Three months into the invasion of Ukraine,
Russia and its surrogates have seen a failed attack on Kyiv,
an unprecedented global backlash,
and, according to a recent report from UK intelligence,
as many casualties as the entirety of the Soviet war in Afghanistan.
In sum, despite some territorial gains along the Sea of Azov,
the war has not begun well for Vladimir Putin.
With that in mind, a natural question to ask
is why no high-level officials within the Russian government—those
who are well-aware of how the war has played out so far—have tried to remove Putin from power yet.
So, armed with some of the latest research in political science on the subject,
here are five reasons a coup has not yet ousted Vladimir Putin.
Number one: Putin’s popularity
Those in the west may have a perception that Putin
is residing in a house of cards that is about to fall apart.
Although that may be true in the long term, things appear to be going well for him at the moment.
Prior to the war, public opinion polls on Putin’s approval rating sat at 67.2%.
It is tempting to believe that those numbers overstate Putin’s approval. After all,
citizens of autocratic regimes may be fearful to give truthful responses in fear of reprisals.
But as we have talked about before, political scientists have ways to check for preference
falsification like that, and it seems that Russians were telling the truth back then.
It also appears that the war has only increased Putin’s popularity.
Following the start of the conflict, that approval rating jumped to 81.6%.
This is a classic rally-round-the-flag effect. It’s common when wars begin.
For example, following September 11, 2001,
George W. Bush’s approval rating shot up from 51% to a stunning 90%.
That number dwindled during the interwar years.
However, he saw another substantial jump at the beginning of the Iraq War, going from 58% to 71%.
As long as Putin maintains these high poll numbers, a coup against him will be difficult.
That’s because the plotters, if successful, would have to explain to the masses why they thought
the ouster was necessary. Doing that is a lot easier if no one likes the leader to begin with.
But that popularity might not last forever.
By December of 2003, Bush’s approval rating had dwindled to 50%.
This was in large part due to the mismanagement of the post-“mission accomplished” phase of the war.
Something like this has happened in Russia’s past as well.
As soldiers returned from the Soviet-Afghan war, they gave
their friends and family a clearer picture of what was actually happening on the ground.
This contributed to the instability within the Soviet Union
that gave rise to reformer Mikhail Gorbachev. Something similar could happen with Ukraine.
Number two: coordination
The issue with popularity leads to a second-order problem. For a coup
to be successful, you will need handful of key Putin allies switch allegiances to the plotters.
But if each key ally thinks the other key allies are unlikely to support the coup—perhaps
because Putin has a high level of popularity—then they may decline to participate in the plot.
Worse yet for the plotters, they might tell Putin about the situation
and spoil the whole thing. And because of all those concerns,
the would-be plotters might not even try to get any plans off the ground.
Thus, even if there is a silent consensus throughout Russia’s political elites that
they would be better off without Putin, it’s still possible that no one will try.
In game theory, we call this a “coordination problem”.
Coordination problems can lead to all sorts of inefficiencies,
and we have discussed in the past how it’s a problem for a potential popular uprising.
It’s also a key reason why you hear a lot of intelligence reports
from western and Ukrainian sources indicating that Putin is in trouble.
Whether those are true or not is hard to say. But if broadcasting them makes Putin’s inner circle
reevaluate how others feel about him, this could induce coordination that would otherwise fail.
Number three: Loyal Oligarchs
Imagine you were a political entrepreneur that wanted to initiate a coup against Putin.
Let’s go back to the handful of Putin allies whose support you will need for the coup to succeed.
How do you convince them to come along for the ride?
You promise to pay them a lot of money once you get into power.
A lot of money.
The problem is that Putin is already paying them for protection. And the bigger issue for
them is that they cannot be certain you will keep them around after the coup has succeeded.
After all,
there are a lot of other people who are willing to fill those roles.
And they may be willing to do it for a lower price.
That would mean more money you can keep in your own pocket.
At that point, why not make the switch?
This is why the oligarchs are loyal to Putin.
Given that they have a hard time trusting potential coup plotters, why risk a sure thing?
Of course, there is something that the international community is doing about this.
