As the war in Ukraine continues, an interesting development
in another conflict in the former Soviet Union went largely unnoticed.
In May 2022, the leader of the breakaway Georgian region
of South Ossetia announced plans to hold a referendum on joining Russia.
But while it may have seemed like the ideal moment for Moscow to annex the territory,
the vote was quickly called off following Russian pressure.
Tis all raises the obvious question: what in fact does Russia really want with South Ossetia.
Hello and welcome. If you're new to the channel, my name is James Ker-Lindsay and
here I take an informed look at international relations, conflict, security, and statehood.
De facto states are a fascinating feature of contemporary international relations.
Having broken away from a country and seemingly achieved a degree of independence,
they're largely, if not completely, unrecognised by the wider international community.
Usually facing political and economic isolation, and often living under the threat of invasion
by the state they left, these entities almost always rely on a third country - or
a patron state, as they usually called - for diplomatic, financial, and military support.
However, the relationship between the de facto state and its patron
can often be extremely complex.
While it might seem that their goals are aligned, this isn't always the case.
Indeed, there can often be very serious tensions between them.
Sometimes, this may be because the de facto state wants more distance from its patron.
At other times, it may be because it wants a closer
relationship - perhaps even full integration.
One of the most interesting examples centres on Russia's relationship with South Ossetia,
which broke away from Georgia at the start of the 1990s.
This came to the fore in Spring 2022.
With international attention focused on the war in Ukraine,
the South Ossetian leader announced his intention to hold a vote on unification with Russia.
But, just weeks later, the plans were shelved for reasons that don't entirely make sense.
Georgia lies in the Caucasus. To its north is Russia and Azerbaijan is to its east.
Armenia and Turkey are its southern neighbours.
To its west it has a Black Sea coastline.
At 70,000 square kilometres,
or 30,000 square miles, it is the 119th largest member of the United Nations.
The population in the parts under government control is around 3.7 million.
Ethnic Georgians make up the largest proportion, at 87 percent,
with Azerbaijanis representing six percent and Armenians at four and a half percent.
A little under one percent are Russian.
Since 1991, the Georgian Government hasn't been in control of two areas of the country:
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Abkhazia, the larger and more populous, lies to the west/
South Ossetia is in the north-central part of the country.
At 3,900 square kilometres, or 1500 square miles,
it makes up around five and a half percent of Georgia's overall territory.
While official figures suggest that its population is around 50,000,
most observers believe it's just 35 to 40,000.
The Ossetians are a predominantly Christian Orthodox people living
in an area that straddles the Caucasus Mountains.
While they trace their ancestry to the Alans, an ancient Iranian people, our story really starts
in the late 18th century when Imperial Russia began to push into the Caucasus.
After conquering the northern part of the region, at the start of the 19th century
Russian forces took the south - along with the rest of Georgia.
In 1917, the two parts were separated by the Russian Revolution.
While the north remained within Russia, the south became a part of a briefly independent Georgian
state - a division that led to a series of South Ossetian uprisings that were brutally put down.
However, in 1921 Georgia was captured by the Soviet Red Army.
While this gave the South Ossetians hoped that they would be reunified with the north,
the region was instead given self-rule - as the
South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast - within the new Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic.
This continued for the next seven decades.
However, by the late 1980s the Soviet Union was breaking apart
and South Ossetia saw its chance to break away.
In 1989, following growing tensions with the Georgian leadership,
the South Ossetian Supreme Soviet voted to unite with North Ossetia.
Although violent clashes were prevented by Soviet troops, the following year South Ossetia
announced that it had formed a separate Soviet republic and called for Moscow's recognition.
In response, the Georgian authorities rescinded its autonomy and declared a state of emergency.
In 1991, as Georgia regained its independence after decades of Soviet rule,
it tried to retake South Ossetia by force.
But despite initial gains, it was unable to seize the region as a whole.
With fighting now escalating over in Abkhazia,
which was also trying to break away, the Georgian government accepted a ceasefire.
They established a joint peacekeeping force along with Russia and opened the
way for peace talks under the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the OSCE.
In the decade that followed, the situation remained relatively peaceful.
Indeed, there was still a lot of contact between South Ossetia and Georgia.
However, this came to an end in 2003 when the Georgian government was overthrown
and a new pro-western president, Mikhail Saakashvili, took over.
Promising to reassert control over the breakaway regions, this soon led to renewed fighting.
But while Georgia now promised to give the region's maximum possible autonomy,
the South Ossetian leaders called an independence referendum.
The final result showed overwhelming support for statehood.
Over the next three or four years tensions remained high.
This was also fed by the growing hostility between Russia and the West.
In aAril 2008, NATO formally welcomed Georgia's aspiration for membership - a
decision Moscow condemned as a 'huge strategic mistake.'
This all came to a head on the 7 August 2008.
As the world watched the opening of the Beijing Olympics, Russia and Georgia went to war.
Responding to what it claimed had been an attack on its troops,
Georgia ordered its forces into South Ossetia.
However, within hours Russian soldiers and heavy armour
were flooding through the Roki Tunnel - linking North and South Ossetia.
Just five days later - and after a massive Russian onslaught by land,
sea and air - Georgia was forced to capitulate.
Under the terms of the ceasefire agreement, Russian troops withdrew from most of the country.
However, South Ossetia and Abkhazia - around 20 percent of Georgia's overall
territory - remained under Russia's effective control.
