Opinions about hypersonic weapons are not peaceful.
Some people consider them "game changers" because, given their extreme speed, it would
be impossible to defend against their attack; others say they are but the latest in a long
line of overhyped weapons systems and are relatively easy to defend against because
they fly more slowly as they near their target than ballistic missiles with càmparable ranges.
Others claim that they will strengthen conventional deterrence; still others argue they will create
instability between nuclear-armed nations by fueling a dangerous arms race.
This debate has gained greater attention in recent years as the United States, Russia
and China have made their own progress in the field.
But before explaining what the three powers have in store, we need to explain what a hypersonic
missile is and differentiate it from a ballistic missile.
We are helped by various entities including the Council for International Affairs of Russia
(but also the American Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance) that in an article states that "there
are two requirements to label a weapon as hypersonic: a speed greater than Mach 5, so
more than five times that of sound and the ability to change course and perform maneuvers
(both vertical and horizontal) while remaining within the atmosphere.
This differentiates it from ballistic missiles that instead travel outside the atmosphere
and although they can reach hypersonic speeds (and very often do), they have fixed arc trajectories
and poor maneuverability.
This image is worth a thousand words.
An example of these is the Minuteman III, the U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM), armed with nuclear warheads, which can reach Mach 23 on descent and could strike
Russia from silos located in the western United States within about 30 minutes from launch.
Traditional cruise missiles, on the other hand, fly at subsonic speeds (less than Mach
1) and supersonic speeds (between Mach 1 and Mach 5).
The hypersonic missiles then divide into two species: hypersonic cruise missiles (HCM)
and hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV).
The former are powered by high-speed engines, called scramjets, and thanks to them they
keep a constant hypersonic speed and altitude during the entire flight.
In contrast, the latter, since they have no propulsion system, are usually launched on
top of a booster rocket (boost-glide system) and then glide through the atmosphere toward
their target at hypersonic speeds.
Both types can carry conventional or nuclear payloads.
The advantage of these missiles over their ballistic rivals is quite obvious.
As reported by the expert Cameron Tracy, “since hypersonic weapons fly through the atmosphere,
they can take advantage of aerodynamic forces to course-correct over most of their flight
path”, making it difficult for enemy radars to predict where they will land; “ballistic
missiles, in contrast, can execute corrective maneuvers only for brief periods during their
initial ascènt out of the atmosphere and final descent to Earth.”
However, glide vehicles, while having this bonus, suffer from a lower average speed than
ballistic missiles due to atmospheric flight and, above all, suffer from extreme overheating
in the subsystems, which not only affects the aerodynamics of the missile but also blocks
communication with satellites or other guidance sources, thereby worsening control.
Something that apparently doesn't affect hypersonic cruise missiles, since they fly slower than
rocket-launched systems.
Beyond the debate surrounding these weapons, one thing is for sure, they pose a challenge
to many existing types of medium and long-range air missile defenses.
U.S. defense officials say this "will require the development of wholly new intercept systems,
supporting technologies, and a new sensor architecture".
The ones of most concern are glide vehicles, so much so that the U.S. is developing defense
systems focused on eliminating this type of threat in the end phase of its flight, since,
as expert James Acton claims, it will travel slower just before reaching its target due
to resistance with the air, thereby being able to be intercepted more easily.
Who is funding the development of these engineering marvels?
Let's take a trip to the United States.
I'll tell you just a few numbers.
The Trump administration had allocated a total of nearly $6 billion (5.8) for all hypersonic-related
research and development for fiscal years 2020 and 2021.
In May 2021, the Biden administration, in its budget request for fiscal year 2022, added
$3.8 billion with the intention of accelerating Trump's plans by strengthening conventional
deterrence against Russia and China.
I say conventional because Washington currently has no plans to equip hypersonic systems with
nuclear warheads, unlike Moscow and Beijing.
Some Pentagon officials say that the rush to hypersonic programs is due to the fact
that current American missile capabilities, such as the sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missile
or the Joint Air to Surface Standoff missile (JASSM), lack the maneuverability and speed
necessary to counter evolving adversary threats, especially those from China.
Others, however, leverage the "competitive" aspect, meaning that as Michael Griffin reports,
the United States needs to develop such weapons to "allow it to match what its àdversaries
are doing".
Then there is a debate in the expert community about how many weapons the US should deploy.
Some speak of thousands, "to deter Chinese hypersonic attacks against carriers and airfields
and other critical targets in the Western Pacific.”
Others speak of dozens because they should be used sparingly and exploited for their
"surgical strike capabilities".
In any case, given the internal differences of opinion within the Pentagon, hypersonic
weapons will put some pretty significant future funding challenges on the table.
Instead, what treasures does China hide?
China has always been reluctant to publicly reveal information about its nuclear forces,
and likewise, very little is known about Beijing's development of hypersonic weapons.
Overall, China's motivations appear to be to prevail over American missile defenses
and outclass its offensive weapons in the event of a war in Asia.
According to expert Tong Zhao, almost all Chinese experts agree that "the ability to
penetrate defensive systems is the most important feature of hypersonic weapons."
There are at least five programs underway in China, including the Dongfeng-17 (DF-17),
a medium-range ballistic missile that U.S. officials estimate has a range of 1800 to
2500 and a speed between Mach 5 and Mach 10.
We don't know whether conventional or nuclear, but U.S. intelligence has rated it as dual-capable.
Then there would be a nuclear-capable hypersonic glide missile prototype known as the Xing-Kong
2/Starry Sky-2 that would be successfully tested in 2018.
Instead, Russia has publicly unveiled the development of hypersonic weapons, saying
they are intended to ensure that Moscow can evade any future U.S. anti-missile defenses.
Putin himself said in September 2020 that "the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty in 2002 forced Russia to develop hypersonic weapons."
And in March 2018, when he introduced a number of new nuclear weapon launch systems, he also
talked about some hypersonic weapons such as the Avangard, a hypersonic glide missile
that was mounted on a SS-19 intercontinental missile, successfully tested and deployed
in 2019.
Among those intended for use in a regional context, I would mention the Tsirkon, a sea-launched
hypersonic cruise missile, and the Kinzhal, a hypersonic ballistic missile launched from
the only modified fighter-bomber capable of doing so, the MIG-31K and deployed a few days
ago in the Ukrainian village of Deliatyn, to hit an underground missile and ammunition
depot.
I open a parenthesis on this, there would be something strange in Moscow's narrative.
The images released by the Kremlin are of a drone and it’s difficult to think that
it could have operated freely in Ukrainian airspace so far west of the front line, where
there’s no Russian air superiority and since Ukrainian air defenses are still standing,
they could have detected it and shot it down.
Some journalists then reported that the inhabitants of the surrounding areas wouldn’t have heard
any big explosion.
Make your own judgements.
But now we come to the conclusion.
Given the potential risks to stability posed by hypersonic weapons, arms control is a valuable
tool for mitigating them but one that may remain utopian.
In recent years, experts have begun to explore several possible options.
The first measure to ensure strategic stability is the strengthening of mutual trust between
powers, which can be translated both in the collaboration to avoid dangerous consequences
even in the absence of formal treaties and in the increase of transparency, thereby sharing
technical details and information.
Another tool is the banning of certain types of weapons, such as long-range ballistic missiles
(see the Russian Kinzhal and the American AGM-183) and where this isn’t possible,
minimizing the risks posed by these systems by putting on paper bilateral or trilateral
agreements limiting their number.
We do not know what the future holds, but it's likely that none of these cooperative
arms control concepts will gain support, let alone become the basis for formal agreements
between powers.
Well, we are done for today, thank you for your attention and see you in the next video.
Ciao!