The Cold War ended a long time ago. Or at least that's what they want us to believe,
because in old Europe there is a region where the shadow of Moscow is still very present.
So much so that you could almost say that, in a way, the Cold War is still alive three
decades after the extinction of the Soviet Union.
And this is precisely the region that will be the focus of our attention today. Far to
the north and wedged between Central Europe and Scandinavia on the "friendly" side and
Russia and Belarus on the "hostile" side are the three Baltic States:
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
The three Baltic States were part of the Soviet Union itself until its collapse in 1991. That
is to say, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were not satellite states like Poland or Hungary
but part of the great communist power itself.
However, above all, the question that concerns us is that the Baltics were, and still are,
a key issue for Moscow with their privileged access to the Baltic Sea, a sea that connects
them directly with the engine of Europe: Germany.
What’s more, the three republics have become one of the most prosperous regions in Europe.
The fact is that for these and other reasons many military experts consider this region
to be a potential powder keg, a centre of deep political and military tensions. Above
all, military ones.
(Lithuania says two Russian military jets violated its airspace – LRT)
(NATO jets spot Russian military aircraft near Latvian border – ERR)
(Estonia says Russian plans violate its airspace, again – AP)
As you can see, the Baltic states, a relatively small strip of 175,000 square kilometres – equivalent
to the size of a country like Uruguay – have become quite a headache for NATO.
In order to counteract the Russian threat, protecting the borders and limiting Moscow's
influence are the objectives.
The question is: How does NATO hope to achieve this? Why have these three republics become
a major focus of interest for Western institutions? What are their main strengths and weaknesses?
And perhaps the most important question of all: Could NATO repel a Ukrainian-style Russian
invasion?
Well, in this video, we are going to answer these and many other questions.
So... Let's get started.
(ONE COUNTRY TWO SOCIETIES)
Think about it for a moment, what really was the key factor that above all else explains
the success of the Russian intervention in Ukraine?
Okay, I'm sure many of you are thinking about the troops Russia put on the ground – even
if they weren’t bearing the flag – and of how those troops were prepared and equipped.
However, give it another twist: would Russian success really have been possible had it not
been for the existence of large pockets with Russian populations?
Well, you know what, how would you feel if I told you that this same ingredient is also
to be found here, on the border between the Baltic republics and mother Russia?
Look: In Lithuania today, it is estimated that 4.8% of the country's population is ethnic
Russian. And yes, this figure may not seem particularly high to you, but Lithuania is
actually the exception, because the percentage of Russian population in Estonia is around
24% and in Latvia even more, 25.2%.
Of course, the fact that there is a lesser or greater Russian population in a certain
place is not necessarily a negative thing. The problem arises when their social and legal
situation has come about due to their exclusion and separation. And that is precisely the
case.
Look, for example, at the place you are going to see on the screen: Lasnamäe
This is a Russian-majority neighbourhood where only 1 in 4 inhabitants are Estonian. Here
the Russian community is predominant. We are talking about more than 80,000 inhabitants
who maintain strong community ties with each other and live in a real life open-air museum
of the Soviet era. It is like Russia but inside Estonia.
It is the main Russian nucleus within a city, Tallinn, where more than 30% of the population
is Russian. We are talking about a population, and this is the important thing, that has
very marked characteristics of its own...
For example, the lowest income areas in the three Baltic republics are precisely those
where the highest percentage of Russians live. And be careful because we are not talking
about a small variation. The income level can be 40 or even 50% lower than in the richest
and most prosperous areas.
But that’s not all. The Russian population in the Baltic States functions in practice
as a kind of second society, or rather, a second-rate society.
And although their situation has indeed improved over the last few years, the differences are
still enormous.
For example, in Estonia, to this day, there are still some 70,000 ethnically Russian people
who are literally stateless.
Yes, that’s right.
Some 70,000 people, about 6 percent of the country's entire population, have no citizenship,
no passport and no right to vote in national elections.
And it is not that they are Russian citizens either, we are simply talking about 70,000
people who are not citizens of anywhere. Without looking any further, here in Lasnamäe we
can find many examples of people who formally do not belong to any country.
And yes, I know what you're thinking: How on earth can this be possible?
Well, you see, the origin of this bizarre situation dates back to 1991 when the Estonian
government made a firm decision: to grant citizenship exclusively to all those who were
citizens before the Soviet occupation in 1940 and their descendants.
To the rest, to the Russians who had arrived during the Soviet occupation, nothing at all.
And take note, because something very similar happened in Latvia, a country where about
7% of the population is in this same situation. We are talking about more than 130,000 stateless
people.
