(intro music)
My name is Jeff Sebo,
and I teach animal and[br]environmental studies
at New York University.
Today, I'm going to talk[br]to you about moral status.
In other words, I'm going[br]to talk to you about
who we have moral obligations to, and why.
Let me start with a quick example
to show you what I mean.
Imagine that you broke into my room
and you ripped the head off my teddy bear.
Most people would think[br]that you acted wrongly.
But why?
Who did you wrong?
Not my teddy bear, right?
My teddy bear is a bunch of cloth.
Instead, most people would[br]say that you acted wrongly
because you wronged me, as somebody
who cares about this teddy bear.
So the question is, what[br]marks the difference
between me and my teddy bear?
What makes it the case that you have
moral obligations to me,[br]but not to my teddy bear?
This is the question of moral status.
Now historically, most[br]philosophers have thought
that the difference between[br]me and my teddy bear
is that I am a human being[br]and my teddy bear is not.
In other words, most[br]philosophers have thought
that all and only human[br]beings have moral status.
But why?
What makes us so special?
Well many people, like Rene Descartes,
answered this question by saying
that we have rationality, or language,
or self-awareness, or some other
very sophisticated cognitive capacity.
This is what makes us special,
and this is what gives us moral status.
But recently, many people[br]have started to question
the idea that all and only human beings
have these capacities.
For example, Peter Singer argues
that no matter which capacity we pick,
we can always find some nonhuman animal,
like say a chimpanzee,[br]who has that capacity
more than some human being,
like say an infant or a[br]severely disabled human being.
In fact, it turns out[br]that the only property
that all and only humans seem to have
is membership in the species Homo sapien.
But if we say that all[br]and only human beings
have moral status for that reason,
then how are we any different at all
from racists or sexists or anybody else
who discriminate against others
solely on the basis of membership
in a particular biological category.
For that reason, Richard[br]Ryder, Peter Singer,
Tom Regan, and many other philosophers
have argued that speciesism is wrong
for the same reason that[br]racism and sexism are.
They are all forms of prejudice,
in favor of one group over another group,
solely on the basis of membership
in a particular biological category.
Dale Jamieson puts the point this way,
to see why speciesism is wrong,
imagine an alternate history,
where Neanderthal survived as a distinct,
reproductively isolated species.
So in this world, human[br]beings and Neanderthals
live together, and work together,
and play together, and are[br]exactly alike in every respect,
except that they happen[br]to be different species.
Now imagine that in this world,
you discover that your roommate,
or your best friend, is a Neanderthal
instead of a human being.
Would this mean that you lose
all of your moral[br]obligations to this person?
Would you now be morally permitted
to use them for food, or clothing,
or research, or whatever[br]purpose you had in mind?
Intuitively, the answer is "No."
You would still have moral obligations
to your roommate or best friend.
And what this shows is that membership
in the species Homo sapien
is not in and of itself[br]what gives us moral status.
So then what is?
What does give us moral status?
Well, one option is to[br]say that rationality,
or language, or self awareness[br]gives us moral status.
But this view would imply[br]that many human beings,
like infants and severely[br]disabled human beings,
lack moral status because[br]they lack these capacities,
and that view seems deeply[br]implausible to many people.
So for that reason, many[br]philosophers have argued
that we should expand the[br]circle of moral concern
by saying that sentience,[br]or in other words,
the capacity for conscious experiences
like pleasure and pain, is[br]what gives us moral status.
This view would imply[br]that the vast majority
of human beings, and[br]many nonhuman animals,
have moral status.
And many people find this view plausible
because they say you need to be sentient
in order for it to matter to you
how your life goes for you.
So Peter Singer uses the example
of kicking a rock versus[br]kicking a mouse down the street.
He says a rock is not sentient,
and so a rock will not suffer
if you kick it down the street.
So you have no moral obligation at all
not to kick a rock down the street.
On the other hand, a mouse is sentient.
So a mouse will suffer if you[br]kick them down the street,
and so you do have a moral obligation
not to kick the mouse down the street.
Other philosophers think that we should
expand the circle of[br]moral concern even farther
by saying that life itself[br]is what gives us moral status.
So this view would imply[br]that all living organisms
have moral status.
That includes human[br]beings, nonhuman animals,
plants, even maybe species or ecosystems,
if we decide that those things are alive.
And many people think that[br]this view is plausible,
because they say that our[br]preference for sentience
is no different from a[br]preference for human beings,
or say white people, or men.
These are all forms of prejudice
for one group over another[br]based solely on membership
in a particular biological category.
As Kenneth Goodpaster puts the point,
"Sentience, or the capacity[br]to have conscious experiences,
"is only one tool that evolution
"gave us in order to survive and reproduce.
"So why should morality[br]privilege those of us
"who happened to survive and reproduce
"by experiencing pleasures and pains,
"over other living organisms[br]who happen to survive
"and reproduce in other ways."
Now obviously, which of these[br]theories of moral status
we accept is going to[br]have profound implications
for how we live our lives.
For example, if we decide[br]that animals or plants
have moral status, then[br]it will turn out that
a lot of what we currently[br]do in everyday life
is deeply morally problematic,
including, but not remotely[br]limited to, the fact
that we currently kill over sixty billion
nonhuman animals a year for food alone.
Now at this point, it might[br]be very tempting to say,
"OK, maybe all and only humans[br]have a moral status after all,
"because our lives would be[br]much easier if this were true."
But keep in mind that[br]a hundred years ago
or two hundred years ago, it might[br]have been very tempting
for white men to say,[br]"OK, maybe all and only
white men have moral status after all,
"because their lives would be[br]much easier if that were true."
And what that shows is that[br]which theory of moral status
we accept has to depend on which theory
of moral status seems most plausible,
and not on which theory of[br]moral status happens to be
most convenient for us.
It may be that we end up deciding that
morality is much more demanding[br]than we might have hoped.
But, as my college ethics professor
Richard Galvin used to say,
no one ever said this stuff was easy.
So, what do you think?
Which theory of moral status[br]seems most plausible to you?
Do you think that all[br]and only human beings
have moral status, and we can[br]kick animals down the street
if we want to?
Do you think that all sentient[br]animals have moral status,
so at least we can kick plants
down the street if we want to?
Or do you think that all living[br]organisms have moral status,
so you can kick rocks, but pretty much
nothing else, down the street?
And finally, and most importantly,
how would you have to change[br]your everyday behavior,
based on which of these theories[br]of moral status you accept?
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