Over the last couple of months a fair few of you have asked me to explain my views on
morality, and for even longer than that I've wanted to… but, unfortunately, I haven't
been able.
Albert Einstein once said that “If you can’t explain something simply you don’t know
it enough”, and in acknowledgement of these words I knew that I needed to ruminate and
converse with greater minds before publicly expressing my thoughts.
But finally, I believe myself to be at such a standard, and so, for what it's worth, here're
my views on morality.
As many of you are already aware, in the current state of moral philosophy we have three subject
areas; metaethics, which is concerned with where morality comes from and what moral terms
mean; normative ethics, which is concerned with forming standards that regulate right
and wrong conduct; and applied ethics, which is concerned with specific controversial issues,
such as abortion, animal rights, climate change, capital punishment, and nuclear war.
Now, since I'm predominantly concerned with metaethics (because that's where I see the
most confusion), that's what I'm going to primarily focus on within this video.
The field of metaethics itself tends to be divided into two overarching schools: objectivism
and relativism, with the former positing that morality exists as a matter of fact, and the
latter positing that morality exists as a matter of opinion.
For example, Catholicism advocates an objective metaethic, since it posits that morality exists
as a product of divine law, and as such is comparable to any scientific law.
While cultural relativism advocates a relativist metaethic, since it posits that morality is
entirely a cultural construct.
My view, however, is that morality is both objective and relative.
That is, it exists as a matter of fact and it’s relative to certain conditions.
Now on the surface (because of conditioning) this might seem absurdly contradictory, but
I assure you, it's not.
It’s no more absurd than the science of health, which is a great comparison (that’s
been utilised by the likes of Sam Harris before) because while health is rightfully acknowledged
as an objective science, it’s also acknowledged as a relativistic science, since facts about
health are relative to species, and in some cases, individuals.
Anyhow, I’m getting ahead of myself now.
To back up a little, I’m going to take some advice from Voltaire and talk semantics.
First off, so far as I’m concerned, words such as “good”, “bad”, “right”,
“wrong”, “should”, “shouldn’t”, “ought”, oughtn’t”, “virtuous”,
“evil”, and, indeed, “ethical”, “unethical”, “moral” and “immoral”, are, I would
argue, utterly meaningless without a reference.
They're descriptive, and without a reference (which is granted either consciously or unconsciously)
they’re vacuous.
To demonstrate this, consider the following: is it “good” or “moral” to punch someone
in the face?
In general, no, it’s not.
But notice that by saying “in general” I just assumed a reference (that being our
social contract).
If I assumed the reference of a boxing fight then punching someone in the face is “good”.
In fact, it’s the “right” thing to do.
And so my point being here is that from a foundational perspective, words such as “moral”
and “immoral” are meaningless.
To say that something is moral is to say that something is good... and we can’t say that
something is good unless we have a reference.
Moving on, what’s the definition of “objective”?
Because this word, in my opinion, is the sticking point for most people when it comes to morality,
and I think it’s because while we’ve largely outgrown religion, we’re yet to outgrown
religious language.
There are two prominent conceptions of objectivity, one that’s scientific, and one that’s
philosophical.
Scientists (and many philosophers) tend to view the relationship between objectivity
and subjectivity as that of “fact” and “opinion”, and thus define an objective
statement as “A fact that isn’t affected by an individual’s feelings, biases or interpretations”
(and therefore can typically be verified).
While other philosophers (and the religious) tend to view the relationship between objectivity
and subjectivity as that of “independent of a subject”, and “dependent on a subject”,
and thus define an objective statement as “A statement that does not depend on a subject
to exist”.
Now both of these definitions suit their purpose, of course, but people often conflate and confuse
them, and they do so especially when it comes to morality.
To illustrate this, consider the following question: is it objectively the case that
you’re now thinking?
If your answer is “yes”, then that’s because you’re using the scientific definition
of “objective” – it’s an objective fact about human thought, and it’s something
we can measure, infer, and indeed verify.
But if you were using the philosophical definition your answer would necessarily be “no”,
because this “fact” depends on you (a subject) to exist.
The problem, of course, is that people erroneously assert that because morality is subjective
in the philosophical sense it's also subjective in the scientific sense, when this obviously
isn't the case.
Anyhow, with moral semantics covered, I want to touch upon the great David Hume’s is/ought
guillotine.
I’ll dedicate an entire video to this topic upon a time, as most people (including some
otherwise reputable sources) completely misunderstand the problem, but for now, here’re some brief
remarks.
Hume famously observed that people erroneously make claims about what “ought” to be based
entirely on what “is”; that they attempt (but fail) to derive prescriptive conclusions
from entirely descriptive facts.
For example, consider this seemingly sound argument: Premise 1: Humans typically die
if they’re hanged.
Premise 2: Ken is a human.
Therefore: We ought not to hang Ken.
This looks like a valid deductive argument, but it’s not… it’s a non-sequitur.
Even with both premises being true, the conclusion doesn’t logically follow.
It attempts to get a prescriptive statement from descriptive facts, but it fails.
Sure, humans tend to die if hanged, and Ken is indeed a human, but how exactly do these
statement of fact tell us that we ought not to hang Ken?
Exactly, they don't.
And so Hume’s lesson, so far as I can tell, is “Don't assume that you can draw moral
conclusions directly from statements of fact, and watch out for arguments that do.”
