In the summer of 1757, things were not looking good for Prussia. Its King, Frederick the Great,
often wondered if his participation in what would become known as the Seven Years’ War
had been the greatest mistake of his life. After the costly victory at the Battle of Prague,
Prussia suffered a decisive defeat at the hands of a much larger Austrian army at Kolin.
In the aftermath of Kolin, Frederick retreated to Silesia and Saxony in an attempt to hold the
frontiers there. The theatres of war during this time can be roughly divided into three parts.
A large French army and the Reichsarmee threatened Prussia’s western flank.
In July, a combined Hanoverian-Hessian army under the Duke of Cumberland
was defeated by General D’Estrees, opening the way to Brandenburg and Saxony. To the south,
the Austrian army under Field Marshal Daun and Prince Charles of Lorraine threatened Prussia’s
heartland. Not to mention the constant raids by irregulars against towns and villages. This
was exemplified by the defeat of a Prussian army at Landeshut. Though not a decisive, monumental
battle, it illustrated Prussia’s problem: they were nearly always heavily outnumbered.
But through it all, the most significant problem, logistics-wise, was East Prussia.
The Duchy was separated by over 300 miles, around 500 kilometres, of Polish territory. Moreover,
because of Russia’s lukewarm feelings towards the French and British and their abysmal supply
line infrastructure, the conflict on Prussia’s eastern frontier had not yet escalated to combat.
Frankly, the eastern front had been dormant so far. But news of the defeat at Kolin
also reached the east, and things began moving. The Russians learned of Prussia’s recent defeat
and sent two armies to the Duchy. 18,000 soldiers under Count William Fermor laid siege to Memel.
Another army, numbering some 70.000, under Field Marshal Stepan Arpaxin, crossed the Niemen River,
slowly advancing towards Wehlau. The Russian army, especially its Cossacks, was notorious
for its plunderings and general disobedience. This invasion was no exception. In early July, Fermor
captured Memel, establishing the main military base and departing to link up with Apraxin.
The first reports of Cossack plunderings reached Frederick on July 17. He had the looming danger
in the west- and south to worry about and ordered the heavily outnumbered, 70-year-old,
Field Marshal Hans von Lehwaldt to hold the Duchy with 25.000 soldiers. The King wasn’t
too worried - that unruly bunch would stand no chance against the disciplined Prussians.
Additionally, the Russian supply lines were stretched beyond what could reasonably maintain an
army. As a result, tens of thousands of soldiers were foraging the woods and plundering villages.
But marauders or not, fact of the matter was that the Russians advanced against the Prussians.
In late August, Apraxin continued his advance against Lehwaldt, stationed at
Wehlau. Lehwaldt received no specific orders, only to face the Russian army as he saw fit.
Historians mention his advanced age and his inexperience as an autonomous commander.
But given these facts, it makes it all the more surprising what happened next.
Because due to some rapid and unexpected manoeuvring,
the Prussian army surprised the Russians between the villages of Gross-Jagersdorf and Norkitten.
On the evening of August 29, Lehwaldt and his army arrived nearby the village of
Pushsdorf (Pushkarevo). They set up camp between the village and the woodlands. But not for long.
That night, the Prussians prepared for a march against the Russians in what would
hopefully culminate in a deadly surprise attack. Lehwaldt commanded approximately 25.000 to 27.700
soldiers. 17.000 infantry in 22 battalions, 8200 horsemen in 50 squadrons and 55 artillery pieces.
Field Marshal Stepan Apraxin commanded at least double that.
Sources differ, but it is generally assumed he commanded between 55.000
and 75.000 soldiers. At least 36.200 infantry, 18.600 cavalry,and 263 guns.
The Russians camped between Uszbundzen and around the Pregel near Norkitten. Their surroundings
consisted of marshes and woodlands. The Russians outnumbered the Prussians at least 2 to 1.
At around 2 AM that day, unbeknownst to them, Lehwaldt ordered the entire Prussian
army to march in three columns through the woodlands, towards Gross-Jagersdorf.
The duke of Holstein commanded the south, Lt. Gen. Schorlemer the north and Lehwaldt the centre.
Despite hoping to surprise the Russians, there is reason to assume Apraxin could have prepared for a
Prussian attack with the knowledge of hindsight. His Cossack scouts had already informed him of
advancing Prussians in late August. However, because of the lack of deployed guards,
the advancing Prussian army wasn’t spotted and the situation didn’t put the Russians on high alert.
At 4:00 AM, a misty dawn, the Russian soldiers slowly awoke and began preparing for their march.
The Russian cavalry and Cossacks moved from their camp at Uszbundzen
down south along the road towards Allenburg (Druzhba). Fermor’s division was delayed,
resulting in only half of the Russian cavalry moving south towards Allenburg.
[Battle Sequence]
To the west, Lehwaldt’s army advanced. When he saw the Russian cavalry trekking south,
he ordered the Duke of Holstein with 20 whole squadrons to move against the vanguard.
Next, he ordered Lt. Gen. Schorlemer’s cavalry to move towards Weynothen in the north. If
successful, the Prussians would mount a surprise attack against both the north- and southern flank.
Lehwaldt maintained command of the Prussian infantry,
covering the entire centre. They deployed in front of Gross-Jagersdorf and Uderballen, preparing
a march past Metschullen and the Norkitten wald. Thanks to the morning fog, the Russians overlooked
the advancing Prussians at first. A Russian battery nearby Weyhoten was the first to notice
Schorlemer’s advancing cavalry. They opened fire, alerting their comrades that battle likely was
imminent. However, several units “collapsed in disorder as their officers frantically sought
to deploy.” Frankly, it was chaos, as the Prussian infantry appeared in front of the marching column.
