Much of whether a coup or mutiny will be successful depends on the element of surprise.
They are not situations where two large militaries face off on opposite sides of the battlefield,
where surprise is helpful but will not save you when vastly outnumbered.
Instead, coups and mutinies are ticking time bombs:
they can be won or lost in a matter of hours.
Catch the leader off guard, Arrest him,
take control of a few pressure points in the capital,
and checkmate, you can now declare yourself the king.
At that point, it is up to everyone else to unseat you—and that is a risky decision
for any of your potential opponents to make.
So they may just fall in line.
It could still take a few weeks for the situation to stabilize, but the hard part is over.
With that in mind, we now have a better idea of why the Wagner
Opera failed.
The new details come from reports in The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times.
If true— emphasis on “if”, a very fun point that
we will come back to later— the problem was surprise—
or lack thereof.
It appears that Russian intelligence uncovered Yevgeny Prigozhin’s plot to usurp power
from the Ministry of Defense.
This forced Wagner to accelerate its plans.
However, Russia foiled the initial step.
And although Wagner captured Rostov-on-Don with surprising ease, the group lacked a contingency
plan.
This led to the unscripted scramble to Moscow and the mutiny’s end.
But the details are more complicated.
Today, we are going to cover the basic background behind the intelligence reports,
what the intelligence reports claim,
how it makes sense of the observe truce,
how it strangely makes Russia appear weaker than it did before,
and a fun theory about the authenticity of the report.
But we begin with the publicly known information of how we got here.
The origins of today’s drama trace back to February 2014, a time when Kyiv was in
crisis.
Putin began maneuvering what would later be called
“little green men” into Crimea to prepare the peninsula for annexation.
Some of those green guys were actually Wagner musicians.
After President Viktor Yanukovych fled to Russia—coincidentally Rostov-on-Don—
Putin pulled the trigger.
The annexation went off with barely a hitch.
With the mission accomplished, Wagner moved to the Donbas.
The main target: Luhansk oblast.
The goal: foment a separatist movement.
Major operations there terminated in 2015.
A handful of Wagner faithful stayed behind, but the bulk headed to Africa or the Syrian
Civil War.
Nevertheless, seven years later, they would be back at it as Putin prepared for the invasion.
Some may have taken part in assassination plots to remove Zelensky from power,
but we all know that those fizzled and how Zelensky celebrated with a wardrobe change.
However, most of Wagner’s contributions came along the eastern front.
This is critical because the western front proved to be a disaster.
Meanwhile, the southern front was a mixed bag for Russia.
But as the phases of the war shifted, Wagner would have the opportunity to demonstrate
its utility to the Kremlin.
The Battle of Bakhmut began in August, pairing Wagner forces with regular Russian
troops in urban combat against Ukraine.
One month later, and slightly north of Wagner’s position in Bakhmut,
Ukraine began making massive gains in its September counteroffensive.
During all this, there were long-running rumors of who controlled Wagner.
But it was this point when Prigozhin stepped out of the shadows
and revealed himself to be the puppet master of Wagner all along.
As he saw things, outside of the initial Eastern thrust, Russian strategy had been abysmal.
He was mission was now to prove Wagner’s superiority.
As Russia’s position grew worse with the loss of Kherson, Wagner kept pecking away.
In January 2023, Prigozhin’s forces took Soledar,
a salt mine community just north of Bakhmut.
It was the first notable gain for Russia for what seemed like forever,
but Wagner was claiming the victory for itself.
Around this time, it is plausible that Prigozhin realized that he had an opportunity to advance
his political career.
The next four months again saw Russia drawing blanks—
except the slow progress in Wagner’s Bakhmut campaign.
By May, victory in Bakhmut appeared imminent.
However, this is when the ammo wars began.
Prigozhin released a series of social media tirades,
accusing the Russian Ministry of Defense of withholding the vital supplies that Wagner
needed to complete the job.
