On May 9th 1945, the Japanese Heavy Cruiser Haguro deployed into the malacca strait from
Singapore.
It was to be the ships’ last voyage.
A few days later, Haguro was ambushed by a flotilla of Allied destroyers, who used dozens
of torpedoes and heavy gunfire to sink her, over the course of an hour-long battle where
Haguro’s crew made their final stand.
By the start of May 1945, things were not looking good for Imperial Japan.
In the pacific, the allied net around J apan was tightening with intense fighting on Okinawa,
while in the Indian ocean Rangoon was captured as the Burma campaign unwound into a decisive
victory for the United Nations.
With Japan on the back foot almost everywhere, its occupied territories throughout south
east asia looked more and more precarious.
As a result Field Marshal Hisaichi Terauchi, the commander in chief southern army area,
began to pull back from some of the more isolated garriso ns from February 1945, as part of
a staged program of evacuations to concentrate Japanese strength in Malaya and Indochina.
By May, Terauchi was ready to begin Operation Sho- the evacuation of Japanese troops occupying
the Andaman and Nicobar islands to the north of Sumatra.
To accompany the transports that would need to sail from Singapore for this task, the
10th Area Fleet had only the heavy cruiser Haguro and destroyer Kamikaze available . It
was a thoroughly inadequate escort, especially when considering what Haguro was up against.
By May 1945, the Royal Navy’s East Indies Fleet had come a long way from the dark days
of 1942, when it had been forced into headlong retreat in the face of Japan’s fearsome
carrier force.
Even after a large part of the fleet had been split off to form the new British Pacific
Fleet, the remainder under Admiral Sir Arthur Power was still formidable.
Two battleships, four escort carriers, 3 cruisers and 8 destroyers.
In the first week of May 1945, Admiral Power’s fleet had been at sea, supporting the Allied
advance on Rangoon.
It returned to Trincomalee in modern day sri lanka on May 9th.
But just hours later the fleet was ordered to raise steam and prepare to go to sea again
at first light.
Allied intelligence had decrypted Japanese signals ordering the cruiser Haguro to put
to sea and head for Port Blair in the Andaman islands for what was the start of Operation
SHO.
By now Admiral Power was away from his fleet on a trip to newly-recaptured Rangoon, so
it fell to his deputy, Vice Admiral Harold Walker to take the fleet to sea on the morning
of May 10th and steam eastwards, hoping to catch and ambush Haguro as it left the Andamans
sometime on May 12th.
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Haguro and her escort, the destroyer Kamikaze left Singapore on May 9th and headed north
up the malacca strait.
The cruiser was skippered by Captain Kaju Sugiura and had his superior Rear Admiral
Hashimoto onboard.
But when Japanese air reconnaissance spotted a British fleet on its way east Haguro was
ordered back south, avoiding an unwinnable confrontation and hoping that the Allied fleet
would eventually go away.
Frustrated by the failure of Haguro to steam obligingly into the trap laid for her, Vice
Admiral Walker took his fleet to the south west for refuelling from the tanker Echodale
on May 13th.
While he did so, the Japanese transport Kurishoyo Maru slipped through, steaming from Penang
to Nancowry without opposition.
Encouraged by the lack of Allied response to this sortie, Haguro decided to have another
go at the voyage, starting its way north again on May 14th.
By early the following day, vice admiral Walker had committed some of his ships well to the
east in a hunt for the Kurishoyo Maru, which was now on its way back to Malaya having picked
up troops at Port Blair.
The five destroyers of the 26th flotilla under Captain Manley Power were rattling along at
27 knots, while Avengers’ launched from HMS Emperor streaked overhead on the hunt
for Japanese shipping.
At around 10am , three aircraft spotted and attacked the Kurishoyo Maru with bombs but
without success, losing two avengers in the process.
At almost the same time, Captain Power aboard HMS Saumarez received a signal from the fleets
shore based headquarters at Colombo ordering his flotilla back to the south west, as with
no sign of Haguro it was believed there was no prospect of catching it.
But Captain Power, guessing that whoever had sent the order would not have known about
the ship that had just been attacked by the avengers, decided to ignore the order for
the time being.
He held his ships course whilst signalling back to ask for a confirmation to the orders
in light of the reports from the aircraft.
Whilst waiting, at 11.50, Power picked up a report from another wave of carrier aircraft,
identifying one Japanese cruiser and one destroyer south of the Kurishoyo Maru’s position.
The destroyers soon received permission to sink enemy ships before returning to the fleet,
and set off in pursuit.
The hunt for Haguro was on.
Haguro meanwhile had now been warned by Japanese outposts on the northern tip of Sumatra of
the approach of Allied naval and air forces and was not about to hang about to find out
exactly what kind.
The cruiser and her escort swung back round to the south and steamed for Singapore.
The allied forces set off in pursuit, with Captain Power’s destroyers 130 miles from
the enemy by 12.10pm.
They steadily closed the distance while Haguro was occupied with fending off air attacks
by more avengers.
As afternoon turned to evening, the British destroyers turned southwards, following Haguro
into the Malacca strait and rearranging themselves into a single line abreast, keeping a keen
eye out for their powerful opponent.
At more than 15,000 tons fully loaded, Haguro displaced more than all five of Captain Powers
destroyers combined, and with 10 8 inch and 8 5 inch guns, packed a much bigger punch.
She was also a distinguished and experienpced ship, having fought in battles including the
Java Sea, the battle of Midway, and at Leyte Gulf.