Economic sanctions reduce the total quantity of goods that Putin can divide among his cronies.
Presumably, if you were to succeed with your coup plot, those economic sanctions would go away.
This creates a larger pie for you to split among whomever you appoint to those key positions.
In turn, the current group of oligarchs may be willing to support you. Yes, there is some chance
you will betray their trust. But the potential for larger benefits may make up for that risk.
Number four: Aid Problems
Another issue arises with what would happen after a successful coup.
Since the Cold War ended, there has been a significant change in post-coup regime structures.
In 1953, the United States and United Kingdom helped organize a coup in Iran to overthrow
democratically-elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh.
This consolidated power for the Shah,
who would control the country for the next 26 years before the Iranian Revolution.
Meanwhile, the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia removed Eduard Shevardnadze from power.
Two months later, Mikheil Saakashvili was elected president,
and two months after that Georgia held parliamentary elections.
These two cases are representative of a broader trend.
From 1945 to 1990, in the five years following a coup,
a competitive, democratic election took place in just 27% of those countries.
From 1991 to 2006, that number jumped to 72%.
A primary driver of the difference is the end in Cold War competition.
Before 1991, life was easy for someone who just replaced the previous leader of a country.
The new leader could simply approach one of the two superpowers
and receive instant support with only a few conditions.
For example, this happened between the Soviet Union and Fidel Castro in 1952.
But this story is more about changes to U.S. behavior. The United States was willing to
sponsor democratic backsliding as long as the new leader would was going to support the West.
Beyond the Iran 1953 case from a moment ago, this also happened
In Guatemala in 1954
What is now the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1960
Brazil in 1964
Bolivia in 1971
Chile in 1973
And Argentina in 1976.
With the Cold War over and the Soviet Union gone, the United States backed off that policy.
Now, if a country wants to receive aid from Washington,
it must schedule elections in short order following a coup.
The problem here is that this makes coups less attractive
for those who are in position to initiate them.
Before, a political entrepreneur knew that the aid would be free-flowing following the coup,
allowing them to pocket a lot of money.
Now, however, a coup plotter in Russia would have to submit to an election if they were
successful in ousting Putin. And they’d have to win to get any material gain out of it.
That makes the coup less attractive and therefore less likely to arise.
Finally, number five: Purges
This is the hardest one to evaluate with any kind of certainty,
but it is plausible that purges are playing a role here. Putin is a strategic actor.
He knows he is facing coup threats, and there are things he can do to reduce the likelihood that
one succeeds. Reports indicate that purges have increased since the start of the war,
particularly directed at the FSB, Russia’s intelligence agency.
What portion of those are directed at removing potential coup threats,
and what portion are punishment for a disastrous first phase of the war is unclear.
Regardless, straightforward purges like that are obvious. But let’s talk about another
type that is less obvious—and one that’s easy to execute while a war is already underway.
Call it the Uriah the Hittite strategy. Uriah is a biblical figure—an Israeli
military officer under King David and married to a woman named Bathsheba.
One day, while peering from his castle, David saw Bathesheba.
Apparently she was quite the sight—he immediately seduced her and impregnated her.
Recognizing the sticky situation, David wrote to Uriah’s commander and told him:
“Put Uriah out in front where the fighting is the fiercest.
Then withdraw from him so he will be struck down and die.”
And that’s exactly what happened. Afterward, David married Bathesheba.
The central lesson here is that the best place to hide a dead body
is in the middle of a battlefield.
If Putin suspected some portion of his military commanders were plotting a coup against him,
one simple solution is to send them to the front lines of the war.
Best case scenario: they die in battle and pose no further problems to Putin.
The commanders, fully aware of that problem, may try executing the coup while they are
still in Moscow. But at the very least, this forces the plotters to accelerate their plans,
making the probability of success less likely.
If Putin were to issue such orders, it would likely be years before we ever found out the
details. But it is interesting to think about as the war is ongoing.
And those are five reasons why a coup has not yet removed Putin. Is there another critical point
that you think I am missing here? Let me know in the comments. And if you enjoyed this video,
please like, share, and subscribe, and I will see you next time. Take care.