Since Russia invaded Ukraine, the war has not been going in Russia's favor. With over a hundred
thousand casualties, thousands of destroyed vehicles, and punishing sanctions against the
Russian economy, it’s clear that Putin will not meet his war aim of “de-nazifying” Ukraine any
time soon. Either through an outright military defeat or humiliating peace, Russia will probably
lose the war in Ukraine. But the question remains, “What happens to Putin when he loses?” The short
answer is probably nothing, and here’s why. The main reason why Putin will probably not
be removed from power is that he is a ruthless statesman. After the collapse of the Soviet Union,
Russia faced a troubling and dramatic time during the 1990s. Marked by record unemployment,
superinflation, and a massive crime wave, the fragile government of the 90s was dominated
by a select few known as the oligarchs. The oligarchs were not necessarily from
one region or family in Russia. Instead, the oligarchs were simply people who used existing
Soviet connections to purchase state enterprises at ridiculously low prices or steal them outright.
Every type of business you could imagine became private overnight from oil and natural
gas to rail networks, industrial factories, food manufacturers, and so on. These early,
opportunistic entrepreneurs used brute force, cunning trade relationships,
and bribery to build their own monopolies within their respective industries.
Because the oligarchs wielded so much power purely due to their money, the government under
the leadership of Boris Yeltsin was powerless to oppose them. Instead, the government agreed
to the oligarchs' demands as long as they funded campaigns for all of Yeltsin’s cronies and helped
keep the government afloat financially. One of the campaigns that the oligarchs
supported was Putin's first presidential bid. Though famous in St. Petersburg, at that time,
Putin was an unknown figure on the national stage. With Boris Yeltsin's backing and the money from
the oligarchs, Putin swept the 2000 presidential election as a veritable dark horse candidate.
Shortly after winning the presidency, despite gleefully taking the oligarchs'
money to support his campaign, Putin started his own campaign against the oligarchs as soon as he
was sworn into power. Putin detested the power the oligarchs yielded against the government,
and he sought to change that. In the summer of 2000, Putin summoned the 21 wealthiest
oligarchs to Moscow to give them a personal message from him to tell all the others.
During that closed-door meeting, Putin made it abundantly clear that the oligarchs now
only existed because he allowed them to do so. Putin allegedly told them that as long as none
of them opposed his will, sought any political aspirations, and in no way challenged what he
was going to do, he would let them continue living their life of luxury. If they stepped out of line,
he would personally see to it that they were made penniless, thrown in jail, or killed.
Not long after that meeting, Putin was put to the test when an oligarch that ran the first
independent newspaper in Russia started mocking him on a television series he was running. Shortly
after airing the first episode, the oligarch was arrested for defrauding the government
of 10 million dollars, thrown in prison, and his company sold to a Putin ally for pennies
on the dollar. Putin would continue pursuing oligarchs throughout the next twenty years.
Putin has jailed or murdered numerous oligarchs since 2000, but his persecution
of them has ramped up exponentially since the invasion. Since February 2022, at least ten
oligarchs have been murdered or found dead under mysterious circumstances. Though each case was
different, the one commonality linking them was their outspoken criticism of Putin and the war.
So, if the oligarchs, supposedly the people with all the money and power in Russia,
can’t or won’t do anything, then who could? The only other entity that could
challenge Putin is a group called the siloviki. Coined about ten years ago, the term siloviki
means "men of force" and refers to the group of Putin allies that help him run the country. Once
Putin made it clear that the oligarchs would not lord over him, he created a fiercely loyal group
of oligarchs directly answerable to him. Since 2000, Putin has been steadily growing his list
of trusted confidants that he personally selects. Each of these hand-picked men is given a lucrative
business to run. Most of these businesses have deep ties to state-ordered contracts,
and his cronies and their families have become incredibly wealthy from those relationships.
Though the siloviki lord over their own domains in Russia, they have a few commonalities.
Firstly, almost all these men have experience either in the military,
police forces, or intelligence services of either the USSR or Russia. Those who do not have this
experience have been stalwart allies of Putin who served with him early on in his political
career. Regardless of their backgrounds, they each share an undying loyalty to Putin. It is
this loyalty that allows them to be close to him. Though the number of Russian oligarchs is around
400 to 1000, the number of siloviki is only around a dozen. Because it’s such an exclusive club,
the barriers to entry are high. People like Ramzan Kadyrov, the leader of the Chechen republic,
and Yevgeny Prigozhin, known as Putin’s chef and the de facto leader of the
paramilitary Wagner Group, desire to be in this club but so far haven’t made the cut.
When news media talk about people like Ramzan Kadyrov and Yevgeny Prigozhin, they often talk
about them as if they are vying to set themselves up to be the future president of Russia. But what
they do not understand about the siloviki is that they, too, only exist because Putin allows them
to. Unlike the oligarchs, the siloviki are granted audiences with Putin where they can
advise him and address their concerns. But what they cannot do is ever challenge his authority.
Because of this dynamic, the siloviki would require an almost unanimous consensus among them
to overthrow Putin. It could be possible since, with their cumulative connections in the military,
police, and business sectors, they could get away with it. However, this would be
unlikely given that some have been staunch Putin supporters literally since Putin's childhood.
