Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein manipulates the evidence to change the perspective we
now have on the Battle of Stalingrad, and the commander of Sixth Army, Friedrich Paulus.
Popular opinion states that Paulus was timid, that Paulus was at fault, that Paulus is to
blame for not breaking 6th Army out of Stalingrad. People say that Paulus should have defied
Hitler’s orders and ordered his army to break out.
And it is Manstein who is the one championing this view.
The problem is that Manstein is the one at fault, not Paulus. And Paulus is taking the
blame, because Manstein has manipulated the evidence. He has changed popular opinion against
Paulus, in order to protect his own image. And in this video, we will find out exactly
how and why he did it. Manstein is lying - let’s find out why.
Assuming the breakout attempt was possible - which it probably wasn’t by mid-December
anyway - we have a situation where Paulus is ordered to hold his ground under all circumstances.
He’s told he would receive adequate air supplies and told that he will be rescued
soon. He therefore waits for the order to breakout.
The problem is that Paulus is taken prisoner after the battle. He’s made a Field Marshall,
doesn’t commit suicide as he was supposed to do, and is shamed by the events of the
battle. While he’s in Soviet custody, he can’t defend himself to the public. He was
only released in 1953. By that time his reputation is in the gutter. Two years after his release,
Manstein publishes his memoirs - which become massively popular, and have since gone on
to paint him as, well not only innocent of all war crimes, but also as a military genius.
These memoirs play upon the opinion that Paulus was passive, timid and so on.
“When General Paulus let the last opportunity slip, when he hesitated and finally decided
against the venture, he certainly did so on account of the responsibility he felt on his
own shoulders.” - Manstein, Lost Victories, P342
Well, this military genius was the only general out of Weichs, Paulus, Richtofen, and all
of Paulus’s corps commanders, saying that Sixth Army should hold on.
“Whatever motivation Manstein may have had for his assessment of the situation, its psychological
effect was devastating. Not only did it mean the collapse of what a day earlier was still
a united front of the generals against Hitler, but it endowed his operational stubbornness
with an appearance of professional soundness. Small wonder, therefore, that, supported in
his plans by the most respected operational authority of the day, Hitler again displayed
signs of confidence and became even more intolerant of dissenting opinions than before.”
Let’s look at the timeline again. 19th of November 1942, Operation Uranus begins
and Sixth Army is surrounded by the 23rd of November.
On the 20th, Yeschonnek indicates to Hitler that Sixth Army could be supplied by the air,
which Hitler then decides is the correct course of action.
22nd of November, Göring arrives and confirms this by promising the Luftwaffe could supply
Paulus’s army. 24th of November, the day after the encirclement
is complete, Manstein sends a letter to the high command. Under the assumption that the
air resupply would be sufficient to sustain Sixth Army in the field, and that he would
receive more forces to begin the relief attempt, Manstein recommended that Sixth Army’s breakout
be delayed. The encirclement at this point is very thinly
held. Apart from reacting instantly and abandoning Stalingrad before the encirclement is closed,
withdrawing in the last days of November 1942 is the best time for Paulus to begin a breakout
attempt. If he does it now, before the Soviets throw in more troops between the Sixth Army
and the rest of German lines, there’s a good chance that Paulus could break out with
a significant portion of his army. But Manstein delays the breakout attempt.
“Based on assessments like these, along with Manstein’s imminent presence on the
scene and Göring’s comforting, if unrealistic, assurances about resupplying Sixth Army, Hitler
had some reason to believe that the Uranus encirclement could be defeated and that Sixth
Army could survive for a brief period if it could be resupplied by air.” - Glantz, Stalingrad
Effectively, Hitler is persuaded by Yeschonnek, Göring and Manstein.
So basically, at a time where rapid action was needed, Manstein - the greatest of Germany’s
WW2 generals - recommends a delay.
“The fact that Manstein broke up the united front among the generals concerning the peril
facing Sixth Army indicates his personal responsibility for its ultimate fate. In Hitler’s eyes,
at that time, Manstein was probably the army’s most influential voice concerning operational
matters.”
Paulus describes to Manstein the state of his army in a letter on the 26th of November.
Manstein does not realise the scale of the problem, and even when he speaks to Weichs,
the penny does not drop. In fact, it is at this point, bearing in mind
that he blames Paulus after the war in his memoirs, that Manstein sends this message
to Paulus -
“The Führer’s order relieves you of all responsibility other than the most appropriate
and resolute execution of the Führer’s order. What happens when, in execution of
the Führer’s order, the army has fired off its last bullet - for that you are not
responsible!” - Manstein to Paulus, 26th of November 1942
At this point Manstein says Paulus is not to blame. Paulus is being ordered to stand
- even though Paulus doesn’t want to - and therefore the responsibility isn’t his.
