It is March, 1943. As we have seen, by this point it was clear that the tide had turned in favor of
the Allies, with their hard-earned victories at Midway, Guadalcanal and the Kokoda Track showing
that the initiative was now firmly in their hands. Yet the Pacific War was far from over;
and so was the New Guinea Campaign. A few weeks ago, we covered the Battle of Wau, a bold Japanese
advance by the Okabe Detachment that had caught the Australian forces off guard and that had been
defeated only at the eleventh hour. Emboldened by that near success, the Japanese again gambled
that it was possible for them to retake the initiative in New Guinea; yet their efforts
would only lead to certain doom, finally cementing for the first time in the war that the Japanese
offensive capabilities had been destroyed and that their role for now on was going to be defensive.
Join us as we delve into another key point of the Pacific War: the Battle of the Bismarck Sea.
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As we last saw, the forces under Brigadier Moten had successfully arrived on the nick
of time to defend Wau and hold on the Japanese surprise attack, thus forcing
the Okabe Detachment to fight a difficult withdrawal back to their main base at Mubo.
With the Australians in hot pursuit and harassing them all the way, General Okabe’s
forces would finally arrive at Mubo by the end of February, signifying the end of the Battle of Wau.
Yet by late February, the Japanese still held the vital high ground around Waipali and Guadagasal,
something that indicated that a possible renewed offensive against Wau was still possible.
But more importantly, Okabe would need to receive substantial reinforcements to stand
a chance against the full might of Moten’s 17th Brigade. Because of this, Generals Imamura and
Adachi immediately started to plan for another convoy to be sent from Rabaul to Lae by the end
of February, hoping to reinforce the area with the rest of Lieutenant-General Nakano
Hidemitsu’s 51st Division . The convoy of eight transports would be escorted by a small fleet
of eight destroyers under Rear-Admiral Kimura Masatomi; and although this was a small fleet,
these destroyers and their experienced crews had taken part in some of the most important
naval battles of the Pacific War up to this point. Additionally, by the end of February,
the Japanese had also carried out a large number of convoy operations that consisted of only one
or two destroyers , successfully reinforcing their presence on the Wewak-Madang coast with
the bulk of the 20th and 41st Divisions . Learning from the past experience of the
January convoy, this time Kimura was to follow a route along the northern coast, trying to put more
distance between the Japanese vessels and the Allied reconnaissance aircraft until the convoy
reached the Vitiaz and Dampier Straits. Kimura would command the operation from the destroyer
Shirayuki, while other destroyers would also carry important figures such as Generals Adachi
and Nakano . Upon arrival at Lae the ships would anchor 600 meters apart along the shoreline from
just west of the airfield to the mouth of the Busu River, around 500 meters offshore.
It was also planned to establish smoke screens over the anchorage to mask both the unloading
vessels and the shore storage areas if any air attacks occurred. Furthermore, an escort of forty
naval and six army aircraft would provide aerial protection over the convoy for 13 hours each day.
Meanwhile, General Mackay, who had temporarily taken command of New Guinea Force while General
Herring was on leave, recognized that the enemy still hoped to capture Wau and the Bulolo Valley,
and that his forces in the area were insufficient to carry out the defense of these places.
By early February, Allied intelligence reports had also concluded that although
further troop movements to Lae could be expected, the Japanese were likely to have
found surface convoys too costly for normal running. Thus, they were using submarines to
bring supplies to Lae and they were setting up an alternative supply line via Madang-Wewak.
Persistent reports of Japanese patrols moving down the Ramu and Wampit Valleys
with Wau as their objective finally forced General Blamey to prepare the 3rd Australian
Division , mainly consisting of the 7th and 15th Brigades, to reinforce the Bulolo Valley area.
Yet these forces would not be ready until late March, so in the meantime only the
depleted 39th Battalion would be flown to Wau to provide a reserve for an anticipated Japanese
attack . On February 19, however, reports of large concentration of ships in Rabaul and a
decrypted message indicated that there would be a second convoy to Lae in early March. This vital
lead allowed Generals Blamey and MacArthur to organize an appropriate response , immediately
appointing General Kenney, the commander of the Allied Air Forces, to deal with this new threat.
Kenney’s command comprised the Royal Australian Air Force, under Air Vice Marshal William Bostock,
and the 5th Air Force , led by Brigadier-General Ennis Whitehead; totaling some 154 fighters,
34 light bombers, 41 medium bombers and 39 heavy bombers available for combat in New Guinea.
The 5th Air Force was also subdivided into two main commands: the V Fighter Command of
Brigadier-General Paul Wurtsmith, which counted with some 95 fighters available for combat,
including a number of competent P-38 Lightnings; and the V Bomber Command of Brigadier-General
Howard Ramey, which counted witha variet of medium and heavy bombers. But most importantly,
Kenney and Whitehead had at their disposal the 3rd Attack Group of light bombers,
nicknamed the Grim Reapers, which included a squadron of A-20 Bostons and two squadrons of B-25
Mitchells that had been significantly modified by Major Paul “Pappy” Gunn. These modifications,
for example, allowed the B-25s to be used for masthead bombing attacks without a bombardier,
in opposition to their original role of carrying out bombardier assisted missions from altitude.