In a gun battle at any sort of range in daylight, Powers destroyer flotilla would barely stand
a chance of getting close, let alone sinking Haguro.
But the Japanese cruisers achilles heel wa s its speed- once capable of doing 33 knots,
years of war service without proper refit had left her boilers and turbines capable
of only around 25knots, slower than the British destroyers.
And so the range between the two groups of ships slowly came down, until at 10.40pm , the
radar onboard HMS Venus detected a large contact to the north west.
Venus’s bridge crew were initially sceptical of the contact, believing it to be a cloud,
but when the suspected cloud was seen to sharply alter course to the south at 11.32, it was
clear that it was the Japanese warship they were after.
Captain Powers took his destroyers further south to cut Haguro off and then at 12.15am
turned north, spreading his ships into an attack formation with HMS Venus and Verulam
as the most advanced ships on each side.
A few miles away , steaming south oblivious to the trap awaiting them, was the cruiser
Haguro, with the escorting Kamikaze trailing behind.
The Japanese ships were pushing to reach the safety of Singapore, but had been slowed by
the relative inexperience in these waters of her navigator, Commander Ota, who required
a slower speed to be certain of avoiding minefields.
As a result, Rear Admiral Hashimoto and Captain Sugiura had calculated that any pursuing force
would catch up around 1am if they had maintained the pursuit into the small hours.
Despite knowing this, according to Lieutenant Commander Isamu Motora, the officer of the
watch unaccountably failed to raise the alarm when lookouts spotted a line of destroyers
approaching nine miles away . It was not until 12.50 that the Captain realised what was happening
and took control of the ship, by which time the British destroyers were just 6000 yards
ahead and closing rapidly . Sugiura ordered a hard starboard turn and opened fire on the
nearest destroyer on the port side, which was Verulam.
The cruiser swung round, but straight into the teeth of Venus on the opposite flank.
The destroyer closed to 4000 yards, lined itself up and then promptly flunked its torpedo
attack by having the incorrect angle set, which would have meant a certain miss.
Unable to launch, Venus hauled away sharply to the west, trying to keep Haguro encircled.
Seeing this, Suigiura assumed the enemy ship had launched torpedoes and began another turn
to starboard , coming back round to a southerly course and now steaming straight for the oncoming
Saumarez and Vigilant at the centre of the British formation.
Kamikaze meanwhile in its attempts to keep up with Haguro’s erratic manuvering had
ended up ahead of its companion, closing on Saumarez at a combined speed of almost 60knots.
Captain Power took evasive action and Saumarez raked the destroyer with anti aircraft fire
as it passed down its port side.
The British ship tried to engage the destroyer, but Kamikaze managed to slip away into the
darkness.
The situation around Haguro was now totally chaotic, w ith the cruiser being assailed
on all sides by hostile ships.
At around 2.10, Saumarez and Verulam made near simultaneous attack runs from the north
and south-east.
Haguro concentrated its fire on Saumarez and blazed away with 8 and 5 inch shells, knocking
out one of its boiler rooms just as it was launching four torpedoes . Meanwhile, at 1.14
Captain Douglas Bromley of Verulam fired a full salvo of eight torpedoes, having been
able to close in without receiving any fire before setting off to the north east to try
and cut off Haguro’s escape.
The oncoming torpedoes from Verulam were spotted on Haguro and an emergency turn to starboard
was ordered, but it was too late , and the turn only carried it into the spread fired
by Saumarez.
Three hits were observed, probably from a combination of Saumarez and Verulam’s torpedoes.
A large fire began at Haguro’s stern, its speed dropped and the cruiser began to list
rapidly.
As Captain Sugiura’s ship foundered, it came under fire from all directions, as the
British flotilla came in to finish her off.
Rear Admiral Hashimoto ordered Kamikaze to save itself with retr eat to Penang, shortly
before a British shell demolished Haguro’s bridge, killing almost everyone there.
At 1.24 HMS Venus began her second attempt at attacking Haguro, with a salvo of six torpedoes
launched from the north.
Three minutes later, on the opposite side of the stricken cruiser Virago followed suit,
launching seven torpedoes . With torpedoes flying all over the place, the British were
extremely lucky not to hit each other – twice during the battle Venus’s crew reported
hearing the sound of torpedoes rushing past the ship close to her hull.
Haguro was not so lucky – three more hi ts were scored on the cruiser which by now
was stationary, listing over dramatically, but still afloat and with her guns still blazing
away even with most of the senior officers onboard dead or wounded.
31 torpedoes had now been fired and still Haguro refused to go down, so the British
ships came in again.
At 1.50, HMS Vigilant fired eight more torpedoes, f ollowed by a final attack from Venus with
her last two . At least two more hits were observed, and Haguro began to sink.
At 2.06, Venus signalled Captain Power that the enemy cruiser had been sunk , and the
British flotilla began to retire to the north, having sustained only minor damage and the
loss of two men onboard Saumarez.
The day after the battle, Kamikaze returned to the site of Haguro’s sinking, where it
found hundreds of sailors clinging to wreckage and lifeboats. 320 were able to be rescued,
with another 751 men going down with the ship, including Captain Sugiura and Rear Admiral
Hashimoto.
The sinking of Haguro in the Malacca strait was the last gun battle between major surface
warships of the second world war, and it underlined the degree to which the allied powers had
taken total control of the sea.
It was a control they used to squeeze Japan into eventual submission three months later.