KATHERINE: The United States cannot kill its way out of the war against Islamist terror.
To turn the tide, America must rethink its strategy.
Since the attacks on New York and Washington on September 11th, 2001, the United States
has defined its enemies as specific terror groups.
PRESIDENT BUSH: Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there.
It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.
KATHERINE: The Obama administration defined ISIS as enemy number one, and its control of Mosul and Raqqa
as the pressing problem.
PRESIDENT OBAMA: We’re going after ISIL from their stronghold right
in downtown Raqqa, to Libya, where we took out Abu Nabil, the ISIL leader there.
The point is, ISIL leaders cannot hide.
And our next message to them is simple: You are next.
KATHERINE: Trump doubled-down by killing even more ISIS members and driving them out of their captured
lands.
PRESIDENT TRUMP: And we are effectively ridding the world of ISIS.
I see that as a primary role, and that’s what we’re going to do, whether it’s in
Iraq or in Libya or anywhere else.
KATHERINE: But while America’s current anti-ISIS campaign may severely degrade them, it will not defeat
or destroy them.
Instead, it may help al Qaeda assume the lead in Syria and facilitate the rise of the next
ISIS incarnation in Iraq.
In short, the cardinal error of American foreign
policy since 9/11 has been the pursuit of specific, named terror groups as the enemy.
The US needs to rethink that strategy.
By focusing U.S. military, legal and policy tools on the destruction of particular groups
like ISIS and al Qaeda, policymakers miss the real enemy: the Salafi-jihadi movement.
To understand the way forward, we need to understand this movement.
Let’s be clear: The root cause of Islamist terror is not specific terror groups, like
ISIS and al Qaeda.
The cause of terrorism isn’t the religion of Islam, either.
It’s not Muslims.
The roots of Islamist terror sprout from Salafi-jihadism, a fringe sect with extremist beliefs about
the practice of Islam.
The practice and observance of Sunni Islam, like all major contemporary religions, varies greatly.
On one end of the spectrum are Sunni who are fundamentally secular.
There are also devout mainstream Sunni.
Salafism is a trend in Sunni Islam, and among Salafis, the spectrum of belief ranges from
those who abstain from politics and violence, to those who pursue political power to effect
change, to those who justify violence for political purposes.
Positioned at the extreme are those who seek to destroy the state and establish a new polity
under sharia, though even these groups disagree among themselves over when, where, and against
whom violent acts are justified to achieve their aims.
Salafi-jihadi ideology brings together groups and individuals into a network that seeks
the same shared outcome, and these groups and individuals comprise the Salafi-jihadi base.
It’s these Salafi-jihadi groups that pose the threat of terrorism, Al Qaeda and ISIS
most prominent among them.
Yet the majority of Muslims reject the end
state that al Qaeda, ISIS, and the broader Salafi-jihadi base pursue.
So how has Salafi-jihadism – a once-isolated ideology – become so powerful?
In short, vulnerable Sunni Muslim populations have turned to Salafi-jihadi groups for help.
Sunni populations across the Muslim world are now under threat – both real and perceived –
from Iran, Shi’a Muslims, the Assad regime, Russia, the Kurds, and even the West,
among others.
They are looking for help to survive.
Modern Salafi-jihadism has been present in the Muslim world for decades,
but at the edges of society.
In stable countries, Sunni populations had no reason to tolerate extremism in large numbers.
But popular grievances, beginning with the Arab Spring in 2011, inspired uprisings that
then spread and spiraled out of control, disrupting the stability of the Middle East.
There are now at least six failed states in the Muslim world.
Weak states from Nigeria to Egypt to Afghanistan are also unable to deliver basic goods to
their populations.
In these destabilized countries, the Salafi-jihadi base delivers protection, stability, and assistance
to these threatened and aggrieved populations.
Sunni communities are now making short-term decisions to tolerate the Salafi-jihadi base,
ending the base’s decades in isolation.
So, if ISIS and al Qaeda are taking advantage
of weak Sunni populations, why can’t the United States just target the leaders of these
Salafi-jihadi groups and help partners recapture terrain?
While al-Qaeda and ISIS are the most dangerous and prominent groups in the Salafi-jihadi
movement, attacking them does nothing to weaken the Salafi-jihadi movement itself, and doesn’t actually
break the relationships that Salafi-jihadi groups have with vulnerable Sunni populations.
US policy decisions, particularly those regarding Syria, have fed a ground truth narrative that
the US doesn’t care about the Sunni or, worse, is actively supporting the aggressors
against the Sunni.
In fact, the United States has implicitly allied with all actors fighting against ISIS in Syria
except for the majority-Sunni opposition group.
The US even has a de facto partnership against ISIS with the Iranian- and Russian-backed
Assad regime, which was compounded by President Trump’s decision
to stop arming the Sunni opposition group.
The US remains focused on disrupting or destroying the cells of al Qaeda and ISIS that are plotting
major operations against the West, reducing the military strength of select groups – especially
through regaining territory – and killing group leaders.
This does nothing but change which group vulnerable Sunnis run to, or which leaders drive the
Salafi-jihadi base.
Al Qaeda and ISIS each seek to be the leaders of the Salafi-jihadi movement.
Imagine that these filings represent the individuals and groups that believe in the Salafi-jihadi ideology.
Al Qaeda was the only global organization, and like a magnet draws the filings to it,
so too, did al Qaeda assume the leadership position.
The rise of ISIS added another pole to the movement.
Al Qaeda’s and ISIS’s competition didn’t weaken the movement.
Both advance it.
Defeating ISIS will position al Qaeda to capture the remnants of that organization.
Defeating al Qaeda, too, weakens the movement, but another organization will rise in its place.
While it is possible – and may even be necessary – to target individuals or networks, guns
and bombs cannot destroy a movement.
The elements of American power now operate against a mere fraction of the movement.
They may destroy that fraction, but will not destroy or even defeat the movement itself.
This is why the US must look beyond the groups and focus on the Salafi-jihadi base itself.
So, can we win?
Knowing what we know now, what should we do to move forward?
As a first step, the United States must work to resolve local wars and conflicts that seemingly
fall outside of American interests, but actually strengthen the Salafi-jihadi base.
None of these wars have a military solution.
Resolving them will be no easy task.
But an end to the conflicts would help to demobilize Sunnis, and would constrain the
Salafi-jihadi base’s ability to insinuate itself into Sunni populations and generate support.
Additionally, in areas penetrated by or vulnerable to the Salafai-jihadi base, US policies must
promote accountable governments that are legitimate, transparent, and responsive to the needs of citizens.
The only path to victory is resolving local conflicts and societal upheaval, focusing
on the Sunni population, and breaking the ties between the people and the Salafi-jihadi base.
Anything less ensures another generation of Americans will be fighting the same war and losing.
To learn more about my take on what the United States should do to defeat al Qaeda, ISIS,
and the Salafi-jihadi movement, check out the link to my new report, "America's Real Enemy",
in the description below.
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