The end of the tank has been prophesized more times than I can count. The same goes
for the helicopter – it happens every time a number of tanks or helicopters get destroyed
in high-profile action. A good example from a few years ago was Turkey losing Leopard
2s in Syria, or the air assault raid by Russian helicopters in Feb 2022. Now we have a new case,
with Russia releasing footage of it attacking a Ukrainian column of Leopard 2 and M2 Bradleys.
This event, or rather events as the pictures you are seeing, show the result of multiple attacks,
didn’t turn out favorably for the Ukrainians. It gives us though, from an analytical perspective
a case study of what can go wrong in combat, what the relative strengths and weaknesses of
helicopters and armor are – especially against each other – and what we can learn from that.
Again, context is King and Queen here and we are limited to only a number of videographic sources,
and while those provide some insights, it is possible that more information in the future
emerges that changes or adds to the picture we have now. For this video I also invite a German
ex-Leopard 2 gunner and a US Army Apache pilot to provide their insights. Let’s get into it.
Let’s start by familiarizing ourselves with Ka-52 and Leopard 2 for this specific match-up.
The Kamov Ka 52 is a Russian twin seat attack helicopter, known under the nickname “Alligator”
or NATO designation Hokum B. The Ka 52 features a terrain following radar system. For target
identification, tracking and engagement of ground targets, it features a day/night
TV/FLIR optics system in two small turrets. The usual caveats apply to IR systems: they
lose effectiveness based on range and the density of obscuring elements such as smoke or foliage.
Let’s familiarize ourselves with the FLIR screen. Although it is largely blurred,
other footage gives us a better understanding of what we are seeing.
To the very top, we have the azimuth indicator for the gunners view. Below it, offset left and
right the helicopters speed and radar altitude. To the far left, the vertical speed indicator,
and the far right the line of sight elevation. In the middle the retcile the gunner uses to manually
steer the missile into it’s the target. To the bottom, the range to the target. The cyrillic
TG indicator (TГ) means automatic tracking is in standby – and PR (ПР) means the weapon is
ready to fire. Once it is, we see a countdown in second – and an impact counter in seconds.
The Ka-52 uses a laser rangefinder and designator for weapons employment, and the
crew can be equipped with night vision googles. This allows the Ka-52 to operate day and night.
The main anti-tank weapon of the Ka-52 is the 9K121 ATGM called “Vikhr”,
which translates to Whirlwind. Ka-52 carries up to 12 missiles,
divided equally on either side under the wings. The Vikhr accelerates on launch to up to 600m/s
and features a tandem HEAT warhead to penetrate armor, followed by a high
explosive fragmentation charge. It’s published range is 10-12km. Depending on the source,
the missile is said to have a penetration of 750-1000mm of rolled homogenous armor.
It is a laser beam riding missile, so the Ka-52 crew can steer the missile
to the target. This requires the gunner to keep sight of the target and track it with
the laser until the missile impacts. For defensive purposes, Ka-52s features
chaff and flare dispensers in the wingtips. IR and EW jamming units are sometimes equipped,
as are passive warning systems. Let’s turn to Leopard 2. Ukraine
received both the A4 and the A6. I will focus on the A6 in this overview.
Its top speed is about 70km/h on roads and somewhat less on uneven ground. This
makes Leo 2 a mobile platform, able to quickly relocate and change location.
The tank features a fully stabilized 120mm/L55 smoothbore gun (L44 on A4) firing different
types of ammunition. As far as I am informed, the ones that have been supplied to Ukraine
is the DM33A1/ DM33A2/ DM53A1 anti-tank round (APFSDS-T), and second is the DM11
HE round (DM11) – it is likely that the DM12 HEAT is also supplied. In training,
A6 crews are instructed to use the APFSDS rounds against helicopters due to its better ballistic
characteristics. A DM11 round ft. a programmable fuze for airburst is available on A7 and Polish
Leopards, making it the preferred anti-Helicopter round, but is not used on the A6 . At-3-4km,
the chances of Leo 2 being effective with its main gun against a helicopter drop considerably.
For protection, the A6 has multilayer composite armor and is lined to prevent
spalling inside the vehicle. The turret can be equipped with external wedgeshaped modular
armor and explosive reactive armor packages can be fitted. For frontal protection, it’s
main armor on the turret is said to have the rough equivalency of 920mm of rolled homongenous armor,
and 620mm on the glacis and lower front hull. The A6 also features 8 76mm smoke mortars for
quick concealment with IR disruptive smoke it can deploy near-instantaneously.
In sum, in a one-on-one vacuum match up where – for now – tactics don’t matter,
Ka-52 outranges Leopard 2 A6. In such an engagement, the Vihkr missiles have a chance
to penetrate the A6, though the probability depend on where and how the hit takes place.
Leo 2, with its mobility, can relocate relatively quickly to seek out cover if the threat is spotted
in time, and its smoke canisters can provide some temporary protection by obscuring sight
between the Ka-52 and the tank. These elements are important as we go into the analysis.
From the limited footage we have of the action,
we can infer three important things . First off, the Ukrainian single file
column includes one Leopard 2 and multiple M2 Bradleys. This is most likely due to a minefield,
as some footage suggests that the vehicles run into mines as the action unfolds.
