“Well, I just have one thing to say before we start which is: I have done it, my brothers
and sisters! I have finished the book. The book Universally Preferable Behaviour – a
Rational Proof of Secular Ethics. It is a magnificent work, if I do say so myself [...] Ah,
it is the holy grail of philosophy. It's been sought since the time of Socrates. I believe
I have done it, but it’s important for you to review that.”
Hello my fellow apes, I hope that you and your loved-ones are well. Recently, I’ve
had a few more interactions with Stefan Molyneux in reference to David Hume’s is-ought distinction,
otherwise known as Hume’s Guillotine. In a nutshell, a few weeks ago Stefan attempted
to defend his Universally Preferable Behaviour (UPB) against James Theodore Stillwell III
(I know, what a name), and during their debate yours sincerely came up a few times (“I
don't know what the dude's name is-- Mr. Shaggy, right? Rationality Rules”). Yikes! Alright
Dr. Evil, keep your knickers on. I’ll be honest, that edit took me way too
long to make… but since it’s gonna give you nightmares, I consider it time well spent.
Anyhow, throughout their exchange, James highlighted many of the logical fallacies and issues with
the Five Proofs that Stefan insists upon in his book, and just as when others have pointed
out these flaws (including myself), the walking-talking Dunning–Kruger effect that is Dr. Evil Molyneux
failed to adequately respond to them, either because he doesn’t understand them, or,
indeed, because understanding them is catastrophic to his argument. “How can you be so obtuse?”
“What? What did you just call me?” “Obtuse. Is it deliberate?” Perhaps the most obvious
example of Stefan’s obtuseness, and I would argue the most damning, is his take on Hume’s
Guillotine. His take is so obtuse, in fact, that it in and of itself exposes the folly
of not only UPB, but Stefan as a moral philosopher entirely. Now I appreciate that I’m coming
off a bit harsh here, but honestly, there’s a reason why the academic world doesn’t
take this man seriously. Put it this way: A moral philosopher misunderstanding Hume’s
Guillotine is like a mechanic misunderstand a spanner. And in Stefan’s case, it’s
actually worse than this, since he claims to have won “The holy grail of philosophy.”
Now you might be wondering, why spend more time on this dead argument? I’ve already
illustrated that depending on what definition of UPB Stefan employs (because he’s uses
two) he’s either simply repackaging Kantian Hypothetical Imperatives or he’s critically
misunderstanding Hume’s Guillotine – and so why hit on this again? Well, it’s for
two primary reasons. The first is that addressing dead arguments is kind of what I do, and the
second is that I have the Hypothetical Imperative (the goal) of wanting to show others (you)
a clearer way to expose UPB. After seeing just how dense Stefan is in the minutes to
follow, I’m convinced that pretty much anyone that can be dispelled from his sophistry,
will be. So, outside of an actual one-to-one debate, this will likely be the last video
I make on this subject (though I’m making no promises). So let’s get to it. This is
Molyneux’s Humean Suicide.
I assume that most of you are aware of Hume’s
Guillotine, but for the sake of clarity, in his work titled A Treatise of Human Nature,
Hume observed that there is a significant difference between descriptive statements
– that is, statements about what IS or is not the case (which is to say “facts”)
– and prescriptive statements – that is, statements of what OUGHT or ought not be the
case. From this observation, Hume expressed that since the conclusive oughts of most moral
arguments do not follow from their factual (IS) premises, most moral arguments are therefore
nothing more than non-sequiturs. Now Stefan claims not only to understand Hume’s Guillotine,
but states on page 9 that he fully accepts it: “I fully accept the Humean distinction
between is and ought.” And yet, over 10 years later, it’s more obvious than ever
that he doesn’t understand it… at least publicly. To illustrate this, I’m going
to first respond to a segment of his debate with James, and from there contextualise Stefan’s
misunderstanding with his first and primary proof of UPB. “When Rationality Rules says
that my argument is incorrect he’s not saying everybody is always rational and always prefers
rationality all the time, right? He’s saying that my claims are not just subjectively wrong.
They’re not just, well, I just don’t like the font that he used, or the cover design,
or the book could’ve been better, or something like that. He’s saying that I am objectively
incorrect.” “We agree there.” “Okay, and that truth and being correct is preferable
to error.” “He’s not saying preferable--” “Yes, he is.” No, I’m not. As I posted
in the comments, “I am not saying that being correct is preferable to not being correct.”
