You might think that Paulus shouldn’t have sent his tanks north of the city of Stalingrad
to block the Volga there, and should have just bypassed the city to the south and gone
straight to Astrakhan. Well, in this video, we’re going to see why Paulus had to take
Stalingrad, why he couldn’t just race off to Astrakhan, and why he had to block the
Volga north of the city. Then we’re going to ask the question: But is this really the
case? Yes, there may be a flaw in this argument, and I’m going to cover that too, because
history lies in the heart of the debate. So let’s get on with it.
Now, we’ve already touched upon some of this in my last video (video 12 of my ongoing
Battlestorm Stalingrad series). In fact, it was your absolutely amazing comments that
prompted me to do this video. So if you haven’t seen that video, link in the description.
But I missed out a couple of crucial points in that video, one of them is pointed out
by Vitross here:
“I honestly don’t understand people who keep advocating going to Astrakhan. Do you
have any idea how far away Astrakhan was? It would be logistically impossible to move
there without the rail road. There was a rail road going there, but guess what hub it was
connected to? That's right: stalingrad. In order to get supplies to Astrakhan by the
railroad, you would need to capture the railroad hub in Stalingrad.”
Absolutely brilliant. How I failed to think of this, I have no idea, because I love talking
about the logistics.
But yes, from the direction the Germans were coming from, there was no direct railway to
Astrakhan. The railways led to Stalingrad. And, since the Germans were reliant on the
railways (because they didn’t have enough oil to run their trucks, which was why they
were going into the Caucasus in 1942 in the first place) it would make more sense to take
Stalingrad first, rather than go off to Astrakhan.
Now, I want to point out that there were two railways going into Stalingrad from the direction
that the Germans were coming from. Previously I only mentioned the southern railroad, which
goes from Rostov to Stalingrad, because this was mentioned in the sources. The second one
wasn’t mentioned in the sources, and because I based the Stalingrad region map on maps
from the late 1940s, I assumed that the railroad shown on this map was either not there, or
incomplete. That was until recently when I came across a source that actually mentioned
it. So, there was, in fact, a second railroad running from the Millerovo area, which I’m
assuming supplied Paulus’s 6th Army, since the southern railroad definitely supplied
Hoth’s 4th Panzer Army.
Because Paulus and Hoth were already having supply issues by this point, and since the
two railroads they used went to the city, it would make a lot of sense to capture Stalingrad
in the late August period, even if this just helped out their logistics on a local level.
But, with Stalingrad taken, and the supply situation improved, then an attack towards
Astrakhan could be mounted. Makes perfect sense, right?
But is this really the case?
Well, there’s a flaw in the argument that needs to be addressed.
As sdfa points out, there was a railroad to Astrakhan, but it was on the other side of
the Volga river!
Yeah! The maps sdfa provides, and the German maps at the time both confirm that there was
no railroad from Stalingrad to Astrakhan on the southern side of the Volga.
If the German logistics required a railroad to get to Astrakhan, then they would have
to cross the Volga in order to get it. And there’s no way the Germans would do that.
Crossing the Volga wasn’t part of their original Fall Blau plan, since their objective
was to create a blocking line along the Volga, not cross it.
And it would be pointless anyway, because the railway lines that went into Stalingrad
from the west didn’t cross the Volga. There was no connection between the railways on
the western bank and the railways on the eastern bank, meaning that they would have had to
drop off the supplies in Stalingrad, ship them over the Volga in ships they didn’t
have, then reload them on the other railway line, then send them to Astrakhan. Which is
not a likely scenario.
However, there was a railroad to Astrakhan from the direction that the Germans were coming
from, but it came from the Caucasus. It goes to the Grozny area, then along the Caspian
Sea to Astrakhan. So, if the Germans had to use railroads in order to take Astrakhan,
then they would have been better off taking the Caucasus first instead of Stalingrad.
In which case, Hitler was right to go south and split Army Groups A and B from one another.
However, another thing to consider is the fact that the Germans themselves were preparing
for a thrust to Astrakhan, even without any railroads. Bit of a spoiler, the 29th Motorized
Division was pulled out of the line and replenished to the point where they had more tanks than
they actually should have had. This was so that they could strike to Astrakhan after
the fall of Stalingrad. They never did this because the Soviets struck first and encircled
the 6th Army, but the point is that the Germans believed that 29th Motorized Division, with
other reinforcements, could go to Astrakhan without the railways.
