In Griswold v. Connecticut, the the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut's Executive Director, Griswold, and one of its doctors, Buxton,
were arrested and charged under a Connecticut
law that forbade the use of contraceptives by anyone, including married couples, and
penalized those who provided information about contraceptives. Griswold and Buxton were found
guilty as accessories and fined $100. Griswold and Buxton fought the convictions, alleging
that the Connecticut laws violated their right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Appellate Division of the Circuit Court affirmed their convictions, as did the Connecticut
Supreme Court of Errors. Griswold and Buxton appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court found the Connecticut law unconstitutional and reversed the convictions.
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, held that there is a right to privacy implied
throughout various provisions of the Bill of Rights, even in the absence of specific
language addressing privacy. Douglas pointed to the “penumbras” and “emanations”
of constitutional protections, such as the right to assemble in the First Amendment;
the Third Amendment’s requirement for consent before quartering soldiers in private citizens’
homes; the Fourth Amendment’s recognition of people’s right to be “secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures”; the
Fifth Amendment’s right against self-incrimination; and the Ninth Amendment’s direction that
“the enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people.” The Court found that this “zone of privacy”
should extend to intimacies between married people, including the use of contraception,
and that those relations should be protected from “governmental intrusion.”
Three justices filed concurring opinions, and two dissented. Justice Goldberg argued
in his concurrence that the right to privacy in marriage is so fundamental that allowing
its infringement because privacy is not specifically addressed in the previous eight amendments
is to ignore the Ninth Amendment altogether. Goldberg rejected this reading of the text
on the basis of the Court’s holding in Marbury v. Madison, that “every clause must be given
effect.” Justice Harlan’s concurrence found support
for married people’s right to use contraceptives in the Due Process Clause. He disapproved
of the majority’s willingness to look beyond established law and infer a new right of privacy,
which he viewed as inappropriate judicial activism.
Justice White concurred that the Connecticut law deprived married
couples of liberty without due process of law. White further found the law so excessively broad
beyond its stated purpose—that is, prevention of adultery and fornication—that it was unconstitutional.
Justice Black dissented, because he refused to read in a right to privacy that was not
in the text of the Constitution. Justice Stewart criticized the Connecticut law as “uncommonly
silly” but believed that legislative change should be addressed only through elected representatives.
This is a landmark case, because the Court recognized a constitutionally protected right
to privacy. The Supreme Court also relied on Griswold in subsequent reproductive rights
cases. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court extended privacy protections to unmarried people seeking
contraceptives. The right to privacy identified in Griswold similarly served as a foundation
for Roe v. Wade, which removed some restrictions on abortion.