The Prussian infantry and cavalry soon fought against a haphazardly formed Russian vanguard.
They pressed the attack and aggressively pushed into their lines. Eyewitness accounts survive of
Russian officers caught by total surprise. Some of them “Galloped around distractedly, shrieking out
meaningless orders.” Regular soldiers supposedly left the battlefield to “go guard the baggage
train” or “hang around in nearby bushes.” Because central control lacked, many infantry
units could not form up in the squares - a traditional defence against cavalry attacks. The
Prussians made serious inroads in record time. Things were not looking good for the Russians.
But to the south, Sibilsky’s cavalry managed to form a battle line against Holstein’s advancing
cavalry. Still, Holstein’s dragoons launched a severe charge and burst through the enemy lines.
Brutal fighting broke out. And to the north,
despite the initial surprise and casualties, the Russians held Schorlemer’s cavalry at bay.
However, this promising position for the Russians was radically altered when Fermor
ordered the advance batteries in the north to retreat. There is no satisfactory explanation
for why he gave this order, but it directly freed up Schorlemer’s 30 cavalry squadrons.
These cavalry squadrons now flung themselves at Fermor’s cavalry
despite the artillery battering. Casualties mounted. To their south, the Prussian infantry
continued making inroads against the Russians. Fighting slowly moved into the Nordkitten Wald.
But despite the Prussian discipline and their advantage of surprise, it gradually became evident
reserves plugged the holes with relative ease. This also became noticeable to the south.
Holstein’s dragoons lost 55 men. Despite inflicting many more casualties, it put them
on the backfoot. The other cavalry units too lost significant numbers, sometimes up to half
their strength. They battered the Russians, but their numerical disadvantage showed.
Meanwhile, nearby Nordkitten, General Pyotr Rumyantsev managed to rally his infantry.
Using them as reserves, they charged forward through the Nordkitten forest
against the Prussian infantry. The combat slowly began moving in the opposite direction,
outside the woods. The Russians returned fire perhaps a fraction of the time, but the volume
of volleys still tore into the Prussian ranks. The battlefield was cluttered and chaotic
thanks to artillery shelling from both sides. Eyewitness accounts mention blinding smoke. During
the skirmish, a Prussian regiment accidentally fired into its frontlines. Many men were lost.
Then on the south, the Russian cavalry seemingly broke. They were routed, and Holstein’s dragoons
chased them using the momentum. Would the Prussians finally breakthrough? Well,
certainly not in the way they expected. It was all a ruse. The cossacks feigned retreat. As
Holstein’s dragoons chased them past Uszbunden, suddenly they ran into Sibilsky’s heavy guns. They
mauled the Prussian cavalry, and as the Russian infantry closed off their only escape, they
surrendered. They were captured almost to a man. This happened around 0600 AM. Fighting continued
until approximately 0700 AM. The battle lines remained somewhat the same. The decisive combat
occurred around the centre, where the Prussian infantry and Russians heavily clashed. Still,
despite causing many more casualties, the holes were plugged with reserves.
For example, an infantry unit broke through the Russian ranks but lost 489 men and 16
officers. Because of the lack of follow-up, the heavily battered unit had to pull back again.
As more and more Russians began forming up and resisting the Prussians, Lehwaldt understood
further attacks would disproportionately affect his men. So he ordered the general retreat.
In total, the Prussians suffered between 5000 and 6000 casualties. Sources indicate 1452
dead and 4502 wounded. Although the number of wounded soldiers seems to be inflated.
Among them were 282 officers. They also lost 17 battalion guns and 11 big guns.
The Russians suffered between 5- and 7000 soldiers. At least 1818 dead and 2800 wounded.
Among them were 11 generals, a surprisingly high number.
I think it is worth briefly reflecting on the battle and its implications.
First, the Prussians managed to closely contest an army twice their size. They
surprised the entire army and initially, it seemed like they would emerge victoriously.
But we should not forget that the Russians still managed to come out on top despite
a surprise attack, fundamental lack of discipline, and an absence of drilling.
Sure, their numerical superiority played an essential part in the eventual victory,
but still. They had no opportunity to form conventional battle lines, for example.
Redman explains how the Europeans still did not know much about Russian warfare at this time.
Besides Sweden’s wars, their next best source was the Ottomans, which
did not exactly provide the average European commander with much knowledge. Simply put:
the Prussians had no idea what to expect and misjudged the Russian tenacity. This is something
that caught me by surprise but makes total sense. During the early- and middle 18th century, there
indeed must have been an absence of knowledge about the Russian army and battle tactics.
As for Gross-Jagersdorf’s aftermath, for the Russians, the most logical course of action
would be to continue for 50 more kilometres and seize Koniggratz, the Duchy’s capital.
It would amputate one of Prussia’s safeguards and open the way to its heartland.
However, the opposite happened. It was a blessing for Frederick, one that is inexplicable.
There would be several more of these events during this war. Whether it was
because of a false report of the death of the Tsarina, the complete lack of supply lines,
local uprisings against the marauding Russians, or an epidemic of smallpox, all that is sure is
that Apraxin did not follow up his victory. After the victory at Gross-Jagersdorf, the
Russians retreated from the Duchy. Unfortunately for Apraxin, the Tsarina had not passed away.
When she learned of his… rather random retreat, she relieved him from command and investigated
the Chancellor, supposedly supporting the retreat, for treason. As a result, the Chancellor, Alexey
Bestuzhev-Ryumin, was exiled to his estates. The Tsarina appointed the new Russian commander:
William Fermor. This new commander would give Prussia much more of a run for its money. And as
the other parties to the war learned of Prussia’s defeat, things began heating up in central Europe.
Thank you for watching this video.