trouble.
The offensive - Operation Exporter - began on the 8th of June 1941. Back in France, Petain
instructed the Vichy French forces in Syria to fight, telling them that the propaganda
wasn’t true - German forces were not in Syria - and to know that they were fighting
for a just cause. Still, he had nothing to give them but moral support.
The Austrialians (with the Free French and some Indian forces) attacked from the Palestine
region, the British ‘Habforce’ struck across the frontier near Rutba, while the
10th Indian Division would strike from Iraq. As you probably expected, the Vichy French
forces put up stiff resistance at first, compelling the British to send up their 6th Division
from Egypt in order to keep the advance going. But by the 14th of June, the Vichy French
were in trouble, and by the 24th of June, they were on their last legs. Resistance continued,
but they were merely delaying the inevitable. By the 28th of June, Dentz was convinced that
he had lost and that there was nothing that he could do now except hang on. But even before
this, he had wanted to negotiate his way out of the conflict. He only got permission to
do this from the French government on the 9th of July, and submitted a request for a
ceasefire on the evening of the 11th. A minute after midnight on the 12th of July a ceasefire
came into effect, and the fighting was over just 34 days after it had begun.
There are various estimates regarding casualties on both sides. But as a ballpark figure, the
British lost about 3,300 men and either 27 or 41 aircraft. The Free French had lost another
1,300 men (although another source lists 627), so the total for the Allied side was around
4,700 men killed or wounded. Vichy Forces had suffered 5,400 wounded, and about 1,000
killed, plus 179 aircraft (mostly on the ground). Three British destroyers were also put out
of action, and Vichy France lost one destroyer, one submarine and one cargo-ship.
“These are sadly high figures for this regrettable and bitter campaign…”
And I agree. This campaign seems largely pointless because it was obvious that the cut-off Vichy
French forces in Syria wouldn’t have been able to hold out indefinitely against the
British and Allied forces. It reminds me of the East African Campaign, which was similar
in the sense that a surrounded and cut off Italian force was doomed to destruction, yet
had been ordered to fight on. Nevertheless, I think, had the Iraqi coup not occurred,
and had the Germans not reacted by sending a pathetically small Luftwaffe force to Syria
in order to support them, then the British might have left Syria alone. De Gaulle might
have wanted Syria, but without British permission or support he was in no position to take it.
So really, if the Germans had kept out of Syria, it’s likely that Syria would have
remained neutral until the end of the conflict. But having intervened in Syria and Iraq, the
Germans forced the British to react, which they did.
I don’t really want to get into French politics because it’s stupid, but in a nutshell,
De Gaulle rebelled against the British, causing a bit of a crisis, which was resolved when
the British gave him Syria as a base (under their supervision). This then gave legitimacy
to De Gaulle’s cause. However, it also annoyed Churchill, who was soon to get some payback.
The Syrian question came up again four years later, leading to the “Levant Crisis”
in May and June 1945, where the British invaded Syria once again, this time against their
former allies and De Gaulle. British intervention forced the French to withdraw from Syria completely,
leading to Syrian independence.
So I would argue that the impact of the 1941 Syria-Lebanon Campaign led to Syrian and Lebanese
independence after the war. And the primary motivation for the 1941 campaign (and in 1945)
was for the British to protect access to their oil fields in Iraq, plus the Suez canal. So,
it was all about economics. If you haven’t seen my video on the Weimar Hyperinflation
(the first in a series), you really should, because not only did I put my heart and soul
into this series, it also explains why the First World War (and thus, the Second World
War) even happened. Yes, it’s all economics. Thanks for watching, bye for now.