The disastrous Battle of Midway is remembered nowadays as one of the major turning points of
the Pacific War, leaving the IJN significantly weakened. The Japanese would still continue to
secure more territory, but it was now the allies who held the strategic initiative,
and the Americans would then go on to execute Operation Watchtower,
the first Allied offensive of the Pacific War; and as we’ve seen last week, the invasion of the
Solomons was up to a good start. Yet despite its tremendous losses at Midway, the IJN was still
standing and it still had sufficient strength to contest control of the south seas from the US,
so Admiral Mikawa now prepared for a bold naval ambush that would prove to be one of the worst
defeats in the history of the US Navy. Join us as we cover the Battle of Savo Island,
and as we also take a look at some new developments on the Kokoda Track.
There are of course countless other battles you might be interested in, and luckily,
our sponsor MagellanTV, the documentary streaming service founded by filmmakers,
brings you the Battlefields of the World Wars series. In eight fully realised documentaries
they investigate the tactics, technology, legends, and hidden truths of climatic 20th century battles
to reveal just what happened, and why. From Verdun to the Bulge, learn the deep and often enigmatic
causes that separated victory and defeat, and sealed the fate of soldiers and governments alike.
And there’s no shortage of similar content on MagellanTV: they boast the richest and most
varied history content available anywhere, covering everything from the ancient to
modern eras, wars, biographies, and the earth itself. Aside from history,
they’ve got extensive collections of science, true crime, travel and other documentaries.
They add 15 or more hours of 4K, high definition content every week for their
subscribers at no extra cost. It is all viewable anytime, anywhere on televisions, laptops,
mobile devices, and more. Get access to 3500 hours of ad-free documentaries for only $4.99 a month,
and get a month for free by subscribing to MagellanTV via our link in the description.
On August 7, the Invasion of the Solomon Islands began with Marine landings on Guadalcanal,
Tulagi and the islands of Gavutu and Tanambogo. In the next two days, the Americans, under the
command of General Vandegrift, would go on to subdue all Japanese opposition on Tulagi
and its neighbouring islands, and also to occupy the main Japanese base on Guadalcanal. The rapid
progress of the operation was a fortuitous turn of events, since as we’ll recall, time was of the
essence for Operation Watchtower. This was because Admiral Fletcher had instructed his carrier force,
led by Admiral Noyes, to remain in the area only for three days, due to the danger of attacks by
Japanese land-based aircraft. Without the aerial support of the American carriers,
it would be impossible to continue the offloading of the supplies that the Marines needed to secure
their control of the Southern Solomons, so Admiral Turner would have to direct his surface forces to
abandon the area as well. In the best scenario, Vandegrift believed that his forces would need at
least five days to move all the supplies from the landing craft to the beaches and ultimately to the
supply dumps; yet he was only going to get three days, so both Vandegrift and Turner would direct
their men to expedite the unloading. Although the movement from the landing craft to the beaches
had proceeded according to schedule, a serious situation would develop as the men on the shore
were unable to cope with the rapidity and quantity of supplies and equipment delivered at the beach,
thus hampering the American efforts to unload in the short time they had.
Immediately after the initial landings of the Marines on Tulagi and Guadalcanal, Japanese
authorities on Rabaul had been informed of the ongoing enemy invasion, so Admiral Sadayoshi of
the 25th Air Flotilla directed his aircraft at once to start a series of attacks on the Allied
amphibious forces. These attacks proved to be the most serious enemy activity during the first
two days of the operation, scoring a torpedo hit over the destroyer Jarvis, which stopped dead in
the water but then managed to leave the area under her own power, and sinking the transport George F.
Elliot, which was set afire when a Japanese plane crashed on board . The attack on the Elliot had a
very important consequence for the Americans, as the glare cause by her burning allowed Japanese
observers in the Tassafaronga area to see the cruisers and destroyers that were shortly to be
attacked during the night of August 8, reporting their presence to Admiral Mikawa in Rabaul.
