On the 27th of June, 1988, a busy commuter train was bound for Paris’s Gare de Lyon
station.
Midway through its journey, however, a passenger activated the emergency brake and left the
train.
Though it was not apparent at the time, this passenger had just set in motion a sequence
of events that would lead to the third-deadliest railway disaster in France ever to take place
in peacetime.
The Société Nationale des Chemins de fer Français (or SNCF) is the state owned national
railway company of France.
Founded in 1938, much of its infrastructure was forcibly commandeered by German invaders
during World War II, before being returned to the French when Germany was finally defeated.
Since then, the SNCF has grown to manage hundreds of high-speed and regular commuter rail lines
across the country.
One such line was the route from Melun in northern France to the large mainline Gare
de Lyon station in Paris – a journey of around 80 kilometres (or 50 miles).
This was, naturally, a popular route for commuters working in the city.
As the summer season approached, the SNCF made some changes to their timetables.
One such change was to remove the intermediary station Le Vert de Maisons as a stop for some
services on the route.
On the 27th of June, 1988, the 5:38pm service from Melun was running on time as it approached
Le Vert de Maisons, reaching the station at around 6:39pm.
In accordance with its new timetable, it was set to pass straight through… but before
it could do so a woman in the second car rose from her seat and activated the emergency
brake.
As well as triggering an alarm in the driver’s cabin, this also triggered an automatic brake
application that brought the train to a halt while still partially in the station.
The woman who had activated the brake quickly left her car and exited the station, leaving
other passengers bewildered as to her motive.
The driver of the train that day was 42-year-old Daniel Saulin – a man who had worked on
the railways ever since he was a teenager, and was generally respected as a competent
and careful driver.
He was assisted by Guard Jean Bovée – another long-serving SNCF employee.
Driver Saulin left his cabin and surveyed the train.
In order to get moving again he would need to reset the brakes, which he promptly did
by pulling a lever at the rear of the locomotive.
Because this lever was stiff, he braced himself against another handle for leverage… and
inadvertently turned this lever as well.
Without realising it, Driver Saulin had closed the main brake valve, and separated the pneumatic
braking system into two isolated sections: the locomotive and the rest of the train.
Returning to the driver’s cab, Saulin found the brakes still locked.
At this stage he should have called a technician to inspect the train before attempting to
move it again… but, convinced that he knew what the problem was, he did not do so.
Instead he assumed that the sudden emergency stop had created too much pressure in the
braking system, and that the brakes throughout the train simply needed to manually have some
pressure removed from them in order to fix the problem.
Accordingly, Saulin and Bovée did just this – they worked their way down the train,
manually bleeding air from the brakes on each car.
They thought that they were resolving a routine issue, but they weren’t.
Because Saulin had unknowingly closed the main valve to the braking system, there was
no way for the brakes on each car to refill to the correct pressure once they had been
bled.
Rather than releasing excess pressure, the two men were removing from the system the
pressure necessary for the train to effectively brake.
When Driver Saulin returned to the locomotive, the pressure gauge there showed the correct
pressure.
It did so only because the locomotive was isolated from the other cars.
Considering the problem solved, he got the service back underway.
Many passengers had disembarked during the half hour it had taken for the guard and driver
to fix the problem with the train.
The train was now very behind schedule.
To make up some time, a controller instructed Saulin to skip the next stop, and head straight
on to the terminus of the route, Gare de Lyon.
Because of this, Saulin only discovered that his brakes were barely functional when he
passed a yellow signal on approach to his final stop.
By this time the train was on a relatively steep downward slope, and the little braking
power left was insufficient to stop it.
Saulin made a panicked radio call to controllers, stating that he had no brakes, but not clearly
identifying which train he was calling from.
Before anyone could reply, he activated an emergency alarm, left his cab and ran back
through the train, encouraging passengers to move to the back of the train and brace
for a collision.
The emergency alarm was broadcast across the radio network, prompting every driver who
heard it to bring their train to a halt.
A flurry of radio messages to controllers followed, making their task of communicating
warnings about the runaway train even more complex.
This general alarm had other detrimental effects.
The points leading into Gare de Lyon had been pre-programmed to switch the incoming train
to an empty track… but the general alarm disabled this pre-programming and gave full
control to operators.
This was intended to allow them to better control trains in an emergency… but in this
case it was fatal.
Rather than heading towards an empty platform, the runaway train was now barrelling towards
a delayed train waiting at platform 2 of Gare de Lyon.
This delayed train had been poised to leave.
But the general alarm required every train in the vicinity to stop in place, meaning
that this train now could not move out of danger.
By the time controllers were able to correctly identify the runaway train, there was less
than a minute to go until impact.
Warnings were broadcast through the station public address system, prompting some passengers
to evacuate the platform.
The driver of the delayed train waiting at platform 2 was Andre Tanguy.
Upon hearing the announcement regarding the incoming runaway train, he voluntarily remained
in his driver’s cab, and used the train’s public address system to further encourage
passengers to evacuate.
Consequently, he did not survive the collision.
He was not alone.
The delayed train, which had been sitting at the platform for some time, was packed
with passengers, not all of whom could access the doors or get clear of the platform in
time.
Almost 100 people were left trapped in the wreckage, many of them seriously injured by
the impact.
Emergency workers arrived at the station just ten minutes later, and began the long process
of extricating passengers from the crush zone.
The rescue effort went on into the following day.
By midday on the 28th of June it was determined that nobody was left alive in the remains
of the crushed train cars.
In total, 56 people had lost their lives in the accident, and 60 had sustained serious
injuries.
A government investigation followed.
The fact that a passenger had activated the emergency brake soon emerged, and a brief
media campaign was launched to try and identify this passenger.
The day after the crash she came forward voluntarily.
She was a 21-year-old mother who had been on her way to pick up her children from school
when she realised the train would not stop at her station.
Worried that she might be late, she had used the emergency brake to stop the train so that
she could leave.
She was issued a fine for inappropriate use of the emergency brake, but faced no further
consequences.
The Driver, Daniel Saulin, however was found to have made numerous mistakes, and was consequently
charged with manslaughter.
Though he had not intended to cause any harm, many of his actions had done so unintentionally.
His accidental closing of the brake valve.
His decision not to call a technician when he should have done so.
His failure to identify his train when communicating the emergency to controllers.
And, most notably of all, the fact that in his panicked state he completely forgot that
there was a backup electrical brake that he could have used to slow down the runaway train.
Saulin was sentenced to four years in prison for his actions, but was released after serving
six months.
His conviction was contentious from the beginning.
Some, including a SNCF worker’s union, argued that Saulin was under pressure to keep to
schedule, and that it would be better to address systemic problems (for example, the general
alarm making radio communication difficult) than to blame the disaster on one man.
A memorial stands on the platform where the collision took place.
In the aftermath of the disaster the SNCF also made a number of changes to their stock.
Their communications system was updated, and drivers were given the ability to override
passenger emergency brake activations.
New buffers were also installed at Gare de Lyon station – all interventions which make
another accident less likely and the network far safer, and more protected against human
error.