Since the start of Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine and until it ends,
every NATO summit will be dominated by one question: how the alliance can best work with
Kyiv to win the war.
That was true for the special Belgium summit, called one month after the war began, specifically
for that purpose.
It remained true for the 2022 annual summit in Spain.
And it continues for the 2023 summit in Lithuania.
But as time progresses and Western advocates for Ukraine become more and more acceptant
that full membership will not happen any time soon,
there has recently been a shift in the discussion to EU membership as being a close substitute,
citing similar collective security provisions within the European Union Treaty.
But is it a close substitute?
Today, we are going to talk about the hurdles to Ukraine joining NATO,
the logic behind the EU as an alternative and why it just is not the same,
but that EU membership is certainly better than nothing.
Ultimately, we will learn why Ukraine sees this as NATO or bust.
But the details are more complicated than that.
Let’s start at the top with those Ukrainian NATO hurdles.
We can subdivide the issue into two problems: a direct one with the North Atlantic Treaty
and one based on broad NATO working policy.
The rule-based problem comes from Article 10 of the treaty, which requires unanimous
support to admit new members.
We have an entire video on the subject,
so I will not go into the details regarding why the founding members structured the alliance
in such a manner.
The key implication is that every single one of these countries can deny Ukraine entry
into NATO,
as Sweden knows all too well.
While there are some idiosyncratic reasons that Turkey
has stalled Sweden’s entry— here’s looking at you, PKK—
this basically means that Turkey has to consent to Ukraine or the process is going nowhere.
Turkey, of course, has tried to play mediator throughout the war and does not seem particularly
interested changing that.
But we should not pin any hold up entirely on Turkey.
There is broader Ukraine skepticism in the halls of NATO’s Brussels headquarters.
As the alliance expanded, NATO began standardizing its rules for application.
One component is to have settled borders— the idea being that NATO does not want to
inherent an ongoing conflict.
Of course, that encourages rivals to create disputes to keep would-be members out.
And that is exactly what Russia did in 2014 and then doubled downed on with its February
24, 2022 invasion.
In the short and medium term, there only seem to be two plausible ways that Ukraine could
satisfy the no-dispute standard.
First, Ukraine achieves a sweeping victory and forces Russia to sign a treaty that recognizes
Ukraine’s 2013 borders as … well, Ukrainian.
The jury is still out on how Ukraine’s offensive will unfold, but the type of victory just
described is on the extreme of those expectations…
unless Russia devolves into a massive civil war,
akin to Russia’s departure from World War I.
That seemed like a stretch going into the summer but became just a little more plausible
following Wagner’s thunder run to Moscow on June 24.
The other way this could happen is where Ukraine formally ceded
Crimea and perhaps some more in the east.
Then Russia and Ukraine sign an agreement that officially ends the conflict, which explicitly
includes a provision for Ukraine to enter NATO.
Essentially, Kyiv chops off a foot and maybe a hand to preserve the rest of its body.
For now, that seems hardly likely either.
Ukraine thinks that it can outlast Russia in this war and slowly recover everything
it once held, NATO
or no NATO.
In other words, Kyiv is not interested in giving concessions at this point.
Long term, the situation with Russia could evolve in unpredictable ways.
That is why Ukraine is not simply going through the motions here.
But currently the NATO summits are more geared toward coordinating with Ukraine rather than
bringing Ukraine aboard.
This is why much of the chatter has shifted to Ukraine joining the EU as a consolation
prize.
The assumption here is that the EU will be easier to join and provide similar benefits.
The ease of membership question is a topic for another time.
Suffice it to say that it is no simple task either: it also requires unanimity.
The EU’s Copenhagen Criteria for membership require applicants to follow the rule of law
and have a functioning market economy.
But as of 2019, Ukraine was a country where it was possible
to create a TV show where
a history teacher gets caught on video going on an expletive-laden rant
about how bad corruption is in the country, which makes the character so popular that
he accidentally wins the presidential election,
which then spawns a real-life political party based on the television show with an anti-corruption
platform,
which then propels the actor to become the actual president
in a sweeping victory over an oligarch incumbent.
Although unanimous EU affirmation that corruption is a thing of the past is a high bar,
the key difference is that Turkey is not a barrier anymore,
though Hungary—the other half of Sweden’s holdup—is still there.
Long story short: it is a promising direction but not the end of the story.
Anyway, let’s focus on the part about how the EU could ostensibly have similar benefits
as NATO—
that is, Article 5 protection.
In practice, Article 5 does not say what would happen if Ukraine was under its umbrella and
Russia continued the attack.
Rather, the article just instructs member states to do whatever they deem appropriate
for the situation.
We do not have much of a historical template for how this works in practice because it
has only been invoked once:
the United States against Afghanistan, under circumstances that are just about the
exact opposite of a World War I style trench battle in Europe.
Regardless, one would imagine that NATO’s response would be quicker,
involve more materiel, take advantage of NATO’s pre-existing joint
command, and, yes, may very well include having boots
on the ground.
But again, suppose NATO is off the table but the EU is not.
