Today we’re going to look at the German, British, American and Soviet rifle squads,
and compare and contrast them to each other, and see who (on paper, at least) had the advantage
of equipment, firepower, tactics and so on in the Second World War. The purpose is to
see how the weapons, tactics and training impacted the way that the men fought, and
if the reputation of each ‘side’ is based on ‘national’ characteristics, or if it
was more down to their equipment.
I’ll be showing my sources and my workings out, so if you have different numbers for
the weaponry or squad sizes, that’s fine: change the numbers to suit your own findings
and go with that. And we’re going to start off by looking at the theoretical ‘on paper’
capability of each squad, and then we’ll think logically about how the circumstances
of the war impacted each of them, and how that might have changed the way that the troops decided
to fight. Also, feel free to come to your own conclusions - in fact, I encourage you
to do so.
So, for most of the war, the size of an ‘official’ German squad (or Gruppe) was 10 men. There
was a non-commissioned officer as leader of the squad (usually armed with an MP40 submachine
gun); a deputy leader (with either an MP40 or a rifle); a three-man machine gun team
(with either an MG34 or MG42); and five riflemen (with Kar 98k’s), who also carried extra
ammunition boxes for the machine gun. The reason they carried extra rounds was because
the MG34, and its successor, the MG42, had a stupidly-high rate of fire. They could send
a 250-round belt of ammunition down range in about 30 seconds, even in controlled bursts.
So, to keep the machine gun firing, the men needed to carry as much ammunition for them
as possible.
The Kar 98k rifle had a practical rate of fire of around 10 aimed shots per minute (although
one source I have says 15, but I think that’s too high for aimed shots in combat). Bloke
on the Range managed to fire 20 rounds in a ‘mad minute’ with the Kar 98k. But that
proved problematic even in ideal conditions where he had the ammunition next to him, rather
than in pouches, which is where they would be in reality. And even he admitted the Kar
98ks weren’t good for rapid fire. So, for practical aimed shots in combat, I’m going
to go with 10 rounds.
And the MP40 had a practical rate of fire of up to 180 rounds per minute (at most).
So, assuming that we have a full-squad (yes, that’s a big assumption, but for now, let’s
just go with it), and assuming everyone was firing their weapons, and assuming the deputy
leader had an MP40 as well, on paper then, a German Gruppe could put about 910 rounds
into the air per minute. Obviously, this is just a theoretical amount, but the point is
to show the full-firepower potential of a German squad. And it’s clear that the Germans
could send a lot of rounds down range to suppress the enemy under a hail of fire.
“With 13 or more machine guns per infantry company, an effective fire screen could be
maintained even if the unit was only at half strength.”
Let’s compare this to a typical British squad (or ‘section’, as the British Army
calls it). The number of men in the section varied, but in 1942, the ‘ideal’ section
size was meant to be 8 men. It could be higher - sometimes 10 men, and perhaps as many as
11. But the ‘official’ eight man section would consist of: the section commander (usually
a corporal with a submachine gun, like the Thompson or Sten); four riflemen (one with
a sniper-rifle); a second-in-command (a lance corporal, also armed with a rifle); and a
two man Bren gun team (one man with the Bren, one with a rifle). If the squad was 10 or
11 men, the other men were probably also riflemen.
Again, let’s calculate a theoretical maximum firepower potential of the British section.
The riflemen were mainly there to augment the fire of the Bren, and all carried ammunition
for it - in fact, they each carried more ammunition for the Bren then they did ammunition for
their own personal weapon. But let’s just assume that they’ve done that and are all
firing away. According to one source I have, the Lee Enfield rifle had a practical fire
rate of 15 rounds per minute. Again, Bloke on the Range managed 26 rounds in ideal non-combat
conditions where he had the ammunition next to him, so 15 rounds per minute sounds quite
reasonable for combat conditions. Unlike the German machine guns, which were belt-fed,
the Bren used 30 round magazines (usually reduced to 28 rounds because of the magazine
itself). At a “Rapid Rate”, a gunner could fire four magazines per minute, giving a figure
of 112 rounds per minute. (I’m also going to assume that the Bren gunner’s assistant
was helping the Bren gunner rather than firing his own rifle.) The sources I have fail to
mention the practical rate of fire for a Sten gun. So, I’m going to use the same figure
as the MP40 (which had a similar rate of fire) and go with that: which was 180 rounds per
minute.
Therefore, in an 8 man section, the ‘on paper’ rounds fired per minute was 367.
In a 10 man section, this would be 397. And even in the 11 man squad, it would be 412
rounds.
So, assuming we have a full section of 11 British troops, and a full Gruppe of 10 German
troops, the Germans can place more-than double the number of bullets in the air than the
British. 910 bullets versus 412. In fact, one MG34 or MG42 alone could put more bullets
down range than an entire British section.
