- [Narrator] One day, a high school senior named
Alfonso Lopez, brought a handgun to school.
He was arrested and charged
under the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990.
The Act made it a federal crime to knowingly
possess a firearm in a school zone.
Following a bench trial, the Federal District Court
convicted Lopez, and sentenced him to prison.
On appeal, Lopez argued that the Act was unconstitutional,
because it exceeded Congress's power under
the Commerce Clause.
The Fifth Circuit agreed, and reversed his conviction.
The United States Supreme Court accepted the case
to determine whether the Commerce Clause
enabled congress to prohibit gun ownership near schools.
Writing for a five Justice majority,
Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the Act
was unconstitutional.
Rehnquist explained that Congress can exercise
its Commerce Power over three broad categories:
the channels of interstate commerce,
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce,
and activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce.
Regulating gun possession near schools
didn't involve either the channels of commerce,
or the instrumentalities of commerce.
Therefore, the Act was enforceable
only if Congress had a rational basis
for concluding that keeping guns away from schools
had a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
The United States argued that violent crime
resulting from gun ownership near schools,
caused significant costs nationwide.
Violent crime reduced people's willingness to travel
to areas perceived as unsafe.
Moreover, guns in schools
threatened the learning environment,
resulting in a less educated and less productive citizenry.
Therefore, a rational basis existed
for concluding that gun ownership near schools
substantially affected interstate commerce.
The court rejected the government's position,
because it suggested that Congress's Commerce Power
had no clear limit.
The court reasoned that the government's interpretation
of the Commerce Clause would convert Congress's limited,
enumerated power, into a general police power.
The Act's terms had nothing to do with commerce.
The Act didn't contain a jurisdictional element,
which would have required federal prosecutors
to link gun ownership to interstate commerce
in each specific case.
Furthermore, the Act and it's legislative history,
didn't contain any express findings of fact
regarding the effect of gun possession
on interstate commerce.
Thus, no rational basis existed
for concluding that gun ownership near schools
substantially affected interstate commerce.
Therefore, the court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's
conclusion that the Act was unconstitutional.
Justice Kennedy concurred, noting that both education
and gun control were areas traditionally regulated
by the states.
The Act deprived states of the opportunity to experiment
with locally crafted solutions.
Justice Thomas also concurred,
but thought that the substantial-effects test was too broad.
The test conflicted with the historically
narrow definition of commerce.
Justice Stevens dissented, observing that future commerce
necessarily depended upon providing the nation's children
with a quality education.
Justice Souter also dissented.
Souter argued that the majority's test
was a step backward to older, unsuccessful
interpretations of the Commerce Clause,
which relied on unworkable, categorical distinctions.
The lack of legislative findings
didn't change the level of scrutiny either.
While findings are helpful to the court's
rational basis analysis, Congress is not obligated
to render those findings to pass Constitutional muster.
Justice Breyer filed a third dissenting opinion.
In determining an activity's effect on commerce,
Breyer argued that courts should consider
not just one instance of the activity,
but instead the cumulative effect of all similar activities.
The relevant question was not whether, in fact,
the regulated activity substantially affected commerce,
but whether Congress could have had a rational basis
for concluding as much.
For Breyer, the connection between preventing gun violence
around schools and commerce was clear.
Breyer cited extensive empirical evidence
of gun violence in schools that interfered
with delivering quality education.
Given education's effect on commerce,
Congress could have rationally found
that gun violence in schools was a commercial problem.
United States versus Lopez,
was the first time in over half a century,
that the Court limited Congress's power
under the Commerce Clause.
Lopez dramatically redefined the balance
between state and federal power.
And laid the basis for subsequent court rulings,
invalidating Congressional attempts to regulate
using the Commerce Power.