Yet even before this, Mikawa had already decided to audaciously counterattack with his surface
forces, immediately preparing his flagship, the cruiser Chokai, for a tentative night attack on
enemy ships off Guadalcanal. While the Japanese admiral awaited for his forces to concentrate
on Rabaul , he decided to send four submarines to Guadalcanal to attack Allied shipping and
also to form a relief force of 519 sailors to reinforce the defenders at Guadalcanal and Tulagi.
During the night of August 8, this relief force would be intercepted by the submarine
S-38 , which managed to torpedo the transport Meiyo Maru, killing 373 men from the force.
But meanwhile, Mikawa finally departed Rabaul around 19:40 on August 7,
taking direct command of a Striking Force that comprised five heavy cruisers , two light cruisers
and just one destroyer . During his advance towards Guadalcanal, Mikawa would launch a
search with his cruiser floatplanes, gathering a competent amount of information that was further
aided by the reconnaissance of the land-based planes and the work of the Japanese observers
around Tassafaronga. His plan was to penetrate the passage south of Savo, torpedo the enemy vessels
off Guadalcanal, attack Tulagi with gunfire and torpedoes, and finally withdraw by the
passage north of Savo. In contrast, the Americans expected an early detection of approaching ships
by long-range aircraft from both the Southwest and South Pacific Areas, yet Mikawa would manage
to evade the regular search planes, wiggling through the holes in the Allied air search net.
Two Australian Hudsons would actually manage to spot the Japanese Striking Force, but
they would fail to adequately transmit these two sightings to Admiral Turner until it was too late.
At the same time, during the evening of August 8, Admiral Fletcher, worried about the safety of his
carriers after the Japanese torpedo attacks, decided to order Admiral Noyes’ Carrier Force
to withdraw immediately. This was according to Admiral Nimitz’ principle of calculated risk,
as Fletcher regarded the preservation of his carriers as more important than the
success of Operation Watchtower. With the loss of air support for his surface forces,
Turner now called a meeting at his flagship with Vandegrift and British Rear-Admiral
Victor Crutchley, who led a screening force of 8 cruisers, 15 destroyers and 5 minesweepers.
The British admiral had divided his forces into three groups, with Rear-Admiral Norman
Scott’s Eastern Force sealing the eastern approaches between Florida and Guadalcanal;
Captain Frederick Riefkohl’s Northern Group guarding the northwestern entrance;
and the Southern Group under Crutchley himself protecting the southwestern approaches.
Additionally, Crutchley had also positioned two destroyers to the west of his forces to patrol
the area with primitive short-range SC radars in case the enemy could sneak past the air patrols.
During the meeting at the McCawley, Turner explained to both commanders that he would
also have to withdraw from the area, although he planned to unload as much as possible during
the night and then depart the next day. This meeting would have an unfortunate consequence,
as Crutchley , who hadn’t informed the commanders of the other cruiser groups of his absence,
would not be there to command his Southern Force for the incoming attack, leaving no flag officer
to adequately control the western task forces and failing to notify the captains of his departure.
With midnight approaching, Mikawa skillfully continued his advance forward, covered by
a moonless night and cloaked by a series of cloud curtains. Before midnight came, however,
the Japanese sent four floatplanes to scout the area and provide flare illumination. Around
01:00 on August 9, Japanese lookouts had sighted Savo Island and the destroyer Blue only 9 km away
steaming slowly across Mikawa’s path. Yet again, the Japanese Admiral skillfully chopped speed
to remain undetected by the American radars as it passed through the southern entrance.
By 01:30, Mikawa was hidden in the folds of low clouds around Savo while he prepared
for the commencement of the attack. Yet as the Japanese vessels advanced,
slowing speeds down to reduce wakes, the destroyer Yunagi lost sight of the ships ahead
and had to turn back west to avoid an encounter. A couple minutes later, Mikawa came across
the crippled destroyer Jarvis, but held his fire to avoid exposing himself to the enemy.