Maybe, if Stalingrad fell and the local logistical situation was sorted out, they’d be able
to pull the motorized and armoured elements out of the line and send them to Astrakhan.
Motorized and panzer units used trucks, not horses, to supply themselves from the local
railway lines. So, in theory, a panzer corps, with maybe some additional trucks, wagons,
and air transport support, could have got to Astrakhan after the fall of Stalingrad,
which seems to be what the Germans were planning.
What’s also interesting is that, on the 30th of August 1942, the 16th Motorized Division
was in the Elista area, south of Stalingrad. It’s forward elements were almost at Astrakhan
anyway. I mean, look how close they are! Don’t get me wrong, this is still quite a distance,
and there were Soviet troops in the area which blocked them, but they were able to support
one division in this area at this time.
So, I don’t know if it was logistically possible, or impossible, for the Germans to
get to Astrakhan after Stalingrad had fallen. Another question would be - is it even necessary
to go to Astrakhan?
The objective was to block the Volga to stop the oil going north, and secure the northern
flank. Well, they could have secured the flank by occupying the Lake area; they didn’t
necessarily have to go to the Volga. And the best way to block the Volga wasn’t to block
it to the south of it - because there’s a lot of little rivers that come off the main
artery of the Volga, so blocking the main artery could have still allowed ships to sail
down one of the little rivers. But, where Wietersheim’s 14th Panzer Corps reached
the Volga to the north of the city, there is just one river - the Volga. So if you wanted
to block the Volga in the Stalingrad area, this was probably the best place to do it.
Otherwise you’d have to go all the way to Astrakhan.
This is another reason why Paulus went north of the city. It wasn’t just because the
terrain favoured the tanks, or that he didn’t have to cross any rivers to get there, or
that the distance to the Volga in the north was shorter than to the south. It was because
this was the best place to block the Volga.
It would also prevent Soviet reinforcements from coming south, as I explained in the previous
episode. Which then leads us to Marin’s amazing comment:
“This is very interesting, I was totally unaware that, at the time, going into Stalingrad
was probably the best decision. I was sure that there were genuine arguments for going
into Stalingrad, but I wasn't aware they were that strong. Now that I am aware of the need
to block reinforcements I can even understand them not clearing the don bridgehead, which
was really baffling me until now. Thanks so much for explaining all this and making things
clear.”
Brilliant! I hadn’t even realised this until Marin pointed it out, but it makes perfect
sense!
As we’ve seen during the Battlestorm Stalingrad series, in mid-August, Paulus defeated 4th
Tank Army in the Don Bend, but left a small bridgehead across the Don in the Kremenskaya
area. Instead of clearing this, he instead shifted his forces to the southeast, crossed
the Don, and raced to the Volga. Knowing that this bridgehead would come back to haunt the
6th Army in the future, many have concluded that Paulus should have cleared the bridgehead
first before going to Stalingrad. But, if he had done this, those Soviet reinforcements
would have moved south through the Kotluban area, reinforced the 62nd Army, and may have
made the subsequent crossing of the Don and race to the Volga operations, either far more
difficult, or even impossible.
These reinforcements would have also made Hoth’s job even more difficult. So, as Marin
points out, it makes perfect sense why Paulus left the Kremenskaya bridgehead alone, and
raced to the Volga. In the August of 1942, this was actually a decent decision.
But there was, perhaps, another option Paulus could take once his men had reached the Volga
north of the city. Yugster78 explains:
“If you wanted to siege the city, which was part of the original plan, you would need
to reach the Volga at some point north of the city. The mistake was sending the bulk
of the 6th army into the city to capture it, exposing its flanks making encirclement easy.”
This is an interesting idea that I hadn’t even considered. Let me explain.
Wietersheim’s 14th Panzer Corps reached the Volga north of the city. Then Paulus and
Hoth’s armies advanced into the city. But imagine that, instead of going into the city,
they instead just formed a ring around it and sieged it. This way, they’d still block
the Volga, and then wouldn’t have to enter the city and get chewed up in the attritional
urban warfare.
This is a great option I hadn’t even considered, and makes a bit more sense than just going
south of the city, blocking the Volga there, and then bombing Stalingrad. In this case,
the Germans would have the added bonus of blocking the reinforcements coming in from
the north, and they’d block the Volga at the best point.