The Australians also counted with the No. 9 Group of Group Captain William Garing,
consisting of the No. 73 Wing at Port Moresby and the No. 71 Wing at Milne Bay. Garing had noted
how poor were the Allied attempts to prevent a number of Rabaul convoys from reaching the
New Guinea mainland and was determined to put in place a suitable plan for the next convoy to try,
so he would persuade Whitehead that a properly rehearsed plan integrating all available aircraft
and carrying out skip bombing and mast-head bombing was needed for the operation.
Garing’s plan was for the planes to gather over Cape Ward Hunt at 09:30 and then be over
the convoy at 10:00 in quick succession, totally overwhelming the enemy escorting aircraft and the
anti-aircraft defenses. At least two rehearsals would be carried out, with the last one turning
out to be “damn good”. At last, on February 28, the Japanese finished loading all their supplies,
with the convoy departing Rabaul for Lae at around 02:00 on March 1.
Slowly moving across the Bismarck Sea, the convoy would enjoy two tropical storms that hampered the
Allied air reconnaissance for the first few days. Then, on March 1, as the weather was clearing,
three B-24s would make the first convoy sighting, reporting fourteen vessels escorted by Zero
fighters around 70 kilometers north-west of Ubili and heading west. Yet the Allies
needed more information, so more aircraft would be dispatched to continue the search.
Despite this, General Whitehead would command a formation of eight B-17s that
were returning from a striking mission at Gasmata to attack the convoy, although the
bombers would fail to locate the vessels after dropping around a dozen flares on the water.
Meanwhile, the Japanese destroyer Tokitsukaze had intercepted an Allied message saying that
the convoy had been spotted, so Kimura and his forces were alert that an attack was incoming.
Undisturbed, the convoy would nonetheless steam west along the New Britain coast under the
protective blanket of weather for a further six hours. At dawn on March 2, under a cloudy weather
with occasional showers, six Australian A-20s also swept low over Lae to bomb the runway and strafe
some dispersal areas, successfully preventing the enemy fighter escorts from using this base.
At about 10:00, another Liberator flying through poor weather managed to find the convoy yet again,
so General Whitehead decided to launch his first strike. Although the convoy was still too far away
for a coordinated attack, eight B-17s took off to attack, followed an hour later by a second group
of 20 heavy bombers . They were to be escorted by 12 P-38s equipped with long-range drop tanks,
yet the cloud cover would hinder them and make them miss the rendezvous.
Finding the enemy ships without difficulty, the first eight B-17s
made the first attack amidst a rain of anti-aircraft fire at about 09:45,
claiming to have scored five critical bomb hits on the Kyokusei Maru that started large fires.
The second formation then struck under broken cloud and rain squalls, this time escorted by
the P-38s, claiming to have sunk four enemy vessels; yet in truth, only two transports
would be hit, suffering only very light damage. The Kyokusei Maru, however, had to be abandoned
and would finally sink some time later. Despite this, destroyers Asagumo and Yukikaze would manage
to rescue 850 troops of the 1200 onboard, as well as two mountain guns, before the transport sunk.
They would then race ahead of the convoy at full speed to land at Lae the rescued troops,
along with General Nakano, by the end of the day, immediately turning around to rejoin the
convoy before daybreak. A number of air strikes by heavy bombers would follow throughout the day,
yet the convoy was now stretched out for 20km and zigzagging regularly,
so high-level bombing would fail to cause further damage as it was inefficient in this situation.
Worthy of mention is that the numerous Japanese escorting fighters showed little aggressive intent
against the American bombers and then suddenly departed after the last attack of the day.
By nightfall, Australian PBYs had been sent to shadow the Japanese convoy, successfully
determining that it was heading south through Vitiaz Strait towards Lae. Yet during the early
hours of March 3, Admiral Kimura made a disastrous decision as he ordered his ships to mark time and
circle in the dark, wasting at least two precious hours of the cover of night. The reasons behind
this catastrophic blunder are largely unknown, but maybe Kimura wanted to be sure that he would have
air cover at first light, which would then escort him all the way to his destination.
In any case, he would see neither Japanese aircraft nor stormy weather
by sunrise. A clear and brilliant day was ahead, a bad omen for the Japanese.
At this point, the enemy was also within range of the air base at Milne, so a strike of eight
Beauforts would be launched at 04:00. Only two of the Australian torpedo bombers would make it
through a heavy weather front, however, and both would fail to cause much damage on the convoy.