If that did not change, then Wagner would withdraw from Bakhmut,
leaving the Russian regulars to fend for themselves.
All of the progress from the last six months would be put in … well … Jeopardy.
There are four non-mutually exclusive interpretations of what happened here.
First, Prigozhin’s assessment is correct.
After all, it would not be the first time that the MoD made significant errors during
the war.
Second, the MoD faced a tradeoff.
Ukraine’s counterattack was on the way, and rationing decisions may have gone against
Wagner.
Third, Prigozhin’s public pivot arose suspicions that he had plans to go rogue.
Finally, Wagner was not actually bullet starved.
Rather, Prigozhin was stockpiling ammunition for the opera he was about to conduct.
Regardless, Wagner and Moscow got back on the same page, at least temporarily.
Bakhmut subsequently fell, further bolstering the Wagner narrative.
However, then the MoD apparently felt that preemptive action was necessary.
In June, it drafted orders for all mercenary groups to sign MoD contracts.
This effectively would mean the end of Wagner, so Prigozhin passed.
By June 10, if he had not made up his mind already, Prigozhin decided to make a play.
Now we can get into the details of the new intelligence reports.
The source is an American intelligence official.
Keep that in mind as we get deeper into the analysis.
The main villains in Prigozhin’s eyes were Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu
and Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov,
whom Prigozhin saw as weak bureaucrats whose incompetence and corruption had turned the
invasion into a disaster.
But an opportunity arose nearby.
Rostov-on-Don was the main hub of the war effort.
And through the normal course of business, both Shoigu and Gerasimov were planning to
visit there at the end of June.
The city conveniently borders Donetsk, where Wagner troops were resting following their
victory in Bakhmut.
Thus, Wagner could blitz to Rostov-on-Don and capture the pair.
What would happen next is ambiguous.
Perhaps throw them in a cell and hold them prisoner?
Try them in a mock military tribunal?
Force action from Putin to dismiss them?
Regardless of the mechanism, this was a low-level coup times two—or, more precisely, a mutiny.
Either way, surprise was key.
Successfully capturing the pair would shift the status quo outcome in favor of Prigozhin.
That part might be especially important in trying to remove Shoigu, who was Putin’s
long-time vacation pal.
However, the FSB was there to rain on Prigozhin’s parade.
Two days before the Wagner plot was to begin, Russia’s main security agency learned of
it.
The silver lining for Prigozhin was that he had been tipped off that the FSB knew.
How the knowledge disseminated either way is unclear.
Much of the speculation falls on Sergei Surovikin, Commander-in-Chief of Russia’s Aerospace
Forces,
and briefly the commander of the overall invasion as Russian forces withdrew from Kherson in
November 2022.
It is possible that Prigozhin alerted Surovikin to the plot,
and then Surovikin informed the FSB.
After all, his air force seemed like the only entity interested in slowing the Moscow convoy,
with the casualties to underscore that point.
However, Surovikin and Prigozhin may be friendly with one another,
and a yet more recent report indicates that Surovikin was secretly a member of Wagner.
Perhaps the FSB, not knowing the connection, informed Surovikin about the plot,
and then Surovikin forwarded the message to Prigozhin.
If so, why the air force then fired on Wagner is unclear.
Regardless, the plot was spoiled, and Prigozhin knew that he had been found out.
He now faced a dilemma on what to do.
But rather than stay the course or just give up,
Wagner accelerated the plot.
On June 23, Priogzhin released a video that essentially
outlined his public case against the Ministry of Defense.
Later that day, he released a second video accusing the MoD of bombing his troops.
Real, imagined, or a false flag, this became Prigozhin’s call to arms.
Wagner sprinted to Rostov-on-Don.
The city fell without a fight early the next morning.
But Shoigu and Gerasimov?
Well, they had vanished into thin air.
Perhaps the FSB let them in on the secret.