Just two weeks later, Moscow announced that it had in fact
recognised the two territories as independent sovereign states.
Although South Ossetia's independence was rejected by most of the world,
four more countries would eventually recognise it as a state: Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru and Syria.
However, most observers in fact believe that it had little real interest in independence.
While some South Ossetians may have supported statehood,
opinion polls appeared to show overwhelming support for unification with the far larger
and more populous North Ossetia within the Russian Federation.
As a result, calls for a referendum on integration grew.
However, despite the growing economic and political ties between North and South Ossetia,
as well as the growing control Russia exerted over South Ossetia,
Moscow steadfastly resisted the calls for annexation.
Instead, it seemed to prefer creeping de facto integration over actual unification.
This even continued after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014.
For example, while a treaty of alliance and integration, signed in 2015,
saw Russia guarantee South Ossetia's defence and security, and even created a customs
union between them, it was nevertheless framed very clearly in terms of interstate relations.
Despite Russia's apparent opposition to the idea,
unification nevertheless remains firmly on the South Ossetian agenda.
This was most recently highlighted in Spring 2022.
As international attention was focused on Ukraine, the South Ossetian leader,
Anatoly Bibilov, announced plans to hold a referendum on union with Russia.
At the time, few took the idea particularly seriously.
Fighting a tough re-election campaign,
many saw it as an attempt by the incumbent to shore up his vote.
However, despite being defeated, Bibilov announced that the poll
would still go ahead; setting Sunday 17 July as the date for the vote.
While the planned vote was condemned by Georgia, the European Union, and the United States,
it was rather more interesting to see that Russia also announced that it was against the referendum.
Speaking publicly about the planned poll, the Russian Government Spokesman, Dmitry Peskov,
appeared to suggest that the Kremlin hadn't even been consulted about the vote.
More to the point, the Russian government
also had serious concerns about the legal implications of the decision.
While careful not to dismiss the possibility of eventual unification,
it was clear that Moscow had no intention of seeing annexation at this stage.
On 31 May, the new South aOssetian leader, Alan Gagloyev, issued a decree cancelling the vote.
Crucially, this left little doubt that Moscow had stopped the referendum.
As well as citing legal uncertainties over the wording of the question in the referendum,
the statement also emphasised that South Ossetia
couldn't take unilateral decisions that would affect Russia's interests.
So, what exactly happened?
In many ways, the decision to cancel the referendum may seem strange.
For a start, there's clearly a lot of support for unification with Russia.
Again, South Ossetia - small and isolated as it
is - has always seemed to have a weak commitment to its statehood.
Instead, there's a strong - though not necessarily
universal - wish for unification with North Ossetia, albeit within the Russian Federation.
Moreover, after decades of gradual integration with Russia and North Ossetia,
South Ossetia is already effectively a part of the Federation.
Formal annexation therefore seems like the obvious next step.
On top of this, the timing for such a move seemed ideal.
The war in Ukraine appeared to offer a perfect moment to act.
Given that extensive sanctions had already been imposed, Russia seemed
to have little to lose economically or diplomatically by annexing South Ossetia.
Indeed, it could even have been politically useful.
As well as sending a message to the West that Russia wouldn't bow to Western pressure,
it would have helped pave the way for the expected annexation of Donetsk and Luhansk;
which is now widely expected if, or when, Russia consolidates its control in eastern Ukraine.
So, why didn't it happen?
In truth, it's hard to say with certainty.
Some have suggested caution amongst the incoming South Ossetian leadership.
Once unification takes place, they could well lose their privileged position.
In truth, though, the problem evidently lies with Russia.
For Moscow, the matter is more complicated and delicate than it seems.
For a start, it doesn't appear to offer much domestic benefit.
Russians don't have an emotional link with Ossetia in the way that they do with Crimea or the Donbas.
The annexation of South Ossetia just simply wouldn't offer the same domestic political
advantages for the Kremlin as the annexation of other territories.
Meanwhile, it would carry wider international costs.
Aside from the further reputational damage caused by seizing the territory
of yet another sovereign state, South Ossetia remains a useful bargaining chip
with neighbouring Georgia; which has increasingly looked westwards.
While annexation wouldn't be internationally recognised, in practical terms Russia would
then find it very difficult to leave the door open to its eventual reintegration
into Georgia as the Russian constitution forbids the country from giving up territory.
Gradual integration short of actual annexation
represents a far better long-term option for Moscow.
But while on the surface this explanation
would appear to make sense, it still doesn't seem entirely convincing.
Can Moscow really expect to just hand back South Ossetia to Georgia
at some point - thus defying a deep-rooted, centuries-old Ossetian wish for unification
and ripping apart all the ties that have been formed?
In this sense, and recognising that it's created a difficult problem for itself,
now would seemingly have been the ideal moment for Moscow to put the issue to rest.
For all these reasons, one just gets the sense that this isn't the full story.
There seems to be a lot more going on.
But it's hard to say what.
Indeed, even long-standing regional watchers seem divided on what exactly is happening.
And all this goes to show that, when dealing with the complex relationship
between de facto states and their patrons, what one usually sees on the surface masks a
far more complex situation that's often extremely difficult for outsiders to decode.
If you found that useful, here are some more videos on conflicts in the former Soviet Union.
Thanks so much for watching and see you in the next video.