Instead, the Japanese pressed their advance and soon found the Southern Group. At 01:38,
the attackers increased their speed and started firing their torpedoes , and five minutes later,
just as the Japanese aircraft flares blossomed revealing the position of the defenders,
the Chokai and Furutaka started to fire at Canberra. On the Allied vessels, the weary
sailors were asleep, hardly prepared for what was to come. Within four minutes, the Canberra was
hit 24 times , leaving the cruiser immobilized and without power. The cruiser Chicago was then
hit several times, although the crew managed to control the damage; and the two destroyers of
the force started to fire at the Japanese vessels, with the destroyer Patterson successfully scoring
a hit on the Tenryu, although it suffered much damage in return as well. In about seven minutes,
the Southern Group had been decimated, so Mikawa elected to head north to attack the
Northern Group, with his column splitting unintentionally into two jaws. Inexplicably,
Captain Bode’s Chicago kept standing to the west while the Japanese turned north and didn’t report
his encounter to Captain Riefkohl, an error in judgement that would cause the suicide of
its captain many months later. With the Japanese force divided in two, the eastern group , led by
the Chokai, soon found and torpedoed the Vincennes before attacking the rest of the Northern Group.
From the other side, the western group would also soon fall upon the defenders around 02:00.
The Vincennes hesitated to avoid hitting friendly vessels, but managed to quickly respond with fire,
but within a minute, Riefkohl saw his vessel receive much damage from a number of hits
that caused uncontrollable flames. Although Riefkohl’s crew was vigilant because the
captain gambled that an attack could happen that night, the rest of the American vessels
were unprepared for the incoming attack, so they would suffer much against the heavy Japanese fire.
After a couple of minutes, both the Astoria and Quincy received many hits, suffering the start of
large fires and the loss of power. Both cruisers, however, responded heavily with their own fire,
scoring several hits on the Chokai and causing minor damage on the enemy.
Meanwhile, while the unaware Riefkohl still awaited orders from Crutchley,
the Vincennes also suffered many more hits, leaving the cruiser dead in the water.
Remarkably, during the struggle, the Quincy lurched out of the American formation
while engulfed in flames to ram the enemy with their forward guns.
Concentrated fire soon reduced the American cruiser, with a final torpedo hit at 02:16 that
left the Quincy sinking. The Vincennes would also continue to be hit by Japanese fire until 02:16,
receiving such an extent of damage that Riefkohl would have to abandon his ship at 02:30, with the
cruiser sinking half an hour later. Content with the spectacular outcome of the battle, Mikawa who
had had the chance to destroy the enemy transports decided to turn back west at 02:20, as he had no
air cover and was fearing a possible carrier-based air retribution on his exposed vessels.
The western group of Japanese vessels had actually started to retreat at 02:08, and they would soon
find the destroyer Ralph Talbot in their path, scoring five hits that left the destroyer listing.
By 03:40, the Striking Force had reassembled, immediately starting its withdrawal in an
anti-aircraft disposition. At 09:58, Admiral Goto’s 6th Cruiser Division was detached to
continue on to Kavieng via the Bougainville Strait; yet on the morning of August 10,
the triumphant cruisers would be torpedoed by the submarine S-44 , which quickly managed to sink
the Kako, thus scoring the first retribution for the devastating Battle of Savo Island.
Meanwhile, as the Japanese retreated, Admiral Turner assessed the situation. He decided to
scuttle the Canberra, since she couldn’t accompany the withdrawal scheduled for the next day;
and ordered unloading to reach its final stages, achieving remarkable progress at Tulagi. Astoria’s
crew also continued to fight the fires in the cruiser, but she would eventually sink at 12:15.