Well, as you can imagine, this situation not only fuels exclusion, racial segregation and
lack of opportunities for this group of the Russian population, but it is also the perfect
breeding ground for the disinformation and manipulation strategies sponsored by the Kremlin
to be effective.
And do you know what? In Moscow they are perfectly aware of that.
This is precisely why the Russian government has been trying for years to fuel a sense
of confrontation and nation-building among this population.
So how far have the Russian authorities gone? And the most important question of all: What
potential do such strategies really have?
Listen up.
(HYBRID WARFARE)
Where does it stem from, why is Russia so interested in the Baltic States? Is it a question
of mere historical resentment? Is it perhaps to curb the influence of the EU? Or is it
a question of neo-imperialism?
Well... the answer is – all of those reasons and also none of them – at the same time.
On paper, my friends, Russia's argument is the idea of the "Russian World". Now, what
exactly is this Russian World?
Well, you see, for Vladimir Putin, when he talks about Russia and the Russian people,
he is not talking exclusively about the Russians living within today's Russian borders, but
about all the Russians scattered around the world. And especially in the ex-Soviet territories.
It is, so to speak, an expanded definition of the Kremlin's political responsibilities.
Therefore, the strategy of Putin's governments is to materialize this concept of the Russian
World. In this way the government wants to link as many Russian-speaking minorities as
possible to the Motherland.
Why? Because they see these Russian minorities as a key political tool for extending the
country's influence.
So much so in fact, that in past wars, Moscow already alluded to the idea of protecting
its "compatriots" as the main argument for intervening. We are talking, for example,
about the war in Georgia or the military interventions in Crimea and the Ukrainian Donbass.
Now, we are talking about the Baltics. And the question we need to ask is: What does
all this mean? How does the Russian government intend to exert its influence here?
Well... welcome to Hybrid Warfare.
Hybrid warfare is a type of non-conventional conflict in which the aim is to wear down
the enemy by combining political, economic and informational means, for example. Methods
that are not strictly military in nature.
This is achieved, for example, through disinformation campaigns, cyber attacks, blackmailing with
energy supplies, interfering in electoral processes or supporting and training radical
and insurgent groups.
All these tactics have an enormous impact on a country's security and also on the functionality
and even legitimacy of its institutions.
And yes, almost all of these tactics are what Russia employs against the Baltics. But...
Do you want some concrete examples? Then take a look.
(Report: Russian hackers exploit Lithuanian infrastructure – AP)
(Suspected Russia-backed hackers target Baltic energy networks – Reuters)
And don't think for a second that computer attacks are the only examples on the table.
We can find many, many, many more.
Without going any further, it is known that the Russian government secretly funded a group
of news websites called Balt News that were ostensibly independent. The intention was
to be able to disseminate stories and news dictated directly by the Kremlin.
All with one purpose:
To turn the Baltics from a pro-Western worldview to a more pro-Russian one. And to do this
they know that even more important than influencing the political establishment can be to do it
in the street, to directly influence society itself.
That is why it is so important to carry out disinformation campaigns, fake news, human
rights denunciations, data capture and political and economic threats.
But wait a minute, because these are not the only tools of hybrid warfare that Russia employs
in this region of Europe either.
There is another even more worrying one: what we could call the strategy of constant tension.
The Russian military presence in this region is enormous.
We are talking about such a concentration of equipment and troops that many military
experts doubt that NATO could really do anything to stop a hypothetical Russian invasion. Something
more than its supposed power of deterrence, of course.
But... What exactly is the Russian military threat that these three Baltic countries – Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania – may be facing?
Well, let’s take a closer look:
(NATO'S ACHILLES HEEL)
This location you are about to see is the Plokštinė [PLOKS-TEE-NE] Missile Base. Located
in western Lithuania, very close to the Baltic Sea, it was the first underground nuclear
strike base in the entire Soviet Union. This was one of the places the Red Army counted
on to deploy its destructive power.
For years it was a hot spot in the confrontation between East and West. Today it reflects like
few others the triumph of the Western bloc. Once a key part of the Soviet Union's own
nuclear deterrent system, today it is a facility open to the public located in a full member
country of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
For decades NATO has been and remains a key tool, a counterweight in the world power system.
Democracy and freedom versus freedom-stifling autocracies.
This is true. But it is also true that this organization has weaknesses. Delicate parts.
And some of them can be found precisely in this region of Eastern Europe.
The three Baltic States currently have NATO bases and troops deployed to defend the borders
separating the western bloc from Russia by land, sea and air.
Today we are talking about more than 35,000 soldiers, taking into account both the national
troops of these three countries and the support units deployed by countries such as the United
States, the United Kingdom, Germany and Canada.