Second, the Russian helicopters are in range of the column with Vihkr anti-tank missiles. The time
between the missile launch and impact is about 25-26sec. This indicates that this helicopter
was operating at close to the Vihkrs max range of 10-12km given the missiles average travel time.
Third, there is no visual obstruction, such as trees, buildings or smoke, between the helicopter
and the column that can throw off the gunners aim or obstruct the laser from hitting its target.
It is important to note that it appears Ukraine moved in this area twice, maybe three times with
some units. One top down picture comparison shows this clearly as suddenly additional
Bradley’s appear to one side of the first column. It is difficult to definitely state at this point
whether what we see here is part of one, perhaps the first attack, or any subsequent movement.
I’ll add that from the footage I have seen, the Leopard in the column appears
to be mainly damaged to the rear left, rather than the front. Without more detailed pictures,
it is unclear whether the Leo was knocked out by a Ka-52, or if other weapons incl. mines contributed
to this result. As a comparison, other Leopards have been subject to artillery bombardment
in the area and that the result we see here is the product of at least two different attacks.
Based on this, we can make some preliminary conclusions although they must be taken with a
grain of salt. Things may very well be different than a very limited pool of data,
even video material like this, can make us believe – but with that said,
there is enough to figure out the broad strokes of what’s going on here.
What are the main takeways from this? Basically, for a column of armor to be
a target like this for a Russian helicopter, a series of things must have gone wrong. This
makes for a sobering analysis, one that is required if we want to draw lessons from it.
First off, the route of approach and single file made the column an easy
target to the Russian helicopters that could knock out one vehicle after the
other. It is possible this single file approach was chosen because of mines.
Second, the helicopters appear not to have been spotted before the attack. If they had
been spotted, then nothing was done to counter them proactively through passive or active means.
I lean heavily on the side of that the Ukrainians simply didn’t see the Russian helicopter.
Third, although we don’t know, there appears to be no air defense in the area that can identify the
threat proactively or could protect the column. Using air defense systems in this situation is a
big topic, I will pick that up in a future video. Fourth, it appears that even after the first
missiles hit, the Ukrainians didn’t know what was hitting them exactly and from where.
Finally, the critical human factor that is often forgotten. Shock and confusion play
a major role in combat, and the measures taken by the Ukrainian crews seem to exacerbate the
problem – there is at least one video showing the use of smoke though it appears to be used
somewhat late. The thermal imaging of the helicopter can deal with this smoke at certain
ranges – it’s more difficult at long range but it would be problematic for the laser. Also,
most likely due to the minefield, the vehicles remain grouped up, thus staying an easy target.
To give you a more detailed perspective on this event, I also reached out to a German ex-Leopard
2 gunner, and a US Army helicopter pilot to get their take on the situation. The Leo 2 gunner
had this to say: [Leo2 Gunner]
The US Army pilot had this to say: Based on the recent Ka-52 engagement tapes,
the Alligator are finding success through effective use of the Vikhr missiles utilizing
standoff and altitude. This tells me that the Ukrainians did not bring any effective radar
air defenses forward. If the Ka-52s can engage uncontested at altitudes <1000-3000 feet and at
ranges of 7-10km, manpads will be ineffective. It is likely, without sensors or long range optics,
the Ukrainian ground forces don't even know they are being targeted by the Alligator. Helicopter
sound does not travel far and would not be heard beyond 2km and the Alligator
would be speck at best to the naked eye. The videos I've seen so far look to have taken
place both during day and night. The video looks to have taken place during the night. The Ka-52s
would have to engage at closer ranges (5-6km) based on their FLIR capability but maybe their
FLIR sight is better than I initially thought or it has been upgraded to engage at max ranges now.
The FLIR picture is pretty good compared to older videos I have seen.
As for that video being shot at night, I don't 100% know for sure. Here's why I think it is:
The contrast and the brightness of the vehicles indicates night. They are very bright against
the terrain indicating a significant difference in temperature. During the day, ground is warmer
along with the vegetation making the contrast much less so during the day. The vehicles would
not 'pop' as much as they are here against the background. I've also seen Ka-52 videos from the
recent Ukrainian offensive and in Syria during the day, and the operators would switch back and
forth between FLIR and a day camera. Day camera magnifies a bit more for more zoomed in picture
hence why they would switch back and forth. They didn't utilize a day camera in this video.
In sum, this event – based on the available data – is
a template example of how a helicopters can combat armor successfully. However,
it also shows the conditions that are required for this to happen.
Free line of site, lacking air spotters, lacking air defense,
an unawares target, a target that doesn’t identify the threat after the attack, and a target that
doesn’t react correctly to this threat. The result is what you would expect given that context.
Is the tank as a combat vehicle dead because of it? No. In the future we can learn from this,
I suspect the Ukrainians will absolutely look at this event and do their own analysis.
On the other side, is the helicopter an undisputed tank killer because of this one attack – also no.
It can be effective as we saw, but even some minor adjustments to how the ground forces operated
would make it a lot harder for Russian pilots to repeat this. As always, context is everything.