AMNA NAWAZ: Tomorrow marks the fifth anniversary of what many consider the worst garment industry
accident in history, the collapse of Rana Plaza at the outskirts of the capital of Bangladesh.
It was an event that shocked the world and reminded many of the conditions in which so
many clothes worn around the world are manufactured.
John Yang has this update on the disaster, in which more than 1,100 people lost their
lives and more than 2,500 were injured.
JOHN YANG: Most of the dead were young women, garment workers who were crushed or trapped
in the rubble when the eight-story building collapsed.
Investigators said the top four floors had been built without permits, and the ground
beneath the structure was unstable.
They concluded that the collapse was triggered by the weight and vibrations of power generators
on the top floor that kicked in during a power outage.
Mohammad Sujan lost his wife.
MOHAMMAD SUJAN, Lost Wife in Building Collapse (through translator): My wife and I were working
together as operators in Rana Plaza.
After the accident, I was rescued on the fourth day and in hospital.
I have been looking for my wife.
And after 11 days, I found the body of my wife.
JOHN YANG: Bangladesh is the world's second largest clothing manufacturer, behind China,
employing millions of people in thousands of factories.
The industry has had a long history of lax enforcement of building safety standards and
few worker protections.
Fires regularly broke out at factories.
Building codes were not enforced, and workers complained about not being paid.
The 2013 tragedy led to global pressure on Western clothing retailers and their customers
to take responsibility for those conditions.
Two coalitions formed, one made up mostly of U.S. clothing firms, the other mainly European
brands.
They worked to make the factories supplying them safer.
In a report issued this week, New York University's Stern Center for Business and Human Rights
said conditions have improved, sprinkler systems and fire extinguishers installed, worker training
stepped up and building standards strengthened.
But the progress is not universal.
Factories that do not sell directly to major retailers are not subject to their requirements.
For more on what's changed and what hasn't, we're joined by Paul Barrett.
He is deputy director of the New York University Stern Center for Business and Human Rights,
and he's a former editor at "Bloomberg Businessweek" and at The Wall Street Journal.
Paul, thanks so much for joining us.
Paul, what has changed since that disaster?
PAUL BARRETT, Deputy Director, New York University Stern Center for Business and Human Rights:
Well, as your piece mentioned, the Western brands and retailers have brought pressure,
very effectively, on the owners of Bangladeshi factories, with the threat if they don't make
the factories safer they will lose their Western business.
And that collective action has made factories safer in terms of electrical systems, in terms
of fire prevention, sprinkler systems, alarms, that kind of thing, and structural problems
that had plagued a lot of these factories.
And along the way, a number of factories have been shut down altogether because they were
not something that could be salvaged.
So that's sort of the good news part of the story.
JOHN YANG: But these don't cover all the factories in Bangladesh.
PAUL BARRETT: Right.
And that's the bad news part of the story, is that the Western coalitions that formed
to make factories safer had basically limited jurisdiction.
They didn't cover some 1,600 factories that are overseen by the Bangladeshi government,
which is not famous for the rigor of its regulation, and then an unknown number, possibly in the
thousands, of smaller subcontracting factories that take sort of overthrow work from the
larger factories and do a lot of work on clothing that ends up in the West, Europe and North
America.
JOHN YANG: Your team from the Stern visited -- the Stern Center -- visited one of those
subcontractors.
What did you see?
What did you learn?
PAUL BARRETT: Yes, actually, we visited a couple of them.
And in both places, the owners were fairly forthcoming, as long as we didn't reveal their
identity or the location of their factory.
In one, the owner basically showed us that he had purchased a fire safety plan that was
necessary to join a certain trade association.
And when we asked him whether he actually implemented the plan, he said, oh, no, no,
no, he didn't have the money to do that.
So he had basically bought a phony fire plan to show to people who came to his factory.
In the other one, the owner told us that a government inspector had been by and had left
with him a list of fire safety requirements, but that he had lost the list and had no intention
of following through on it.
So, you can see that, in these smaller factories, there's just no real expectation that regulation
will take.
JOHN YANG: And these outside inspections by this coalition of retailers and brands, that
sunsets.
That's going away.
PAUL BARRETT: Well, that's right.
That's another limitation.
These were set up to be five-year programs.
And one of them, the one that's dominated by American companies, which is known as the
Alliance is set to be basically shutting down by the end of this year.
And the other one, known as the Accord, dominated by European companies, has provisionally said
that it will continue in six-month increments.
But, eventually, that one will go away as well.
And in the long run, this ultimately becomes the responsibility of the Bangladeshi government.
JOHN YANG: Which, as you say, is not famous for the rigor of their inspections.
PAUL BARRETT: Right.
JOHN YANG: Your group has a prescription for a solution to.
And what is it?
PAUL BARRETT: Yes, it's a short-run prescription to deal with the limitations of the safety
coalitions that have been in effect.
We're proposing a Bangladeshi-led international task force that would use a concept known
as shared responsibility to raise funds and see that they are spent properly on safety
improvements in those factories that have not been reached so far.
And the participants in this would include the Bangladeshi government, the Western companies,
crucially, the Western governments whose consumers enjoy low-priced Bangladeshi clothes, and
international financial organizations like the World Bank.
JOHN YANG: What's the price tag on that?
PAUL BARRETT: Well, we did a rough back-of-the-envelope calculation based on several variables that
we estimated, including a per-factory remediation cost of $250,000, and came up with a price
tag of about $1.2 billion.
So it's not an unsubstantial amount, but if the governments of various Western countries
got involved, it would be something that would be manageable.
JOHN YANG: What do you think the chances are of that happening?
PAUL BARRETT: Well, I think it's not a sure bet, to say the least.
I think it's a long shot, but I think it's something that, at a minimum, provokes and
catalyzes conversations and focus on what has not yet been done in Bangladesh.
So, even if we don't get to e ultimate goal that we have set out, we will galvanize attention,
in hopes that the Bangladeshi government will step up and that other entities will as well.
JOHN YANG: Paul Barrett of New York University's Stern Center for Business and Human Rights,
thanks so much.
PAUL BARRETT: You bet.
Thank you.