>> Linda Zagzebski: At the beginning of this course, I said that the basic difference between
virtue ethics and act-based ethics is that act-based theories are primarily concerned
with the question: “What should I do?” While virtue theories are primarily concerned
with the question: “What kind of person do I want to be?” Act-based theories come
up with rules. In the best case, one supreme rule or principle to distinguish a right act
from a wrong act. So classical utilitarianism is an important example of an act-based theory
because it sets up one moral principle that is intended to tell us what to do in any given
situation. Act in a way that produces the best consequences. Where the best consequences
are determined by the greatest balance of pleasure over pain for the greatest number
of people. Kant’s categorical imperative is the ultimate moral principle in the other
major act-based theory in modern ethics. One important form of that principle says to act
in a way that treats every human being not merely as a means but always at the same time
as an end in itself. Respect for rationality and each person draws a line between what
is morally permissible and what is not. Act-based theories are enormously influential but many
people think that they’re vulnerable to important objections. One problem is that
there is more to be concerned about in living a good life than performing acts that are
right. Living a good life is not the same thing as going through life avoiding wrong
acts and doing the right thing as often as you can. We all want to live a flourishing,
fulfilling life and to live in flourishing communities. Classical act-based theories
do not tell us much about that. There is also the worry that the morality of acts might
not be strictly rule governed anyway. That is, there might not always be a rule that
fits every person in every circumstance. Think about all of the practical choices a person
can make, like how to play your hand in poker or when to sell a certain stock or whether
to tell someone a hurtful truth. Only the last one is a moral choice but the same point
might apply in the other cases. There are not enough rules to cover every situation
so rules are not enough. But you might say that at least act-based theories have rules
and rules can be very useful. Isn’t it an advantage of act-based theories that they
have rules that we can refer to in making choices? How much guidance and acting do we
get from virtue theory? Rosalind Hursthouse answers: “Quite a bit.” Virtue ethics
does generate norms for acting that she calls: “V Rules” or Virtue rules. Act justly,
act compassionately, act courageously, act humbly, act generously, and so on for all
of the virtues. Given what we said about practical wisdom in the last lecture, the bottom line
would be the rule: “Act in the way a person with practical wisdom would act.” But that
is not very precise. Isn’t it more precise to have rules like: “Don’t lie?” Well
maybe, but the greater precision of act-based theories might be an illusion for at least
two reasons. One is that a virtue theory will generate most of the same rules as other moral
theories. For instance, a rule like ‘Don’t lie’ follows from the virtue rule that says
‘Be honest’. But more importantly, rules sometimes mislead us because either there
are exceptions that the rule ignores or the rule requires interpretation that makes it
hard to apply. For instance, some moral philosophers argue that the rule ‘Don’t lie’ has
no exceptions but not every untruth is a lie. That makes the decision procedure seem simple,
but it just shifts the burden to figuring out what counts as a lie. It could be better
to devote our time and moral deliberation to reflecting about the nature of honesty
and why we owe it to each other. Rather than creating rules precise enough to settle every
case. In the last lecture, I said that Aristotle makes practical wisdom (or phronesis) the
key virtue. The right thing to do, all things considered, is what a person with practical
wisdom would judge it to be. Perhaps practically wise people follow rules that they can teach
us. But maybe a person with practical wisdom sees what to do but she can not fully explain
why it is the right thing. That would mean that knowing what to do in every moral situation
requires having a kind of wisdom that only a few people have and maybe nobody has fully.
That makes it hard for us to turn ethics into a precise science. But as Aristotle said:
“Not every science can be made precise and ethics is one of those that cannot be precise.”
What about theories that focus on rights? Are they better at dealing with hard moral
issues like abortion? Rosalind Hursthouse argues in a paper you are reading this week
that “Virtue ethics is actually in a better position to handle the problem of abortion
than act-based theories.” Most of the discussion of the morality of abortion focuses on the
status of the human fetus. Does it have rights? If so, how should those rights be weighed
against the mother’s rights? Hursthouse argues that the question of rights is often
beside the point. Even if we assume that the mother has a right to an abortion, an abortion
could be morally wrong because in the exercise of a right we can do something cruel, or callous,
or selfish, or stupid, or disloyal, or dishonest. Hursthouse then argues that in order to determine
the virtuous thing to do, we need to take into account biological and social facts about
human reproduction that are very familiar but which are largely ignored by the theories
that focus on rights rather than virtues. The biological and social facts about how
babies are made and born and grow into adulthood shows us that all of us started as fetus’s
and motherhood is a valuable human state that normally contributes to a flourishing life.
The death of a fetus is always sad and is sometimes tragic. That is morally relevant
because it explains why abortion can sometimes be a selfish, or childish, or shallow thing
to do, or materialistic, or short sided, or callous. She thinks it can also be a choice
that is not vicious at all but shows that something is terribly amiss in a woman’s
life. A woman may lack the kind of support that makes thriving possible for her. There
can be virtues lacking in the community that put all of the burden on the pregnant woman.
So whether or not an abortion violates the virtue of justice is one question, whether
it violates other virtues is another question. Focusing on rights ignores some of the more
important questions. Hursthouse argues in a different paper that “Virtue theory has
the same advantage in explaining the proper treatment of animals.” To talk about the
moral status of non-human animals misses some of the most important facts about the relationship
between humans and animals. To illustrate the defects of rights approach to morality
she asked us to consider the relationship between her and her cat. Almost everybody
says that she is more valuable than her cat. Meaning that if somebody can only rescue on
of them from a burning building they should rescue her rather than the cat. But then she
asks, what if she escapes by herself? Should you rescue the cat? Most people say no unless
you really can do it with no danger to yourself at all because you outrank the cat too, you
are much more important than the cat. She says “Fine, but would you say the same thing
about what she should do? Should she try to rescue the cat?” The answer she says is
not nearly as obvious because the relevant point now is not that she is human and the
cat is a cat, but that the cat is her cat. She has a relationship with the cat and has
assumed responsibility for the cat. She agrees that she would have to be a sentimental idiot
to risk dying to save the cat but if she can rescue him without taking a great deal of
risk, she ought to do it. The point here is that moral status and moral rights are not
the only thing relevant to this decision. Personal relationships, including relationships
with animals have moral weight that can be explained into virtue theory where the virtues
arising from love and friendship and from compassion and sympathy can easily be extended
beyond the human realm. When discussing the morality of abortion, we need to consider
familiar biological facts about human reproduction and the social facts about the rearing of
the young. When discussing the moral treatment of animals we need to consider the social
facts about human animal relationships and I think also potential relationships. Once
we do that, we are led to consider a lot of other relationships that have not been a traditional
part of virtue ethics. Like our relationship to the whole biological environment and our
relationship to future generations. In class, we can talk about what kind of relationship
we have with the future state of the world and what virtues, either new or old, should
govern that relationship.