It’s no wonder that the British developed a ‘plodding’ attitude during the war.
I think you’d also be careful when advancing against an enemy for several years that could
fire more bullets at you than you could hope to fire back, especially considering the other
factors.
“The appalling casualties in 1914-18 had led to a climate of public opinion in which
the squandering of life would not be tolerated indefinitely. By 1944 the United Kingdom had
been fighting for five years, facing many setbacks and often unfavourable odds. At least
some of those generals who had reached the top (and more importantly, stayed there) were
the most methodical and calculating, deeply marked by their experience as subalterns in
World War I - Gen Montgomery is perhaps the most obvious example. How the GI and his generals
would have fought after five years can only be guessed at.”
I don’t necessarily agree with that last sentence. The Germans and Soviets weren’t
‘plodding’ after several years of war, so the Americans may not have developed that
attitude. However, the Germans and Soviets were fighting an ideological war, which the
West really wasn’t. So maybe the Americans would have developed a ‘plodding’ attitude
over time… but obviously there’s no way to know, so I don’t agree with this sentence.
Anyway, American squads had 12 men: a sergeant (who may, or may not, have had a Thompson);
a corporal (probably with a rifle); a three-man BAR team (I’m going to assume that one of
these would actually fire his rifle, since there was one assistant and one ammunition
carrier); and seven standard riflemen. The Garand rifle fired at about 30 rounds per
minute (twice as many as the Lee-Enfield, and three times as many as the Kar 98k). Bloke
on the Range managed 39 rounds in a minute, again, in ideal conditions with ammunition
next to him. (However, he did note that you could be a lot more accurate with the rounds
fired from this gun due to the fact that this was a semi-automatic rifle, not a bolt action,
so it may be worth taking that into consideration.) The BAR fired at about 60 rounds per minute
(due to its limited 20-round magazine). And again, the sources fail to supply basic information,
so I don’t have the practical fire rate of the Thomspon submachine gun. It had a faster
rate of fire than the Sten and the MP40, so I’m going to guesstimate a 220 rounds per
minute practical rate of fire.
Doing some quick math then, a 12 man American squad had an ‘on paper’ firepower of about
550 rounds per minute. This was a higher fire rate than the British squad (which was 412
rounds at best), but still a lot less than the German (910 rounds).
This is interesting because the Americans gained a reputation for relying heavily on
‘overwhelming’ material, and for firing randomly. And the material advantage may be
true on the strategic level. But on the squad level, this wasn’t true. In fact, far from
being ‘superior’ soldiers, the German superiority lay in their faster firing machine
guns, which could put more bullets (more material) in the air than their American opponents.
The Americans only gained the reputation for firing randomly because their riflemen were
ordered and trained to gain fire superiority over their enemy (which would be a tough job
against the MG42).
“...the US infantryman was taught to treat the enemy position as an area target, to be
evenly filled with lead whether or not specific individuals could be seen and hit.”
The Soviet rifle squad has proven to be a difficult one to figure out. Some websites
say that the Soviet rifle squad was 11 men, which is roughly what one of my sources says,
but the source is vague. So, I’m going to go with 11 because I have no choice. My source does
say that the squad was divided into two sub-teams: a machine gun team and a rifle team. Which
suggests that it’s similar to the German set-up. Therefore, I’m going to go with:
a three man light machine gun team; a leader with a PPsH; and seven riflemen. But I cannot
confirm that this is the case, so if anyone has any more info, let me know.
In theory, the Mosin-Nagant rifle was similar to the Kar 98k. I don’t have a source that
says the practical fire rate in combat conditions, but one source does say that the rifles that
preceded it could fire 10 rounds per minute, which is the same as the Kar 98k. However,
Bloke on the Range had a truly ‘maddening minute’ trying to fire the Mosin in ideal
conditions and managed just 15 rounds... on his third go… and the first two goes were
not good to say the least... So, 10 rounds per minute is probably being generous, but
we’ll go with it.
The DP machine gun, which was nicknamed the ‘record player’, was the standard Russian
light machine gun of World War Two. A couple sources say it had a cyclical fire rate of
550 or 600 rounds per minute, which is roughly the same as (or slightly higher than) the
MP40 and Sten submachine guns. From this we can then guesstimate that 200 rounds is probably
its practical fire rate. Again, sources are rubbish. It could be more because the magazine
holds more rounds. But it could also be less because it was more difficult to change the
magazine. I don’t know, so I’m just going with 200. If anyone actually knows the practical
fire rate of the DP, let me know.
For the PPsH submachine gun, we have a bit of an issue. One source I have says 150 rounds
per minute was probably the maximum fire rate… which seems a little low to me, since the
gun could fire faster than that. However, it does note that the user was only issued
150 to 200 rounds anyway, which may have something to do with the limited firepower. And obviously,
you wouldn’t want to fire off all your ammunition within a minute and then be without. So, I’m
just going to go with 150 rounds, but if you want to add an extra 50 the number, go ahead.