Of course, in a hypothetical conflict in the Baltics, Russia not only wins in numbers,
but also in means, capabilities and geo-strategy.
Let’s look, for example, at the case of Lithuania:
This point you are looking at is the Suwalki [SOO-BAW-KEE] gap, a strip of about 90 kilometers
that connects Lithuania with Poland and the rest of the NATO countries in Europe.
The problem is that what surrounds this corridor is hostile territory. Belarus to the east
and Kaliningrad to the west, that is Russia itself.
[By the way, not long ago we made a video about Kaliningrad that helps to understand
the general context of the Baltic cold war. I’ll leave you the link in the description].
But let’s not get sidetracked. The question is how easily Russia could isolate the three
Baltic states when the time comes.
It would be enough to simply occupy or attack this small strait of land to prevent the transit
of military reinforcements. It is, so to speak, a funnel for NATO forces.
And remember we are not necessarily talking about an occupation or a formal attack. Military
experts point to the mobilization of an apparently irregular force similar to those that Russia
used to occupy Crimea or to destabilize the Donbass.
In fact, such an intervention is perhaps what the three Baltic countries are most concerned
about, not only in this corridor, but above all in the parts of their respective territories
that have a majority Russian population.
But be careful, because this is not the only weak point of NATO.
In the vicinity of Kaliningrad, the Russian military has deployed an advanced military
system that has created an A2AD – anti-access area denial – capability.
We are talking about a complex system that makes it possible to prevent the movement
of adversary forces by land, sea and air both in Kaliningrad and in neighbouring areas.
This is achieved thanks to a network of superimposed air defence systems, including, since 2019,
the Russian S-400 anti-aircraft system, long-range artillery, conventional and nuclear ballistic
missiles – including 12 dual-use Iskander missiles – and cruise missiles.
There are also anti-ship and anti-submarine weapons, electronic warfare systems and, obviously,
numerous military planes, fighters and tanks, among many other pieces of equipment. And
let's not forget the Baltic Fleet, which is stationed here to prevent NATO from using
its fleets in the area against Russia.
In this way, Russia seeks not only to perpetuate its dominion over Kaliningrad and protect
its only Baltic port that does not freeze over all year round, but also to keep the
three Baltic countries and thus NATO as a whole at bay.
The problem with this kind of arm wrestling and arms races is that a simple mistake, a
misinterpretation or an oversight at any given moment, could set things out of control. That's
the risk.
(Latvia warns of risk of 'incident' between Nato and Russia – FT)
("You have a border crisis, you have a major military exercise going on at the borders
of Nato countries, you also have increased presence on our side, the Lithuanian side,
Estonian side, Polish side of border guards, and military formations. Of course, this is
increasing the possibility of incidents". – Edgars Rinkevics, Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Latvia)
Of course, Russia's argument for maintaining a huge deployment in the area is that, from
its standpoint, it is NATO that has the region surrounded.
For NATO, however, Kaliningrad is a kind of Russian military fortress within the territory
of the bloc.
But look at this map. On it you can see the huge concentration of military assets that
Russia has placed on its western border. For example, in Pskov, just 20 miles from
the Estonian border, Russia has an air assault division and a Russian special forces brigade
deployed. Putin's Navy Seals.
So, without even counting on the Kaliningrad forces, many military experts suggest that
Russia enjoys significant operational superiority in the area.
NATO itself estimates that the Russians would be able to rapidly deploy between 50,000 and
60,000 soldiers in just a few days. In addition, the threat to the Baltic countries could come
from different directions, making defence of the area even more difficult.
But, obviously, today the possibility of an armed conflict is reasonably small and of
course we cannot forget the deterrent power that NATO itself has.
But ....what do you want me to say? Mistakes do happen. And we don't just have to think
about a chance incident. The influential presence of the Russian community in Estonia and Latvia,
its scant integration in civil and political life and its relatively weak economic situation
could favour shock, rebellion or protest movements that could cause significant damage to the
stability of the three Baltic countries.
That is the real threat. And within it the game of hybrid warfare and the constant tension
deployed by Russia is the greatest asset.
But having got to this point, it's your turn:
Do you think NATO needs to increase its deployment on its eastern border? How do you think Western
countries should deal with a massive hybrid warfare action in the Baltics like the one
that has already occurred in Ukraine? In what ways can the risks be contained?
Leave us your opinion below, in the comments. And, by the way, if you like what we do now
you can be part of this project and help it keep growing by joining our community on Patreon.
Once again thank you very much for being there.
All the best and see you next time.