The problem, of course, is that, this only works with the benefit of hindsight. We know
that entering the city results in the destruction of the 6th Army. So any alternative is better
than that for us. But at the time, Paulus and Hoth truly believed that they could take
the city, especially at this point when there were few Soviet forces in the city itself.
If there were few forces in the city, and your attacking force outnumbered the enemy
(which it did, as I’ll explain when we get to the first assault on the city in the Battlestorm
series), and you have the advantage of air, artillery, and tanks, why stop and siege the
city? In hindsight you would, but there was no way for Paulus and Hoth to know that the
city wouldn’t fall. They thought that they’d take it in a matter of days. So, as an interesting
alternative option with the benefit of hindsight, Yugster’s idea makes a lot of sense, and
may actually be a viable option for the Germans. But without the benefit of hindsight, this
option doesn’t make sense. At the time, the Germans, and even a lot of people on the
Soviets side, believed that Stalingrad was about to fall. There’s no way that the Germans
would have stopped outside the city.
Realistically, the only way for the Germans to guarantee victory at Stalingrad was to
have more guys in the area. But they couldn’t do that. As I explained in the previous episode,
even if Hitler had allowed both Army Groups A and B to go to Stalingrad and Astrakhan
first, then south into the Caucasus, it’s unlikely that they could have supplied those
forces in the field with the limited railroads in the area. So, because of the logistical
issues, it made sense for Hitler to split the Army Groups, sending one south and one
east.
In fact, they would have had to go to a place called Salsk anyway, because the railroad
that Hoth was using to go to Stalingrad with ran from there. So elements would have had
to go south anyway. At which point, you may as well head south to Maikop and get the oil.
As Vitross points out:
“I think the biggest turning point would have been if Maikop had been able to quickly
start oil production, that would have alleviated a lot of german logistical problems. With
a good oil supply the Germans wouldn't have had to stick so close to the railroads.”
Of course, this then leads to other problems, as Camilo points out:
“But remember that the german still needed to refine the oil to transform it into usable
fuel. So they would have had to transport the oil from the Caucasus to refineries in
Romania or Germany. Which would take time.”
Yes, just taking the oil fields alone wasn’t enough. They needed to refine it. And, in
1942, they had to ship it to the west. Now, Toprani goes into this a bit more in his “The
First War for Oil”, which you can find online. As a note to page 33 of his article, he actually
says that the Germans captured intact refineries at Krasnador, although the ones at Maikop
were destroyed. And he says on page 36, that Grozny was important, not necessarily for
its oilfields, but for its refineries. Sadly for the Germans, they didn’t get to Grozny.
And so, without enough refineries in the Caucasus, they would have had to ship the oil to other
refineries captured in the occupied territories, and in Germany and in Romania. This is also
why the idea of going to the Middle East via the Mediterranean route wasn’t a viable
alternative.
“Even getting the oil to the Mediterranean would not end Germany’s problems, since
the higher sulfur content of Middle Eastern oil necessitated the construction of new refineries.
Finally, “transportation to these refineries . . . is only possible if a sufficiently large
tanker fleet stands at the ready and the way through the mediterranean is secure.” ”
All this has led others to conclude that the Third Reich was doomed no matter what it did.
“I see no alternatives for Germany to win. They Never properly planned or developed large
scale supply lines. Whatever plan you come up with, Russia would counter move but Germany
still had its severe supply problems. 1300 Miles from Germany to Stalingrad. And those
supplies going via the territory of Poland and Russia.”
“The Russian was supposed to surrender when they got whipped at Barbarossa, and Russia
called their bluff. Poor Germany, we try anyway knowing we don't have the supply lines to
maintain a proper offense, and can lead to disaster. But it is a bigger disaster, we
do nothing and run out of fuel for the nation, allowing the allies to take their time by
using their planes and weapons of fuel to completely destroy Germany.”
I’d like your opinions on this, but I’m not sure I fully agree. The Axis almost reached
their objectives in the summer and autumn of 1942. If they had, and if they had held
them, the outcome of the war may have been a lot different. The Soviet Union may have
suffered an economic collapse in 1943. To find out why, check out my video here. And,
if you’re new to the channel, here’s the first episode of my ongoing Battlestorm Stalingrad
series. You may wish to check that out. Thanks for watching, bye for now.