Pep Guardiola has been accused by some of overthinking his approach to Champions League
knock-out games, especially away from home. While his sweeping tactical changes ahead
of such games, away from City’s consistent 4-3-3 and best players and towards more responsive,
opposition-focussed approaches, still require a bravery of thought, Guardiola seems overly
caught up in anticipating and responding to the opposition.
As these stats from One Football show, City set up against Spurs with an unusual line-up
and, although the sides were well matched statistically, Jonathan Wilson among others
has noted Guardiola’s conservative approach, an unusual lack of faith in his normal methods
and preferred players.
And, as Wilson and others have noted, Guardiola has previous in this respect.
Against Barcelona away in May 2015, Guardiola used a three man back line, despite having
mostly used a four man defence in the Campions League to that point – although he did used
three at the back in a 7-1 away win against Roma in the group stages. Rafinha was curiously
deployed on the left of the three centre backs, perhaps to show Lionel Messi inside with his
right foot, but it was an unusual switch, even if Bayern had used something similar
in a cup game against Dortmund shortly before.
There appeared to be two reasons for this: firstly, Guardiola clearly wanted to press
Barcelona high, and to do this he needed superior numbers up the pitch, which meant having a
three vs three against Barcelona’s front line. A risk, but the intent seems to have
been to deny Messi, Suarez, and Neymar the ball in the first place through pressing.
The second aim was to congest the middle before running the strikers, Robert Lewandowski and
Thomas Muller, into the channels, with Bastien Schweinsteiger supporting through the centre,
Juan Bernat using the space on the left, and Thiago pushing up and in on the right. This
was a response to Barcelona’s own pressing, and perhaps a recognition that, without Arjen
Robben in particularly, Bayern would struggle to create through overloads and would need
to be more direct.
After a helter-skelter opening fifteen minutes, Guardiola changed to something of a midfield
diamond with a back four, Rafinha moving back across to right back from the left side of
the three defenders. Bayern were able to out-number Barcelona’s three man midfield, and the
strikers continued to break into the channels, but Guardiola’s side suffered from a lack
of natural width, with Barcelona’s full backs pinning Bayern’s back, and none of
Bayern’s midfield moving wide often.
This conservative approach seems at odds with how Guardiola usually looks to stretch the
opposition out wide and create overloads, especially to then switch the play. Indeed,
it was Barcelona who most successfully managed this during the game. Bayern started too frantically
in the press, reorganised drastically – which may or may not have been the plan all along
– and ultimately seemed to have changed too much from their normal game-plan to play
with their normal fluency, even with enforced changes due to injury.
Against Liverpool, Guardiola again sought to stiffen the midfield with a very lop-sided
4-2-3-1 that saw Ilkay Gundogan playing on the right wing but really dropping off an
tucking in. This demanded a lot from Kyle Walker from right full back in both defence
and attack on the right flank, while Leroy Sane played far higher and, behind him, Aymeric
Laporte played half as a left back and half as left-sided central defender.
This allowed City to create a midfield square, but Kevin De Bruyne’s depth meant he was
not able to be as involved in attacks. Again, as Bayern were often reduced to playing long
balls into the wide spaces, direct passes to Walker were City’s best ‘out’ ball,
as Liverpool’s fluid front three worked hard to negate the midfield overload, while
still being able to contribute in attack.
Again, Guardiola seemed to sacrifice his attacking instinct for the security afforded by a bulked
out midfield but, in doing so, made it harder for City to impose themselves on a game. Liverpool,
ruthless on the counter and with the press, took City apart despite Guardiola’s tactical
changes.
Against Spurs, this conservatism was again evident with the selection of Gundogan and
Mahrez over De Bruyne and Sane, which would have seen Sterling on the right instead of
wide left. Guardiola looked to clog the midfield, with a 4-4-1-1 or 4-4-2 shape often seen out
of possession and the full backs not advancing as high as normal. This left City unable to
pass their way through Spurs’ superb man-marking system, while Fernandinho and Gundogan especially
seemed unable to deal with the consistent pressure brought to bear by Spurs’ midfield.
What’s worth noting here is that there are probably only a few things that Guardiola
really fears. But that list includes his former team Barcelona, especially so soon after he
had left them, Pochettino, a pupil of Bielsa who understands the game as well as Guardiola,
and Klopp, whose energetic, high pressing style has consistently been a thorn in Guardiola’s
side.
As Wilson has noted, “[Guardiola’s] first defeat in English football came at White Hart
Lane in October 2016, a pummelling in which his City were overpowered…Guardiola has
often seemed preoccupied by the physicality of Mauricio Pochettino’s team.”
And before the Liverpool game in 2018, City had been beaten 4-3 in a scintillating game
at Anfield.
Maybe the truth is that Guardiola thinks as much about these games as he does any other,
but that Klopp, Pochettino, and, back in 2015, a Barcelona team mostly of his own creation,
cause him to react to those thoughts differently, more reactive and conservatively than usual.