Problem solved?
Analysts have pointed out that an EU equivalent* to Article 5 exists.
It says that “if a member state is the victim of armed
aggression on its territory, the other member states shall have towards it an obligation
of aid and assistance by all the means in their power.”
Besides the awkward legalese, it sounds like just about everything you would
want, right?
But Ukraine sees it differently.
It’s NATO or bust.
The problem is that, like any other international obligation, they are
“obligations”.
The non-existent international police will not arrest any European Union leaders for
failing to come to Ukraine’s aid.
Consequently, opposing leaders are not just going to look
at the rules as written, conclude that collective defense will happen,
and then choose not to invade.
If you really want to deter your opponent with collective self-defense, your opponent
needs to believe you.
Astute viewers will recognize that the legal criticism that I have levied regarding the
EU treaty applies equally to the North Atlantic Treaty.
But they are night and day when it comes to the believability part.
As a starting point, I ask you: what is the name of the EU collective defense provision?
I have no doubt that many of you know—you care a lot more about this than the average
person
but I am also willing to bet the channel that the vast majority of you do not,
even those of you who live in the EU.
And if you do know, go ahead and take a victory lap in the comments.
You deserve it.
For those remaining, perhaps multiple choice would help.
Still unsure?
Okay, I actually lied.
It is none of those.
The provision is Article 42(7).
If you have a hard time remembering that, it is the meaning of life
plus a lucky number.
At least that is the only way that I can remember it.
Even if you live in the EU, you should not feel bad about not knowing the label.
For one thing, almost all of you also live under Article 5.
Note Sweden is one of the exceptions and is trying to get into NATO, which is telling.
Even the full text of Article 42(7) alludes to Article 5.
For another, the EU is primarily a trade bloc, with aspirations for more.
It is not a military alliance.
That is why the provision is relegated to Article 42(7).
It is not on the first page of the treaty.
It is on page 29.
It also means that when EU states are voting to admit a new member,
they are thinking about the economic consequences of doing so,
not something buried in the dark depths of the treaty.
By comparison, the thrust of NATO is collective defense.
You get it almost immediately in Article 5.
The first two articles are boilerplate: peace is good and war is bad.
The third talks about maintaining individually strong armies,
and the fourth describes how to call a meeting.
Then, bam, the meat of the treaty.
Thus, when members are voting on whether to expand, the military issues are the focus.
Never mind that Article 5 has three quarters of a century behind it,
whereas 42(7) still cannot even order a drink from a bar.
And never mind that the United States is not covered in it.
Never mind that UK is not covered in it either.
42(7) and 5 are not the same.
One gives Russia pause.
The other is an afterthought.
Alright, that was a lot of hating on the EU.
But let’s talk about why it will still be a useful step for Ukraine even ignoring 42(7).
It is worth remembering that Ukrainian EU membership is how we got here in the first
place.
In 2013, it looked like Viktor Yanukovich was about to sign a trade deal with the European
Union,
seen as an important first step toward EU membership.
Then he switch at the last minute to join Russia’s Eurasian trade bloc,
with Russia laying in the coercion precisely because the Kremlin was worried about Ukraine
going down the EU path.
That resulted in protests in Independence Square,
and the rest, as they say, is history.
One revolution later, the EU trade deal came into effect in 2017,
but actual EU membership would benefit Ukraine way beyond that.
This all matters because countries that trade together tend to stay together.
It is pure economics.
If Ukraine is your trade partner, you are making money together in the process.
When another country comes to threaten Ukraine, even if you do directly not care at all about
Ukraine, the potential invader is now putting your
own wealth on the line.
That makes you more inclined to intervene on Ukraine’s behalf.
Of course, if Ukraine is a trade partner and falls within a visa-free zone,
then more of you are going to travel there as well.
The corresponding cultural exchange might just make you actually like Ukraine directly
and want to protect it,
regardless of the economics.
Even just having more non-Ukrainian EU bodies physically present in the country will give
the opponent pause.
Now invading Ukraine might incidentally kill a bunch of German, French, and Polish citizens,
and their governments might not look too kindly at that.
Consequently, even ignoring the EU’s obligations under 42(7),
membership is helpful.
And it indirectly helps move toward NATO integration.
All of Ukraine’s new trade partners might want to protect their investment.
Do you know what a good way to do that is?
Well, I have an answer.
It’s Article 5.
That does not directly solve the Turkey problem.
But it does encourage EU states to offer more inducements to Turkey to grease the wheels.
As such, it may be NATO or bust for Ukraine,
but EU membership is a useful rest stop along that path.
Do you want to know more about the invasion.
If so, it is this book or bust on the causes of it.
Check below for more information on that.
And if you enjoyed this video, please like, share, and subscribe, and I will see you next
time.
Take care.
Channel update: in the middle of the chaos involving Wagner,
I completely missed that we had steamrolled past 100 million total views.
That is really awesome, and I cannot thank you all enough.
The next milestone: half a million subscribers.
And we still have a large pool to draw from.
Just give it a click.
Come on.