It’s a brilliant observation, and a very useful tip, but it’s not the same as saying
that “Morality doesn’t exist” or that “We can’t derive a valid ought”, is
it?
So how, then, can we derive a valid ought?
Well, it’s actually very easy – it’s by having a valid deductive argument that
includes at least one ought.
Or in other words, it’s by getting an ought from an ought.
For example: Premise one: We ought to live consistently with our evolution (this is an
“ought”).
Premise two: Humans evolved to eat meat (this is an “is”).
Therefore: We ought to eat meat.
To put this in the language of mathematical logic, this argument is valid (since its conclusion
does indeed follow from its premises), and it’s objectively verifiable (especially
given recent advancements in scientific tools), but it’s not necessarily sound, because
most people don’t believe that “We ought to live consistently with our evolution.”
And so my point being here is that we can deduce a valid ought, but whether we find
it to be sound is dependent on if we personally accept the premises.
And this, finally, brings me to what is the most unique aspect of my moral perspective.
I’m convinced that there are two types of oughts (or “goods”, or “shoulds”,
or “morals”, etc.,) – and I currently refer to them as “axiomatic oughts” and
“contingent oughts”.
Axiomatic oughts are “Feelings of obligation that exist self-evidently”, and they do
so without proof or argument (they just are; they’re facts of nature).
An example is my current conviction that “I ought to survive”.
I didn’t reason myself into this ought, I just have it… it’s an axiomatic fact
of nature (not an assumption)… now that might seem dissatisfying, but so too, at least
in my opinion, are all axiomatic facts.
While it’s not justified, it really is the case that I have this compulsion, this ought,
this impulse, this urge to behave in a certain way, and this can be objectively verified
through the scientific method (And so it’s a scientific fact), and what’s more, thanks
to Darwin, we now know precisely why I have it in the first place (hint… no god needed).
And contingent oughts are “Feelings of obligation that are predicated on axiomatic oughts and
one or more statements of fact”, and because they’re predicated on statements of fact
that may or may not be correct, they too may or may not be correct.
To illustrate this, let's take two contingent oughts - the first being that “I ought to
vaccinate my child”, and the second being that “I ought to remove a segment of my
child’s genitalia” – how is it that I can say that one ought (or moral statement)
is right and that the other is wrong?
Well, it’s by viewing them in their entire context.
Unlike axiomatic oughts, contingent oughts are, well, contingent on premises, and in
both of these cases they’re contingent on the same axiomatic ought (that being “I
ought to prevent my child from suffering”) and at least one statement of fact (or “is”
statement).
And so syllogistically, the first argument goes as follows: Premise 1: I ought to prevent
my child from suffering.
Premise 2: It is the case that vaccinating my child will reduce her chances of suffering.
Therefore: I ought to vaccinate my child.
And the second argument goes: Premise 1: I ought to prevent my child from suffering.
Premise 2: It is the case that removing a segment of my child’s genitalia will reduce
her chances of suffering.
Therefore: I ought to remove a segment of my child’s genitalia.
Now both of these arguments are valid (as their conclusions follow from their premises),
but only one of them is sound.
And so the reason I can say that the vaccine ought is correct (or sound) and the circumcision
ought is incorrect (or unsound) is because it is indeed scientifically, objectively the
case (given the current conditions) that “Vaccinating a child will reduce their chances of suffering”,
and it is not objectively the case (given the current conditions) that “Removing a
segment of a child’s genitalia will reduce their chances of suffering”.
Thus, the former is right because its premises are correct, and the latter is wrong because
its second premise is incorrect.
Now again, we can quarrel about the axiomatic ought, but here’s the thing: if you already
accept it (for whatever reason, or, let’s face it… lack thereof), then for all intent
and purposes, what’s the problem?
Nature has made it so that we’re born with axiomatic oughts, and while, again, this is
intellectually dissatisfying, we just have to get on with it.
As inconvenient as it might be, we are not born with a blank slate, and all moral discourse
must, finally, accept this brute fact.
Anyhow, to some up, I do not believe, for example, that it’s always morally wrong
to murder… there’s no transcendent objective law that we must abide by, and I don’t believe
that we “must” do anything, but I do believe (as a matter of scientific fact) that we’re
born with intrinsic axiomatic values, goals, and inclinations (or in other words, axiomatic
oughts), and that we construe contingent oughts in reference to these axiomatic oughts and
perceived facts, and because those facts can be erroneous, so too can the contingent oughts
predicated upon them.
Or to put this more personally, while we all have different values and preferences, and
we all believe different things, the vast majority of us have the axiomatic ought of
not wanting to suffer, and consequently we want to live in a world in which no matter
who we were conceived by, no matter what genetic disposition we inherited, and no matter what
environment we grow up in, we were given ample love, patience and opportunity, and so given
this mutual acceptance of what is “good”, let’s work together to create a better future.
Now the last thing I want to say is that, if I’m honest, I’m not entirely sure on
how you’ll respond my views, as so far as I can tell they’re largely unique, but what
is for sure is that I’m excited to digest your responses.
If you think I’m right, let me know.
And likewise, if you think I’m wrong… well, you’re already typing…
As always, thank you kindly for the view, and an extra special thank you to my wonderful
patrons and those of you who’ve donated via PayPal.
Until next time my fellow apes, until next time!