(Intro music)
My name is Stephen Darwall,
and I teach philosophy at Yale University
in New Haven, Connecticut.
And today I want to discuss[br]morality and God.
The divine command theory[br]is an attractive view
precisely because it can explain our sense
that morality transcends any earthly law
or social understanding.
Still, that doesn't show that morality
is the same thing as God's commands,
in the sense that if there were no
divine commands, then nothing[br]would be right or wrong.
To see this, let's assume again that
(1) God exists and[br](2) that it's wrong to
violate God's commands.
And let us consider different[br]reasons we might have
for thinking that it's wrong[br]to violate God's command.
Suppose you think we[br]should follow God's commands
because God knows better than[br]we do what we should do.
If that's your attitude,
then you're treating God[br]as what philosophers call
an "epistemic authority."
You're believing something[br]on God's authority,
on his say-so,
that is, because God believes it.
This is a natural attitude to have.
We frequently believe[br]things on other's authority.
If a friend of yours knows[br]much more than you do
about the law of Missouri in the 1840s,
then you might reasonably be inclined
to believe something[br]just because she does.
But her having this epistemic authority
would not mean that she[br]has the kind of law-making
authority that can create law.
Her thinking something was the law
would not actually make it[br]the case that it was the law.
To the contrary, her[br]having epistemic authority
would itself depend on there[br]being independent truths
about the law in the 1840s
in Missouri, of which she has knowledge.
So by analogy, if your reason for thinking
you should follow God's command is that
God knows better than you do
what is morally right and wrong,
then it would not follow that God
makes the moral law.
To the contrary, it would[br]follow that there are
independent truths about the moral law
of which God has knowledge.
So if that were the reason[br]to follow God's commands,
the divine command[br]theory would not be true,
it would be false.
Or suppose you think you should follow
God's commands not because[br]he knows the moral law,
but because he knows what[br]is good and bad for us.
Not in moral terms, but[br]just what would make us
better or worse off,
what would benefit us or harm us.
But if that's your reason,
must you not be assuming that it is true,
independent of anything God commands,
that morality must somehow concern
what promotes human well-being[br]and prevents suffering.
So here again, if this is why you think
you should follow God's command,
you must be assuming that there are facts
about morality that are[br]independent of God's command.
Or suppose you think[br]you should follow God's
commands because God[br]has superior authority
over us, something in[br]the way a sergeant does
over a private, or a legislature[br]does over its citizens.
This reason does avoid the problem
that afflicted the last two.
Such authorities really do seem to be able
to make it the case that something
that would otherwise[br]not have been required
or forbidden in itself
is required or forbidden, just because
they forbid it or require it.
So if God has authority of this kind,
then he can make something right or wrong
through his command.
But notice that the only way authorities
can create requirements or[br]prohibitions in this way
is if it is already true that we
ought to do as they command.
It's only because the[br]sergeant has authority
over the private that the private must do
as the sergeant commands.
In other words, the fact that the private
must obey the sergeant can't itself result
from the sergeant's command.
That has to be true independently
of anything the sergeant commands.
So by analogy, if the reason we should do
what God commands is that he has superior
law-making authority over us,
then it must be true[br]that it would be wrong
to violate his commands,
quite independently of his commanding it.
And if so, the divine command[br]theory would be false.
Or suppose, finally, that[br]you think you should do
what God commands because you love God,
and we should do what[br]those we love ask us to do.
But here again, if that's[br]your reason for thinking
it would be wrong to deny God[br]obedience to his commands,
you must be assuming that it is right
so to respond to the[br]wishes of those we love,
and that this is true independently
of whether God commands us to do
what those we love ask us to do.
It seems, then, that if[br]we think we should do
what God commands for[br]any of these reasons,
we must also assume, not that[br]God is the source of morality,
but to the contrary:
that God cannot be the[br]source of all of morality.
In each case, we must assume[br]that there are moral truths
that are independent of God's commands,
so we must assume that the[br]divine command theory is false.
Now, we could avoid all of these problems
if we were to think not[br]that we should follow
God's commands for any of these reasons,
but just because of[br]God's omnipotent power.
But then we would lose the contrast
between God's power and his authority,
and his goodness.
We would have to see his commands
as simply imposed us[br]in a way that does not
obligate us morally,
but rather that obliges[br]or compels us by force,
just as law, in general, cannot[br]be created by pure force,
so neither can the moral law.
It's logically impossible for morality
to result from force.
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