Bagnold is aware of the WW1 “Light Car Patrol” that ventured into Palestine and the Western
Desert in Model T Fords with oversize tyres. And throughout the 1920’s and 30’s, he
and his comrades travel thousands of miles across the deserts of Africa and the Middle
East in Model T Fords. They travel to the Oasis at Siwa - where Alexander the Great
also visited a couple millennia before - and they even share a meal with some Italian soldiers
on the border of Libya and Egypt. On his journeys Bagnold invents several methods of getting
vehicles across the desert, and builds up a wealth of experience and invented clever
ways to overcome the many obstacles such trips presented him. He finds that normal magnetic
compasses don't work on his metal vehicles, so he creates the sun compass. Effectively
a modified sundial that can be mounted on a dashboard. Bagnold retires in 1935, but
is recalled to service in 1939 at the outbreak of World War Two.
Even in 1940, there is only one tarmac road in the whole of Libya, and that runs along
the coast. There are a few tracks, but otherwise there was nothing but sand. Bagnold is concerned
that the southern flank is open for exploitation by the Italians. From Uweinat, an Italian
mobile force could travel east and, amongst other thing, strike at the railway workshops
of Wadi Haifa - cutting communication between Egypt and the Sudan. The Italians could also
strike south into French Chad and cause havoc there too, as well as bring those French onto
their side. He sees how essential it is to scout out the Italian southern flank and find
out exactly what was happening there.
So making his way to Matruh, Bagnold meets with 7th Armoured Division’s commander,
General Percy Hobart, and tells him about the possibility of recreating a unit similar
to the “Light Car Patrol” of WW1. General Hobart likes the idea, and sends the plan
to his commanders… who turn it down. Disappointed, Bagnold is at least pleased to see the 7th
Armoured are using his sun compasses.
It isn’t until after Italy’s declaration of war in June 1940 that Bagnold’s ideas
are given serious consideration. The strategic picture has changed dramatically. France was
now out of the war, and Italy can potentially strike out in every direction with their quarter
of a million men in Libya. Bagnold’s plan is placed on Wavell’s desk, and within an
hour, Bagnold is summoned to the Commander in Chief’s office and is explaining his
proposal. He explains his plan to approach the Italian positions from across the Great
Sand Sea - a route his friend Clayton had discovered in 1932 - which would maintain
an element of surprise. Wavell quizzes him on several issues. And when asked what he
would do if there were no signs of enemy activity, Bagnold replies that he’d carry out some
piracy on the high seas against enemy convoys. Wavell, suitably impressed, agrees to the
scheme and on the 23rd of June 1940, the “Long Range Patrol” is formed.
Bagnold is ordered to be ready in six weeks. This wasn’t an easy task. Bagnold has to
go to the Chevrolet company in Alexander and beg for an additional fourteen of their 30-cwt
(thirty hundredweight) Chevrolet trucks, as they could only scavenge 19 from the army.
The trucks are great but can’t be used on the soft desert sand with all the equipment
they’re carrying. So they remove the doors, the cabs and windscreens to reduce the overall
weight of the vehicles. They paint camouflage on them and add the 7th Armoured Division’s
red rat insignia to conceal their true purpose.
Bagnold is given a free hand to select his men from other units and gather the necessary
supplies and equipment. Failing to recruit Australians - because the Australian government
doesn’t want their soldiers being used in British units - Bagnold instead recruits New
Zealanders from their Divisional Cavalry Regiment and Machine Gun Battalion. He wants an intelligent
and self-sufficient type of soldier, not a rough and ready-to-fight sort of person you’d
see in the British commandos. He wants men who can survive out in the desert, and the
New Zealanders meet his expectations. Within a couple weeks, they’re ready to set off
on their first patrol.
Captain Clayton and 7 men set off in two trucks from Cairo on the 7th August 1940. They drive
west to Bagush near Matruh and meet with General Richard O’Connor, commander of the Western
Desert Force. O’Connor is the general who would soon show the Italians a thing or two
during Operation Compass. Clayton’s Patrol then moves south, reaching Siwa on August
the 8th. Moving west, they reach the Kufra track, which they watch for three days.