Nonetheless, the Japanese commanders were now alert of the torpedo danger that those Beauforts
posed , something that would be astutely used by the Allied planners in some hours. At 05:10,
four Australian A-20s would again hit Lae, catching several planes on the ground and leaving
them unavailable to help protect the convoy. Finally, by 08:30, a striking force of 90 aircraft
had departed Port Moresby to rendezvous over Cape Ward Hunt an hour later. Upon adopting the correct
formation , they would then proceed towards the objective, reaching the convoy around 10:00.
The leading thirteen B-17s, covered by around thirty Lightnings that immediately engaged the
recently-arrived Zeros, were the first to dive in, attracting the enemy anti-aircraft fire while the
experienced Beaufighters came in just above the waves trying to pose as Beaufort torpedo bombers.
Although the bombing of the B-17s would be largely inefficient, the bombers and the Lightnings
would manage to take down seven Zeros and damage another three, also leaving the Japanese vessels
separated and vulnerable to strafers and mast-head bombers. Meanwhile, as the Beaufighters menacingly
advanced, Admiral Kimura rapidly took the bait and ordered his vessels to turn and face the enemy,
presenting the narrowest possible profile for a moving torpedo. This, in turn, exposed the
length of the vessels to strafing, which was very much to the advantage of the Beaufighters.
The Australian pilots then selected their own objectives and began their strafing runs,
firing with their six .303 machine guns and their devastating four 20-mm Hispano cannons.
In combination, each plane let loose a ferocious stream which flayed everything
it touched, creating a river of fire and destruction running the length of the ships.
Some of the vessels even stopped dead in the water, as the officers in the bridges
were rapidly cut down, and the Australians also knocked out many of their anti-aircraft positions.
After the first strafing run had finished and the Australians set out to begin their second run,
however, the B-17s and B-25s unexpectedly began to drop bombs over the Japanese vessels and over the
Beaufighters, so the Australians would have to go in with bombs falling and exploding around them.
The Mitchells of the Grim Reapers, with their modified weapons that made them true “commerce
destroyers” , had the capability of creating even more mayhem at close range than the Beaufighters.
Squeezing the firing buttons on their control columns, the Allied pilots watched the deadly
mixture tear up the ships like a gigantic claw. The modified A-20s would be the last
to join in the struggle, and they would find every ship they tried to attack already spoken
for by a number of aircraft coming in from a variety of angles. By 10:15,
all seven transports had been hit and were sinking about 100km southeast of Finschhafen. Furthermore,
with a masterful combination of skip bombing and mast-height bombing, some Japanese destroyers
would be taken down by the ferocious Grim Reapers. For example, Kimura’s flagship, the Shirayuki,
after being strafed early on by a Beaufighter that cut down the officers in the bridge,
would then suffer two bomb hits by a Mitchell that started large fires and caused a huge explosion.
As the destroyer sank, the crew would be rescued by the Shikinami,
including a wounded Kimura . The destroyer Arashio would also be hit, forcing it to collide with the
disabled supply ship Nojima and suffering a list of 30 degrees for which it had to be abandoned.
General Adachi’s ship, the Tokitsukaze, would likewise be hit by the low-level bombers,
suffering fatal damage for which Adachi and the 18th Army staff would have to be evacuated. Both
the crews of the Arashio and Tokitsukaze would be rescued by the unsinkable Yukikaze, which was
not damaged in the entire battle; and the other remaining destroyers would also go on to rescue
the crews of the sinking transports, suffering some damage by the attacks of the Allied airmen.
After midday, the second series of air attacks by B-17s and A-20s also began, successfully
bombing and strafing the Asashio while she was rescuing survivors. The four surviving
destroyers then withdrew up the Vitiaz Strait and were joined by the destroyer Hatsuyuki off
Long Island. After refueling the destroyers, the Hatsuyuki and the Uranami brought 2700 survivors
back to Rabaul while the other three destroyers continued to pick up survivors, finally bringing
a further 1100 survivors to Kavieng by March 5. On the night of March 3, a force of ten PT boats
also set out to finish off the convoy, and some B-17s and Beaufighters were likewise
sent to attack the Japanese survivors and their rescuers, a mission that was largely unpopular
amongst the pilots but that was largely necessary lest they reach Lae and soon join the frontlines.
It is estimated that these missions resulted in a further 352 Japanese troops being killed from
the total of 2890 casualties that the Japanese suffered in the battle. Around 224 survivors
would also be rescued by submarines on March 6 and many others would make their way to various
islands , where they were captured or killed by the Allied forces. Although General MacArthur
laughably estimated 15000 enemy casualties, describing the battle as the “decisive aerial
engagement” of the Southwest Pacific theater, the Battle of the Bismarck Sea was indeed a major
victory for Allied air power, although the Allied land forces would fail to capitalize on this
success and launch a swift offensive against Lae before it could be reinforced . It also cemented
the fact that the initiative in the Pacific was now firmly under the hands of the Allies.
Next week, we’ll return to the Solomons and to China to cover some new developments that were
unfolding in these theaters, so make sure you are subscribed and have pressed the bell button to see
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