I am not, in fact, making any statement whatsoever about preferences. All I’m saying is that
it IS the case that Stefan is objectively, factually incorrect. Or as James later put
it: “Again, Rationality Rules is not making a prescriptive claim, he was making a descriptive
claim.” Indeed, I am only making the first claim that Stefan expressed (“He’s saying
that I am objectively incorrect”), but why, then, does Stefan insist that I’m also making
the second claim? (“And being correct is preferable to error”). Well, it’s because
Stefan is convinced that in order to correct him you must enact a universally preferable
behaviour. To most effectively spell this out, let’s listen to how he conveys his
primary argument for UPB in his book. It goes as follows: “1. The proposition is: the
concept “universally preferable behaviour” must be valid. 2. Arguing against the validity
of universally preferable behaviour demonstrates universally preferable behaviour. 3. Therefore
no argument against the validity of universally preferable behaviour can be valid.” As said,
this is the primary “proof” that Stefan offers for UPB, and here’s what it looks
like in a debate: “The moment that you say that I'm wrong, the moment rationality rule
says that I'm wrong, then you are exhibiting UBP.” Indeed, Stefan boasts that the moment
you try to prove him wrong you prove him right, since to prove him wrong you must enact universally
preferable behaviour. So how does he get to this conclusion? What universally preferable
behaviour is being enacted? Well, to cut to the chase, Stefan notes that in order to have
a debate one must accept “A wide variety of [implicit] premises”, such as that we
exist, that we have the capacity for accuracy, and that we can communicate – but among
these correct implicit premises, he has a few false, such as “Correction requires
universal preferences.” He writes: “If you correct me on an error that I have made,
you are implicitly accepting the fact that it would be better for me to correct my error.”
Now there are two things to highlight here. The first is that just like the words “fitter"
and "greater", the word “better” only has meaning in reference to a goal (a hypothetical
imperative). To illustrate this, consider this statement: “It would be better for
Stefan to sprint as fast as he can.” Am I correct? Without a reference this statement
is vacuous. If Stefan’s goal is, say, to win a 100m race, then it would be “better”
for him sprint as fast as he can, but if his goal is to rest his broken leg, then it would
not be “better” for him to sprint as fast as he can. Likewise, if Stefan’s goal it
to be publicly accurate about UPB, then it would be “better” for him to correct his
error, but if his goal is to keep the person in his basement hidden from the person in
front of him, then it would not be “better” for him not to correct his error. "You are
sheltering enemies of the state, are you not?" The word “better” is thus contingent.
It necessitates a hypothetical imperative (a goal) in order to make any sense. And second
thing to highlight, is that when someone corrects Stefan, they are not necessarily “implicitly
accepting the fact that it would be better for [him] to correct [his] error.” While
it’s fair to say that most accept this premise (that is, they assume that Stefan has the
goal of being accurate about UPB). Other’s don’t make this assumption. I, for example,
don’t. When I correct Stefan I do so because 1) I have the goal of being accurate about
UPB, and I know that by publicly expressing a critique I increase the chance of someone
else correcting me should I be mistaken, and 2) I assume that you (the viewer) have the
goal of being accurate about UPB. I do not, however, assume that Stefan has the goal of
being accurate about UPB, because, honestly, I’m not entirely convinced that he does.
It’s for this reason that I don’t tell him that it would be “better” for him
to change his opinion. I don’t, in fact, even tell you that it would be “better”
for them to change your opinion. Indeed, I don’t make any ought claim whatsoever. I
exclusively make an IS claim. It IS the case that Stefan is incorrect. Stefan continues:
“Your preference for me to correct my error is not subjective, but objective, and universal.”
Except, its not. My preference for you to correct your error is, as given away by the
word “preference”, subjective. Now don’t get me wrong, whether UPB comports with reality
is in the realm of objectivity, but one’s preference for knowing if UPB comports with
reality is subjective. Or to put it another way, the descriptive claim “It IS the case
that UPB is fallacious” is objective and universal, but the prescriptive claim “You
ought to correct your error” is not universal. It’s contingent on a hypothetical imperative.
“You don’t say to me: You should change your opinion to mine because I would prefer
it, but rather: You should correct your opinion because it is objectively incorrect.” Again,
no – Stefan is missing the most important premise. The Kantian Hypothetical Imperative
that he wants to be correct about UPB. Without this additional implicit premise, the statement
“You should correct your opinion because it is objectively incorrect” is as vacuous
as the statement “You should sprint because is is objectively faster than walking.”