And it isn’t, since both Manstein and Hitler are in agreement that Paulus should stay where
he is. It was only on the 28th of November, after
speaking to Richtofen and Pickert, that Manstein finally realises that his initial assessment
of the situation was wrong. And then, it’s basically “blame Paulus
time”. Up to this point, Manstein is saying ‘it’s not your responsibility Paulus,
Hitler and me think you should stay where you are, and don’t worry, I’ll get you
out, no problem.’ It’s only when he realises that he can’t
get him out that Manstein then starts backtracking. Knowing now that Sixth Army could not be supplied
by air, he contacts Hitler, who agrees with Manstein’s alternate plan.
The alternate plan is for the two relief prongs to start on the 3rd and 9th of December.
And the idea was for Paulus to mount a breakout attempt.
By the time the Winter Tempest Operation gets going on the 12th of December - so, later
than it should have done - Sixth Army is already significantly weakened - mainly because they’re
half starved and have eaten their horses - and Paulus still doesn’t have the order to break
out. And this is where the lies begin. At the height
of the relief operation, Manstein claims to have sent the breakout order to Paulus on
the 19th of December.
“...an order was issued to Fourth Panzer and Sixth Armies at 1800 hours, in which the
latter was directed to commence breaking through to the southwest forthwith.” - Manstein’s
Lost Victories P336
And he even references that order and provides it in the appendix of his memoirs.
Erm… yeah, the problem is, reading the appendix, what you find is that he doesn’t actually
give the order to break out. He says Paulus should prepare for the breakout,
and that it should start soon after the relief attempt, but he never actually orders it to start.
In fact, in the pinned comment in the comment section below, I will provide you with the
full order - as Manstein writes it - so you can read it.
At no point does it say, “Dear Paulus, start the breakout, love Manstein.”
Does not say that. No, despite a constant exchange of messages
between the two commanders, at no point does Manstein issue Paulus with the breakout order.
What this order on the 19th does do though, is that it puts responsibility for the breakout
attempt squarely on Paulus’s lap. Manstein is effectively saying “I’m not defying
the order - but you can Paulus, if you want to”. The problem is, that Manstein is unable to
assure Paulus that the relief forces were going to reach him. And this is at a point where
Paulus’s army is weakened by starvation and a lack of supplies. This in turn convinced
Paulus not to defy Hitler’s orders and launch his breakout attempt. Not that there was much
hope for a successful breakout attempt at this point as anyway, since realistically, the breakout order
should have come earlier - much earlier - either late November or early December.
But the order never comes.
Basically, to sum up the entire events, what happens is that Manstein sides with Hitler
and the Luftwaffe against the other generals, thus further persuading Hitler that he was
right. He delays the breakout attempt. Then finds out that he can’t break the siege
as he thought he could originally. Shifts responsibility to Paulus at the last minute,
and then goes “well, it’s Paulus’s fault, I gave him the order to breakout, and he hesitated”
even though he didn’t give him the order. No, the reality is this that - Manstein is lying.
Manstein should take full responsibility for the failure of Sixth Army to break out early. Manstein
should take responsibility for the failure to provide Sixth Army with the order to break
out (because he said he did, even though he didn’t) and for the ultimate destruction
of the Sixth Army. Manstein is also significantly responsible for the poor reputation Paulus
receives post-battle. Paulus is not as passive or as hesitant as Manstein makes him out to
be. Paulus wanted to break out, and it was Manstein who said no.
This military genius, who was the best German general of World War 2, passes the blame onto
Paulus so as to not tarnish his own reputation. And this is another example of why you cannot take
anything at face value, why you cannot rely on one source of information, and why you
have to question everything. And this is another example of why you shouldn’t be trusting
memoirs - in this case, this was written 20 years after the war ended, and 22 years after
the battle in question. Just because someone was there, does not make them right. Manstein
is lying at Stalingrad - remember that. I was only able to purchase Glantz’s works
and the official German history of the war, as well as other books, thanks so the support
of my Patreons. As always, you guys are awesome - so thank you!
I’ve pushed this video before and I’ll push it again - if you haven’t seen David
Glantz’s video on the Myths and Realities of the Eastern Front of WW2, go watch it,
you honestly deserve it to yourself to see it. Go see it, click the link on the screen and in the pinned
comment below. Thank you all very much all of you
for watching, bye for now.