Therefore, for a Russian 11 man rifle squad, they had an ‘on paper’ firepower of about
430 rounds per minute. Again, much like the British and American Armies, the Soviets were
outmatched in terms of raw firepower against the Germans. And it’s clear that, overall,
the Germans had a serious advantage in firepower, and that was purely down to their machine
guns.
Obviously there’s numerous things to consider as well. For starters, in combat, you’re
not going to have every single man firing as rapidly as possible and using up all their
ammunition, and then sit there hopelessly. You’re also unlikely to have fully-manned teams - there’s
going to be casualties. And even then, not every man in the team may see the enemy, or
be in a position to fire back. Tactics will also come into play, as will air support,
tank support, artillery and mortar support, etc. Also, just because there’s more bullets
in the air, doesn’t mean there’s more kills. If a machine gun is firing away at
some guys cowering in a trench, it can fire as many rounds as it likes, it’ll never
hit them.
But, the point is that, if you can put more bullets down range then your opponents, then
you may have a higher chance of hitting something, or, at the very least, a better chance of
suppressing them. And the German machine guns clearly have an advantage here.
“Numerous Allied reports from the advance across Normandy and France in 1944 speak of
being caught in German machine-gun crossfire, with entire battalions and even divisions
unable to make significant headway against scything fire.”
The MG42 was nicknamed ‘Hitler’s Buzzsaw’ or ‘Hitler’s Zipper’ by the Allies.
And the Soviets called it the ‘Linoleum Ripper’. It definitely had a psychological
impact, and was effective at keeping people’s heads down under suppressing fire.
“...both machine guns [the MG34 and MG42] were capable of inflicting heavy casualties
and of forcing large units to a standstill. Without weapons of this capability and flexibility,
it is likely that Allied infantry in all theatres would have been able to advance towards their
objectives at greater speed and lower cost. These weapons were true force multipliers,
enabling a small team of men to put down fire that couldn’t have been achieved by dozens
of riflemen.”
Of course, the Allies answered the German machine guns with heavy weaponry - mortars,
artillery, air power, etc. However, some interesting things happened at the squad level too. Typically,
squads on all sides were not at full strength, and would more likely have 5 or 7 men rather
than 10 or upwards. But, even with fewer men, they would keep their machine guns - or even
get more. US squads often took 2 BARs, rather than one. Some Soviet squads also had two
DP machine guns, although the source doesn’t specify why. We do know there was a shortage
of DP’s overall (with some troops being issued DT tank machine guns, or Bren guns,
or Browning 30 cals for use instead), and I think it’s reasonable to assume that Allied
and Soviet infantry were trying to compensate for the lack of firepower compared to the
German machine guns.
This is perhaps why the Soviets were so keen on creating submachine gun squads, or even
entire units. Armed with PPSh-41 submachine guns, a 10 man squad could increase its firepower
to as much as 1,500 rounds per minute, which is way more than our theoretical German squad’s
910 rounds per minute. I’ve already done a video about Soviet small arms with a heavy
focus on the submachine guns, so check that out. But one of the conclusions from that
video was that the Germans would have the firepower advantage at the start of an engagement,
because their machine guns and rifles would outrange and/or outfire the Soviet rifles
and machine guns. But once the submachine guns got into range, the Soviets would have
a clear advantage. Well, the calculations we’ve made here in this video may support
that video further. The Soviets may have realized that their troops didn’t have sufficient
firepower to contend with the German machine guns at long ranges, and so opted to compensate
by using their faster-firing submachine guns to do so instead. Yes, they needed to get closer and
into range to use them, but once they did, they had the advantage.
Same applies to the Americans. The Americans had better rifles than the German riflemen,
and fired rapidly to suppress or take them down. When facing the German machine guns
though, the whole squad had to be used to take them on in a firefight, and they’d
struggle to match the firepower even then. So they’d call in artillery and tanks and
so on, which is perhaps why they got their reputation for firing wildly and relying upon
material.
The British couldn’t hope to match the firepower of the German machine guns, which would put
200 or more rounds into the air than an entire British squad could hope to do. So, they had
to plan their attack out more methodically, earning them their slow and ‘plodding’
reputation.
And really, when you think about it, the ‘superiority’ of the German infantry is down to their superior
machine guns rather than anything else. Which is interesting. Was it really ‘race’ or
‘nationality’ that made the difference? Or was it just different gear? I’m obviously
favouring the ‘gear’ argument here because we actually have evidence for this, whereas
the ‘race’ and ‘nationality’ arguments are based on belief and pseudoscience.
I think it’s reasonable to assume that, if every nation had started gearing up for
war in 1933 like the Germans did, the German infantry advantage may not have been so clear.
Thanks for watching, bye for now.