- [Instructor] Wickard versus Filburn.
So who was Wickard and who was Filburn?
Wickard was Claude R. Wickard, the secretary of agriculture,
and Filburn was Roscoe Filburn, an Ohio wheat farmer.
Filburn sued Wickard in his capacity
as secretary of agriculture to enjoin enforcement
of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938.
But in order to understand why Filburn sued Wickard,
it's necessary to first explain what
the Agricultural Adjustment Act was and how it worked.
Then we'll talk about why Filburn sued to enjoin
enforcement of the act.
The Agricultural Adjustment Act was passed in 1938
in response to the abnormally low crop prices
on world markets at the time.
In particular, and for our purposes,
the Agricultural Adjustment Act was intended
to raise the price and limit the supply of wheat.
So that is raise the price
and bring down the supply of wheat.
And how did the Agricultural Adjustment Act accomplish this?
Well, one way was to simply pay farmers
not to produce their crops.
And in fact, if you look down here at the bottom left,
I found a picture online showing farmers lining up
for their AAA checks, which were, in essence, subsidies
that were intended to incentivize farmers
not to grow their crops.
The second way the Agricultural Adjustment Act
sought to decrease wheat supplies was through the use of
production quotas.
That is, the secretary had the power to determine
the nationwide allotment of acres for all wheat production.
This national allotment was then apportioned
to the states and their counties,
and then eventually to individual farms.
Just to kind of draw it out so you can see.
There were national allotments,
down to states,
down to counties,
and then each individual farmer had his own allotment.
If any farmer exceeded his allotment,
a penalty would be imposed on each excess bushel of wheat
above the allotment.
The quotas included not only wheat sold, bartered,
or exchanged in the market, but included wheat grown
for home consumption only.
Or that is to say wheat that would not be sold,
but would be disposed of on the farm where it was grown,
either by feeding to livestock, using it for seeding,
or for just making flour.
The penalties made no distinction between whether
the wheat was intended to be sold or not.
And so with this background, let's take a look
at the facts of the case.
In June, 1940, Roscoe Filburn received notice
of his allotment for the 1941 crop season,
and he was allotted 11.1 acres and an average yield
of 20.1 bushels per acre.
In the fall of 1940, he sowed his wheat, as was his custom,
intending to harvest it in July of 1941.
Even though Filburn was only allotted 11.1 acres
for wheat production, he actually sowed 23 acres,
or that is 11.9 acres more than he was supposed to sow.
And from these 11.9 excess acres, he harvested 239 bushels
in excess of the quota, resulting in a penalty of $117.11.
Because recall that each excess bushel incurred a penalty,
and in this case,
the penalty rate was 49 centers per bushel.
So 239 times 49 cents per bushel
amounts to the $117.11 penalty.
So just to recap all of this.
The 1941 crop season,
Filburn was allotted 11.1 acres
and instead he sowed 23 acres,
growing 239 excess bushels.
So Filburn challenges the penalty in federal court,
arguing that the Agricultural Adjustment Act
was an unconstitutional and overly expansive use
of Congress' Commerce Clause powers.
Filburn argued that the Agricultural Adjustment Act
regulated consumption and production of wheat,
specifically wheat grown for home consumption
and not intended for sale.
And that growing wheat for home consumption
is an activity beyond congressional power
under the Commerce Clause, because it is purely local
in character and its effects on interstate commerce
are at most, indirect.
And the buzzwords here are indirect
and local.
Because these words were the touchstones
of Commerce Clause analysis at the time.
Wickard, in his defense, denies that
the Agricultural Adjustment Act regulated the consumption
or production of wheat, and instead argues
that it merely regulated the marketing of wheat.
Justice Jackson, writing for a unanimous court,
begins by pointing out that in prior cases
dealing with Congress' Commerce Clause powers,
certain activities, such as production, manufacturing,
and mining were held to be beyond Congress' Commerce Clause
powers because they were local activities
having an indirect effect on interstate commerce.
But Jackson says that these types of distinctions
between indirect and direct, or local and non-local,
economic activities are no longer relevant.
Instead, Jackson says, what's relevant is whether
the activity in question has a substantial effect
on interstate commerce.
And that brings Jackson to Filburn's argument
that his home consumption of wheat is local in character
and therefore outside of Congress' powers to regulate it.
Jackson says that it very well might be true, for instance,
that Filburn's home consumption of wheat by itself
is trivial, local, and does not substantially
affect interstate commerce.
But Filburn's home consumption, taken together with all the
other wheat farmers out there growing for home consumption
is not trivial and would, in fact, substantially affect
interstate commerce.
In essence, Jackson is arguing that it is
the cumulative effect,
the cumulative effect on the supply of wheat
of all wheat farmers growing for home consumption that
allows Congress to regulate the home consumption of wheat.
And Jackson says that wheat grown for home consumption
substantially affects interstate commerce in two ways.
The first is that wheat farmers who stockpile their wheat
for home consumption might be tempted,
if prices were to rise high enough,
to sell that excess wheat on the market,
thereby bringing down the price of wheat
and undermining the Agricultural Adjustment Act's objective
of increasing wheat prices.
And the second is that wheat farmers who grow
for home consumption are less likely to purchase
wheat for themselves in the marketplace,
and so that brings down demand for wheat.
And so, in effect, home consumption of wheat, Jackson says,
has the potential effect of increasing supply
and/or decreasing demand.
So why does home consumption
affect interstate commerce?
Jackson says because it could increase supply
and it could decrease demand.
And all good economics students know
that if you increase supply and decrease demand,
you tend to bring down the price
of a particular good or service.
Therefore, Jackson rules in favor of Wickard
and upholds the Agricultural Adjustment Act
as a valid exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause powers.
But why is Wickard versus Filburn so important?
Perhaps it's because it sits in a continuum
of Commerce Clause cases in the 20th century
that defined and redefined the scope of Congress'
Commerce Clause powers.
Cases such as NLRB
versus Jones and McLaughlin.
This is 1937.
And United States versus Darby,
which was decided in 1941.
And these cases held, respectively, that Congress
had the power under the Commerce Clause
to regulate labor relations and labor standards.
Wickard is perhaps the high watermark
of Commerce Clause power, saying that Congress may regulate
even activity that by itself does not substantially affect
interstate commerce, does not enter the stream of commerce,
and the effect of which is indirect on interstate commerce.
This idea of cumulative effects of activity
substantially affecting interstate commerce
was a very novel idea.
It contrasts with the more conservative Rehnquist court
of the 1990s, which decided cases such as Lopez in 1995
and Morrison in 1998,
or excuse me in 2000,
which reigned in the scope
of Congress' Commerce Clause powers.
And Wickard also features prominently in the court's
2005 decision in Raich,
which held that Congress could regulate home gown marijuana
under its Commerce Clause powers for much the same reason
that Justice Jackson said that Congress could regulate
home grown wheat.
So that's Wickard versus Filburn in a nutshell.
For more information on the Commerce Clause,
I direct you to Quimbee's constitutional lectures
by Professor Stephen Vladeck of American University.
And in particular his two clips on the Commerce Clause,
which provide not only an excellent overview
of Commerce Clause jurisprudence,
but also of Wickard versus Filburn.