So, if even the siloviki would not overthrow Putin, what about the Russian people? After all,
with almost 150 million residents, the Russian people far outnumber the dozen
or so cronies controlling the country. But going back to Putin being a ruthless
statesman, even a popular uprising is unlikely. There has been some very vocal public opposition
against Putin, from mass demonstrations in the streets to even shootings at recruitment offices,
combined with the mass exodus of hundreds of thousands of Russian men avoiding the
draft. However, as one activist has put it, Putin's regime is better at cracking down on
protests than they are at organizing them. For example, Putin's security forces have
arrested thousands of protestors. These protestors have faced indescribably inhumane treatment while
in custody. But what is even worse than their treatment is what happens to them
afterward. Many arrested protestors reported that instead of court summons, they were handed draft
notices and inducted into the army. This forceful conscription has deterred many from protesting.
And at the border checkpoints, when Russian men were fleeing by the thousands,
the Russian military simply set up enlistment offices and handed out draft notices before
men could cross the border. These actions and more have stifled resistance among the
minority of people actively opposed to Putin and denied a voice to the silent majority.
According to most political analysts, Russia has three distinct groups of people.
Some actively resist the war, some are staunchly pro-war, and then there is the silent majority.
The silent majority is a holdover from the Soviet era, where their parents and
grandparents would tell them that everything would be alright as long as there is no war.
This group of people, though research has shown that if given a choice,
generally do not approve of Putin, would never make these statements publicly, even to their
friends and family. Instead, the vast majority of Russia's population chooses to remain apolitical
as long as the war does not affect them. Putin is doing everything he can to do just that.
For example, Putin called up 300,000 men in his partial mobilization back in September. While the
pictures and videos of distraught men being forced to say goodbye to loved ones rippled throughout
Russian media, something more tragic has not made any waves at all. The so-called Russian oblasts of
the Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic have forcibly mobilized the same number
of personnel from a total population about 41 times smaller than Russia’s.
Evidence shows that 140,000 men from these two areas had already been drafted by June.
By December, it’s estimated to now be double that number, and these figures do not even
include the thousands of Ukrainians forcibly enlisted in southern Ukraine. In the Donbas,
roving patrols of soldiers kidnap all able-bodied men aged 18 to 60 to serve in the army. In fact,
the numbers are so huge that the economies in the rear areas no longer function,
mostly because no people are left to work. It’s this type of all-encompassing, general
mobilization that Putin does not want Russians to experience because of the huge public backlash he
would receive from the silent majority. Another way he is avoiding backlash is
by forcibly enlisting immigrants and those from economically depressed areas. In Russia,
there are millions of mostly single Central Asian men who have come to Russia legally to work,
and they often send their money home and frequently travel to see their families. Since
the war started, Russian army officials have been forcing these men to sign enlistment contracts
by telling them they would have problems with immigration authorities if they refused. Leaked
evidence appears to support this theory. In the spring, documents obtained by an
independent news outlet showed the names and home addresses of 120,000 personnel serving
in Ukraine. Many of these men had last names and home addresses from Central Asian countries like
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan. Since the war started, more studies have
proved that mobilization efforts target poorer communities in Russia. Frequently,
oblasts in eastern and southern Russia face per capita mobilization rates ten to
fifty times greater than places like Moscow, which is a hotbed of Putin support. Because
most Putin supporters are middle-class and higher, Putin's force generation efforts
disproportionately target areas where he is not as popular, thereby keeping his supporters loyal.
However, despite racial profiling and discrimination, some communities have embraced
this opportunity to increase their standing with Putin. Dagestan, the Muslim-majority republic in
the Caucasus, has had rocky relations with Moscow due to decades of Islamic extremism in the region.
Local leaders see the war as an opportunity to provide huge numbers of personnel to get political
favors with Putin. These communities have become Putin supporters as a way to secure more financial
aid and lessen Moscow’s grip on local politics. Another factor that keeps the silent majority
silent is the lackluster results of the sanctions on the Russian economy. Over a thousand western
businesses have left Russia, and that number grows every day. But despite this, the Russian
economy is only expected to retract about 4% this year, far less than Western analysts had hoped.
Because of this, though consumers are slightly annoyed because they have fewer options to choose
from, there are still plenty of options in large population centers. With increased salaries from
state-owned corporations, Putin has done much to ensure his supporters are taken care of. However,
these sanctions are hitting Russians harder in rural areas where most of his army hails from.
With already depressed wages, the price increases on the available everyday products have hit the
wallets of many less economically fortunate Russians. With few state jobs in those areas,
these people have seen their buying power plummet. But despite this, they hunker down and endure
the storm because of the prevalent Soviet mindset that has stuck around in the Russian countryside.
Even though a regime change in Russia is very unlikely, it could still happen. The
more likely scenario would be a silent coup from the siloviki. Up for re-election in 2024,
Putin could be forced by this group not to seek re-election. In exchange,
Putin and his family would be guaranteed to live out their days in comfort with the estimated 200
billion dollars of wealth he personally holds. On the other hand, the much more dramatic
scenario would be his forced departure from Russia. One of his closest political aides,
who was also his speechwriter, claims that Putin’s bailout plan should everything go
south is to flee to a country like Venezuela. In a dictatorship, Putin would be guaranteed
safety and freedom of movement for the rest of his days while still enjoying his vast wealth.
As far as a bloody revolution or assassination, the chances of this happening are virtually
zero. While a silent coup could be possible, especially if Putin escalates the war beyond
what it already is, killing him is out of the question. The opposition is too closely
monitored to conduct such an act, he has too many protections in place from his pro-war hawks,
and the silent majority is too afraid to do anything to disturb their quality of life.
Now watch “Ukraine's Plan to Win the War.” Or
check out “Why Are Russian Tanks Failing in Ukraine.”