A new millennium, a new football?
Not quite: 2002 saw the final primacy of three at the
back in World Cups, with both finalists, Brazil and Germany, employing a form of 3-4-1-2 and
the exciting Argentina, who departed during the group stages despite playing well, playing
a form that could be described as 3-3-2-2.
The use of 3-4-1-2 or some form thereof derived from two elements: the predominance of
4-4-2 among more functional, less talented sides, and the need to find room for a creator
behind the strikers who play between the lines of an opposition 3-4-1-2 or 4-4-2 without
sacrificing defensive stability.
Argentina’s approach was perhaps the most idiosyncratic, featuring a holding midfielder
flanked by wing-backs, with a sort of magic square ahead.
The holder screened a back three of stoppers, while the wing-backs marked opposition wide
midfielders; the attacking midfield two created and the two strikers finished.
That, at least, was the theory for, as Jonathan Wilson, Argentina had more possession and
created more chances than any team in the groups, they went home having only scored
two goals.
Brazil, the eventual winners in the final against Germany, had a more prosaic division,
effectively a 7-3 which lined up as a 3-4-2-1 or 3-4-1-2, with three defenders, one of whom,
Edmilson , played as a sweeper or like an old-fashioned Brazilian quarto zagueiro , stepping
out if required and starting counter-attacks.
Ahead of them, two screening midfielders sat and spoiled – it should be noted, though,
that they started the tournament with the more
creative Juninho playing deeper, but dropped him for increased solidity.
They were flanked by two superb wing-backs, Cafu and Roberto
Carlos , who could play anywhere from full-back to wing.
This ‘seven’ protected, disrupted, won the ball, and provided some width for the
‘three’, the wonderfully talented Ronaldo, Rivaldo , and
Ronandinho. The latter tended to drop off more
towards the midfield axis, the former acted as a spearhead, and Rivaldo floated into space out wide.
As Michael Cox has noted, despite a feeling that Brazil are best playing highly fluid,
creativ ‘samba’ football, in recent tournaments,
they have been most successful “when they play a
relatively rigid shape defensively that allows two or three flair players to express themselves
without the worry that their failings will cost the team defensively”.
That’s a very neat summary of the best aspects of the 3-4-1-2
as well though, as ever, width can be an issue for
teams without the quality of Cafu and Roberto Carlos.
Germany’s more pedestrian version of the formation had to account for that, and they
used a midfield four that was industrious without
being spectacular, but achieved a degree of fluidity going forwards because left midfielder
Marco Bode was more attacking, while right midfielder Torsten Frings tucked in alongside
Jens Jeremies and Didi Hamman.
Ahead of the destructive Jeremies, Hamann, and Frings trio, Bode pushed up on the left
and Michael Ballack or Bernd Schneider drifted
from the hole out to the right or doubled up on ​
the left, while Oliver Neuville was a linking forward who dropped off behind the out-and-out
finisher Miroslav Klose . It was another take on the 3-4-1-2 that created
a form of asymmetry, with Germany at time resembling a 3-3-2-2 as well, but with greater
width further forward than Argentina had managed.
It was not enough to unseat the Brazilians, though, won who the final 2-0 with
both goals coming from Ronaldo, the tournament’s top scorer and finest player.
By 2006, however, back threes were largely dead and buried.
Raymond Domenech’s France used a 4-2-3-1 of the most classic form: a
holding midfielder/box-to-box midfielder axis, a
back four with full-backs who could push up, and wingers who could play in or out, flanking
a pure ten with a nine ahead of him.
Of course, the ‘nine’ was Thierry Henry, far from the classic striker: while Henry
could finish, he also had the intelligence and ability to
drop off or pull wide which, added to Zidane’s
creativity and the acceleration and dribbling of Franck Ribery and Florent Malouda out wide,
made France’s front four fearsome.
The aim of the 4-2-3-1 was to give a solid basis from which four players could attack,
while making up for the lack of width that the back
three formations had often encountered.
The back four with a screening midfield axis gave
this solidity and allowed full-backs to push on,
while the use of a ten behind a lone striker allowed the side to carry a purely creative
player, especially if the wingers took on some defensive duties.
Italy, interestingly, played with a version of the 4-4-2, but one that was vertically
lop-sided; Francesco Tot played as a second striker behind
Luca Toni , dropping deep into midfield or wide, but also capable of feeding off Toni
for shooting opportunities.
The central midfield pairing saw the Final’s man-of-the-match
Andrea Pirlo play alongside Gennaro Gattuso, but
while Gattuso harried and pressed, Pirlo dropped off, deeper towards the centre-backs, to
spray passes from behind the halfway line.
In effect, Italy played a 4-1-3-1-1, but the wide midfielders did play with enough width
to make the formation look like a 4-4-2 at times;
this was permitted by the industry of Gattuso.
Italy effectively had two playmakers, Pirlo and Tot, but of very different sorts and the
team’s balance only worked because of the blend of players available to Marcello Lippi.
The final, which was won on penalties after
Zinedine Zidane was famously sent off for absolutely leathering Marco Materazzi , saw
two sides whose set-ups largely negated each other despite the surfeit of genuine football
geniuses on the pitch.
The flat back four was back, after a decade or so of unpopularity, central midfield was
largely now a place of ball-winners and shuttlers,
however otherwise talented they were (like Patrick Vieira), and creativity was about
finding space in the hole behind the striker, either as
a ten, or a second striker.
Pressing had closed the options, but the winger returned, albeit in
a more flexible and defensively-minded mode.
The next advances were to be more stylistic
than formational, as we will see next time, but football was clearly becoming the form
we recognise today.