This is their first reconnaissance of the war. Seeing no Italians at all, Clayton returns
to Cairo with his intelligence, having covered 1,600 miles in 13 days. Wavell is impressed
and decides to allow the Long Range Patrol Group to be fully operational.
Therefore, Bagnold splits his force into three groups.
“W” Patrol is commanded by Captain Mitford.
“T” Patrol is commanded by Captains Clayton and Ballantyne
“R” Patrol is commanded by Captain Steele.
Each has 25 men of other ranks on ten trucks and a pilot car, with enough rations and equipment
for a 1,500 mile journey. Each patrol also has a 3.7 mm Bofors gun, four Boys anti-tank
rifles and fifteen Lewis guns.
On the 5th September, Bagnold accompanies W Patrol from Cairo and drives 350 miles south-west
to Ain Dalla. They reach the Libyan Desert Sea on the 11th of September, at Big Cairn,
where they meet up with T and R Patrols. Big Cairn is a five-foot high mound of rocks that
Clayton had built in 1932. R Patrol heads back to ferry supplies between Siwa and their
current position, whilst T Patrol heads south towards Chad. This leaves W Patrol and Captain
Mitford to head west.
After a few days of blistering heat, they visit two Italian landing grounds between
Jalo and Kufra, which the Italians aren’t guarding. So they smash the fueling and navigation
apparatus there before moving south-east towards Wadi Zighen. On the 19th of September, two
lorries carrying Italian supplies are intercepted. Captain Mitford orders a burst of Vickers
machine gun fire and the trucks came to a halt. The Italians surrender without a fight
and their vehicles - carrying 2,500 gallons of petrol and a bag of official mail - fall
into British hands. After a brief reconnaissance of Uweinat, all are taken back to Cairo, which
they arrive at on the 4th of October. Covered in a second skin of grime, their clothes have
to be peeled off their flesh and burnt.
In Cairo, they became a sensation overnight. They’ve travelled 1,300 miles and brought
back with them a bag of Italian mail. Wavell is so impressed he sends a telegraph to the
War Office detailing their exploits. Secretary of State for War, Anthony Eden visits them
on the 16th at their barracks and is incredibly impressed with what he sees.
Between the 24th of October and 8th of November, W T and R patrols move out once more. Moving
to Uweinat again, they head onto the main road north of Jalo. They lay mines, attack
enemy vehicles, and take more Italian prisoners. Captain Clayton captures the fort of Aujila
(west of Jalo) after one burst of gunfire, which sends the garrison fleeing to the nearby
village. One Libyan prisoner comes back to Cairo with them - Clayton ends up covering
2,100 miles in fifteen days. The Libyan prisoner reveals that the Italians had reacted to the
patrols by not allowing any vehicles to go to Kufra except in a convoy with extra protection.
The Italians are reporting noises to their commanders and jumping at ghost patrols imagined
all over Libya. This is further proof that the patrols are having a significant effect
on Italian morale.
In fact, Marshal Graziani had to reinforce the Italian positions, consume transport,
and provide escorts for his men.
The whole issue in the south places doubts in Graziani’s mind about Wavell’s material
shortages and he wonders if his own reports are accurate.
On the 22nd of November, Bagnold is promoted to Lieutenant Colonel, and granted the authority
to expand his unit to two squadrons of three patrols. The Group is therefore renamed the
Long Range Desert Group, and a legend is born.
It has been suggested by some authors - including some officers in the British Army at the time
- that the Long Range Desert Patrols is one of the main factors contributing to the failure
of the Italian offensive into Egypt in 1940. Whilst they certainly weakened the Italian
10th Army further, were they really the primary reason for their defeat? Reasons suggested
by others conclude that the Italian Army simply wasn’t prepared for war, chose to march
en masse into Egypt without an effective logistical system, and that Italian grand-strategy was
non-existant, and they were perhaps the real reasons for failure.
My video on Operation Compass goes into the Italian failure in the desert during 1940
and 41. Links in the description. But what do you think? Let me know in the comments
below. Thanks for watching guys, bye for now.