In 2012/13, Jupp Heynckes steered Bayern Munich to an unprecedented treble of the UEFA
Champions League, the Bundesliga, and the DFB-Pokal, becoming the first German side
to achieve this.
Bayern also broke numerous records during the season, including recording the
most points, 91, the biggest lead over the second-place team in the league, 25, and winning
the Bundesliga with 29 wins in the season and in only 28 match-days.
Bayern played a 4-2-3-1 formation, with a preferred back four built around the pace
and physicality of Dante and Jerome Boateng, a
midfield double pivot of Bastien Schweinsteiger and costly new signing Javi Martinez, and
a fluid attacking four.
Franck Ribery and Arjen Robben would arguably have been the first-choice
wingers, playing either side of Toni Kroos.
However, Robben and Kroos both spent parts of the season injured, requiring the intelligent,
adaptive Thomas Muller to play central or wide.
Up front, Mario Mandzukic generally started, scoring 15 league goals but also
contributing hugely in other aspects of his play.
Bayern were a side built on intelligent defending and utilisation of space.
Manuel Neuer, already redefining the goalkeeping position,
allowed Bayern’s central defenders and full- backs to push high with his sweeper style of keeping.
But Bayern actually didn’t try to play an offside-based defence, as noted by Rene Maric.
Instead, Dante and Boateng would man mark, even if that disjointed the defensive line
somewhat, relying on their pace and strength to beat forwards in a foot-chase and on the
superb screening provided by the midfield to create shielded areas into which the
opposition struggled to pass.
Indeed, this zonal shielding, or cutting off passing channels, was something at which Bayern
excelled, using their positions on the pitch in concert with pressing to limit opposition
passing options and maximise their chances to win back the ball; this was an adaptable
of Barcelona’s style the previous season, inflected
by some of Louis van Gaal’s coaching philosophy, and worked well.
Bayern also developed a counter-press, perhaps in response to success of Jurgen Klopp’s
Borussia Dortmund.
Heynckes encouraged a counter-press when the ball was lost, but also
instructed his players, especially full-backs Philipp Lahm and David Alaba, not to revert
to marking or the positions they would occupy
in a low block, but rather to continue forwards into a press.
This meant not only that Bayern could counter-press effectively but also that
they immediately found themselves with numerical advantages if they could win back the
back.​ This was, in part, facilitated by the superb
midfield pairing of Bastien Schweinsteiger and Javi Martinez.
Martinez, who had played most of the previous season as a centre-back at Athletic
Bilbao, was a skilful tackler who managed to convert many of his tackles into Bayern
possession, rather than ceding the ball again or giving up a throw-in.
He was also adept at tactical fouling, had the energy to get forwards
and support if required, and filled in intelligently as a third centre-back if both
full-backs were engaged further up the pitch.
This was a fluid side, positionally and spatially, evidence of the influence of Marcelo Bielsa’s
philosophy that players should be able to operate wherever they are required to on the pitch.
The front four exemplified this, as Mandzukic showed the abilities in pressing and
disrupting the opposition, as well as his usefulness when drifting out to the left,
that has been a hallmark of his current use at Juventus.
While Mandzukic pressed, it was not uncommon for Ribery to end up in the striker’s role,
or Muller, but Bayern could also drop into a
4-4-2 or 4-4-1-1 with Mandzukic up front and the
wide players tracking the opposition full-backs, even Arjen Robben.
Similarly, in the centre, while Martinez tended to sit deep but shuffle left or right if required,
Schweinsteiger played ahead of him on either side and also swapped with whoever played
in the ten role, usually Muller or Kroos, with
the latter dropping into space; this was a reaction
to whether the opposition were man-marking the ten.
It’s also worth noting, as Jonathan Wilson has, that Bayern could play a possession-based
style in the Bundesliga, with plenty of short, tidy passing on the front foot, while changing
for Champions League fixtures against better or more tacticaly astute opposition, and using
the physicality of Martinez and Mandzukic, a deeper line, and an aggressive counter-attack.
By dictating the use of space on the pitch, defending intelligently, and pressing or counter-
pressing situationally and with great acumen, Bayern created a fearsome defensive
apparatus which also acted as a springboard to attack.
With players of great individual quality, but a collective understanding shaped
by Heynckes with shades of Bielsa’s influence, Bayern swept all before them in 2012/13.