Perhaps Wagner’s accelerated timeline was just too rushed, leaving the pair in a position
where Prigozhin could not imprison them.
Or perhaps they just got lucky.
Whatever the case, the climax of Wagner’s opera had no audience.
Apparently without a contingency plan—
and perhaps surprised at how easy they took Rostov-on-Don—Wagner troops sped off toward
the capital.
But somewhere past the halfway point, Prigozhin realized that Moscow was a different beast.
With Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenko’s exile offer in hand,
he went safe and chose the exit strategy.
Those are the reports.
Let’s cut through them now and look for the deeper implications.
Presumably, by the time the convoy had departed, Putin knew that Prigozhin held a relatively
weak hand outside of Rostov-on-Don.
However, the optics of Wagner making it all the way to Moscow would have been terrible,
even if mutineers were near-certain to lose.
Perhaps under ordinary times, he would have preferred rolling the dice to
giving Prigozhin a path to exile.
But we do not live in ordinary times.
Meanwhile, Prigozhin was in too deep to walk away without some assurances,
so we got the deal that we have observed—
and maybe more if Shoigu or Gerasimov were to suddenly lose office.
Despite Putin’s apparent Moscow fortress, the rest of the opera must be very concerning
to him regarding the stability of his regime.
If the FSB had even a small amount of advanced knowledge of the plot,
it seems that Prigozhin should not have gotten as far as he did.
Did the FSB simply not relay the information to the MoD,
essentially giving Prigozhin a free pass?
If so, then Putin has a major problem with the main security service within his government.
At least during Soviet times, losing the support of the KGB was an express ticket to retirement.
But it may be yet worse if the FSB did forewarn Putin.
That would tell us that the Ministry of Defense is so unpopular that it could not hold a logistics
hub despite knowing was about to happen.
To make matters worse, the convoy drove deep into the country—
though, if this was indeed an audible from Prigozhin,
they could be forgiven because the FSB could not warn them of that aspect of the plot.
Either way, Putin is going to have to clean house.
There is some evidence that is already underway, with Sergei Surovikin missing in action—
suggesting that the Kremlin finds his role in this suspicious.
Finally, there is always the possibility that this leak came from an American intelligence
official but that the report itself is fictional.
Imagine for a second that it is an entirely fabricated CIA fantasy.
In truth, the FSB did not know about the plot, military intelligence did not know either,
no one.
If you want to stir the pot and cause a bunch of unnecessary purging, this would be a way
to do that.
Welcome to the wonderful world of counterintelligence.
Still, it is worth noting that there are separate reports of concurrent intelligence estimates
within the U.S. intel community
that Prigozhin was going to try something.
and further kept it a secret to U.S. allies, much to their annoyance.
If it leaked to the United States, then there is a greater chance
that someone within the Russian intelligence community also knew.
Nevertheless, the possibility of a false report is a neat idea.
And if the lines on maps guy did his job today, it also plausibly explains the observable
features of what occurred,
which is the mark of a good deception operation.
Speaking of neat ideas, why not check out my book on the causes of the invasion.
See the video description for more information about that.
And if you enjoyed this video, please like, share, and subscribe, and I will see you next
time.
Take care.
As much fun as #wheresputin and #whereszelensky have been, there are three actual people missing.
Thus, until Gerasimov and Surovikin officially return to the job or are arrested or otherwise,
they will be the ones hiding—
kind of like how Gerasimov was touring the American Civil War last time.
Likewise, until there is further confirmation of Prigozhin’s status in Belarus, he is
also in the mix.
Putin and Zelensky will be taking a break, but I doubt we have seen the last of them.
And, you know what, until then, I will probably be keeping Putin with binoculars in the regular
mix of standard images like I did today, just because it’s a great photo.
He just won’t be hiding in the traditional sense.
So, in summary, it’s #wheresgerasimov, #wheressurovikin (note the two s’s there), #wheresprigozhin.
Good luck.