Without such an implicit premise of Stefan actually wanting to win a race (that is, without
the implicit premise of Stefan wanting to be correct about UPB), we can’t say he should,
or ought, or that it would be better for him to correct his opinion. Okay, so with this
now on the table, let’s pivot back to my comment, in which I expressed this nuance.
Here’s how Stefan responded. “Haha oh look you corrected me again according to universal
principles. Don’t worry, I’m sure you’ll get it eventually.” Honestly, it’s like
debating a presuppositional apologist. Just as the apologist insists that correcting him
presupposes god, Stefan insists that correcting him presupposes UPB. Anyhow, a few days later
a dude Tweeted at me that “The name Rationality Rules is deriving an ought from an is”,
to which Stefan replied “Of course.” Which might just seem like trolling, since he has
very clearly said “I fully accept the Humean distinction between is and ought”, but it’s
unfortunately not trolling, since Stefan has in other places also claimed that you can
get an ought from an is. “If you can’t get an ought from an is, you are getting an
ought from an is – which is you ought not talk about getting an ought from an is. Like,
you have already created one.” Stefan, saying that you can't get an ought from an is, is
an IS statement, not an OUGHT statement… Hume didn’t imply that “You OUGHT not
get an ought from an IS”, he implied that “It IS the case that you can’t get an
ought from an is.” Honestly, I’m starting to think that only way I’ll get this through
to you is by putting it in terms of ovaries. So there you all have it folks, Stefan’s
Humean Suicide – he’s the self-professed moral philosopher that misunderstands Hume’s
Guillotine. He’s the equivalent of the mechanic who misunderstands the spanner, the driver
who misunderstands the driving wheel, the baker who misunderstands flour, and the midwife
who misunderstands ovaries. Yes! Done it! Surely he’ll get it! *Dr. Evil laugh* Now
I could conclude here, but I’m going to respond to a few more ways in which Stefan
employs this argument, just to make the flaw more obvious. But before that I just want
to sign off by saying I’m Stephen Woodford, thank you kindly for the view, and an extra
special thank you to my wonderful patrons and those of you who’ve supported the channel
via other means. Thank you for supporting me during this difficult time. “If I say
1 + 1 = 3, and someone says, no, you’re wrong, 1 + 1 = 2, then they are saying I ought
to be accurate, I ought to be truthful, and I ought to say things that are valid rather
than invalid.” No, you’re wrong Stefan – and just like your mathematical example,
this is a descriptive claim, not a prescriptive claim. It IS the case that you’re wrong.
Now if I really wanted to make the additional claim that you “Ought to be accurate”,
then I must first assume that you have the goal of being correct. IF you want to be correct,
you ought to be accurate. Without this hypothetical imperative – without this “if” clause
– I could not, and indeed would not, make such an assertion. “So when someone tells
me that something is false, and that I should not advocate for, or believe something that
is false, then they have said that I ought do something, right?” Okay, so there are
two claims in play here – the first is descriptive (“So when someone tells me that something
is false”) and the second is prescriptive (“And that I should not advocate for”).
The first is an IS statement (“Something is false”) and the second is an ought statement
(“I should not”). If someone makes the second claim, they are implicitly accepting
that you have the hypothetical imperative of being publicly correct: IF you want to
be publicly correct, you ought not advocate for UPB. “So he’s saying he’s objectively
right, I’m objectively wrong, and being right is preferable to being wrong.” Again,
there are two claims here. I am making the first, descriptive claim (“He’s saying
he’s objectively right, I’m objectively wrong”) but I am not making the second,
prescriptive claim (“And being right is preferable to being wrong”). And again,
the second claim -can- be conceived as a hypothetical imperative – as in, since you have the goal
of being accurate, being right is preferable to being wrong – but as a stand alone sentence
this is nothing more than a fart in the wind. It’s akin to just straight up asserting
that “Sprinting is preferable to not sprinting”. It’s vacuous. “I’m sorry… I mean,
maybe this is getting to complicated for my little brain here.” Finally, Stefan, you’ve
made a descriptive statement without fusing it with a prescriptive statement. It IS the
case that Hume’s Guillotine is too complicated for your little brain. Now to be clear, I
don’t think this is the case. I think you can understand Hume’s Guillotine, and that
IF your goal is to be publicly accurate about UPB, you ought to correct your error. However,
IF your goal is to keep selling the book and maintain your handful of lackeys who boast
that you are the greatest moral philosopher of all time (“It is the holy grail of philosophy,
and it’s been sought since the time of Socrates”), then you ought not to correct your error.