Most people would agree that evil should be stopped, by force of arms if necessary.
But how do you know when a resort to war is justified?
I’m Jim Lindsay, and this is Lessons Learned.
Our topic today is Adolph Hitler’s announcement on March 16, 1935, that he was rearming Germany.
Hitler was named Chancellor of Germany on January 30, 1933.
Within a week he told German military leaders that his ultimate foreign policy goal was
to conquer lands to Germany’s east and seek to their “ruthless Germanization.”
One thing, however, stood in Hitler’s way: Germany’s military weakness.
The victors of the First World War had written the Treaty of Versailles to keep Germany from
threatening the rest of Europe ever again.
Among other things, Germany could have no more than 100,000 troops, the size of its
navy was limited, and it was barred from having an air force.
None of that mattered to Hitler.
Soon after consolidating his power at home, he moved to rebuild the German military.
He ordered the creation of the Luftwaffe, the German Air Force.
He also launched plans to create an army three times larger what the Versailles Treaty allowed.
Initially, however, Hitler kept these decisions secret.
In public, he proclaimed Germany’s peaceful intentions and its commitment to honor its
international obligations.
All that changed on March 16, 1935.
Hitler announced that Germany was re-introducing a military draft with the goal of creating
an army of more than half a million soldiers.
He also confirmed what had long been rumored, that the Luftwaffe had 800 planes.
Hitler made his announcement based on a simple calculation: that the other European powers
would grumble, but they wouldn’t go to war to preserve the terms of the Treaty of Versailles.
He was right.
Britain, France, Italy, and the League of Nations all condemned Germany’s rearmament,
but did they nothing to make Hitler pay a price.
This tepid reaction only emboldened Hitler.
A year later, he violated another provision of the Treaty of Versailles and remilitarized
the Rhineland.
In September 1938, he demanded and got the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia.
It was only on September 1, 1939, when Germany invaded Poland, that the rest of Europe confronted,
rather than appeased, Hitler.
What’s the lesson of Hitler’s decision to rearm Germany?
Just this: Aggressive, expansionist states are most easily stopped early on when they
are weak and vulnerable.
But precisely because their capabilities are limited at that point—and their intentions
can only be guessed at—it is often hard to persuade other countries to act.
Governments calculate that it is wiser to accommodate than to confront.
The lesson of Germany’s rearmament lies at the heart of the debates today about what
to do about Iran’s nuclear program and the emergence of China.
Proponents of a military strike against Iran worry that it seeks to remake the Middle East.
In contrast, skeptics doubt Iran’s ability or interest in being a revisionist power,
even if it becomes a nuclear one.
In the case of China, proponents of taking a hard line with Beijing worry that accommodation
only emboldens Chinese officials to act more aggressively.
In contrast, proponents of diplomacy counter that accommodating China’s interests is
the only way to persuade Beijing to accept rather than to challenge the existing world
order.
Figuring out what to do about Iran or China would be easy if we knew how to measure intent;
that is, if we knew what Iranian or Chinese leaders were really seeking to do.
But intent is only something we can guess at.
So here is a question to consider: what are the signs of a country that can only be confronted
and not accommodated?
I encourage you to weigh in with your answer on my blog, The Water’s Edge.
You can find it at CFR.org.
I’m Jim Lindsay.
Thank you for watching this installment of Lessons Learned.