With the day fading, Turner would finally order the withdrawal towards Noumea,
leaving Vandegrift’s Marines alone at the Southern Solomons. Unpreparedness and failed
air searches would render this one of the worst defeats in the history of the US Navy,
with Mikawa winning an amazing victory on his gamble , thus recovering a little
bit of the initiative in the South Pacific. But now, we turn back to the Kokoda Track,
as the Japanese and Australians each prepared their own offensives.
Two weeks ago, we covered the rapid Japanese advance towards Kokoda, where the invaders
ultimately defeated Maroubra Force and forced the Australian defenders to retreat back to Deniki.
In the ensuing days, both sides would have ample time to rest and reinforce their troops in the
frontlines. On Kokoda, Colonel Tsukamoto had concentrated the bulk of his battalion, totaling
some 660 men , in preparation for an offensive to secure the line of the Owen Stanley Range; while
on Deniki, the defenders were reinforced with three companies of the 49th Battalion carrying
some much-needed supplies, and Major Allan Cameron also arrived to replace the deceased Colonel Owen
as commander of Maroubra Force. Now bolstering a force of 433 men, Cameron had decided to conduct
a three-pronged counterattack against Kokoda, preparing to depart on the morning of August 8.
At the same time, Tsukamoto left Kokoda on August 7, advancing towards Gira and Deniki;
yet both forces would soon meet each other in battle before reaching their objectives. Although
the soldiers from A Company had managed to advance undetected and had successfully recaptured a very
lightly-defended Kokoda, C Company quickly ran into Tsukamoto’s main column . As the Japanese
responded with machine-gun fire, the Australians fought valiantly against a superior force, yet
they could only drive the invaders from their most forward positions. Eventually, Cameron decided to
withdraw C Company and prepare the defenses at Deniki, as Tsukamoto was in hard pursuit
of his fleeing enemy and would fire against the Australian forward positions until nightfall.
Meanwhile, D Company had managed to capture Pirivi after a hard-fought engagement in the thick bush,
but Japanese reinforcements from Oivi soon fell upon them and eventually forced them
to retreat towards Komondo. From there, the Australians would rejoin the defenders at Deniki,
where Tsukamoto was continuing his assault on the morning of August 9. Cameron would successfully
manage to hold off the invaders for the remainder of the day, with the Japanese attacks waning
as the afternoon advanced. This was because Tsukamoto had been alerted of the fall of Kokoda,
so he decided to send a company of his main force to retake Kokoda. Dug in in the old
Australian positions, A Company fought ferociously against the invaders, driving them to the ground
with the strength of its fire. As dawn broke on August 10, the Australians continued to resist
the relentless Japanese attacks both on Deniki and Kokoda, but A Company needed to be resupplied by
air if it hoped to survive for a while longer. By afternoon, there were no sign of any air drops,
as the expected aircraft with the supplies flew over Kokoda unable to land, so the Australians
would have to withdraw to the west of Kokoda amidst a violent Japanese assault. A Company
would then have to cross Madi Creek and head to the western side of Faiwani Creek before moving to
the village of Naro and then to Isurava, leaving it unable to participate in the defense of Deniki.
Although Cameron’s offensive to retake Kokoda had ended in defeat, he had indeed delayed the
Japanese advance on Deniki and had surprised the Japanese commanders to such an extent
that, coupled with the recent developments in the Southern Solomons, the invaders would decide
to delay their Port Moresby offensive until the rest of General Horii’s South Seas Detachment,
with the Yazawa Detachment attached, could arrive at the battlefront. Reinforced with an additional
company , Cameron would continue to fight back the renewed Japanese attacks on August 13.
On the morning of August 14, however, Tsukamoto finally managed to break through the western
Australian positions, so Cameron would have to order a hastily withdrawal towards Isurava,
in which the men would leave behind most of their equipment and supplies.
But this is the end for now, and in the next episode, we are going to resume our coverage
of Operation Watchtower with the Battle of the Tenaru and we’ll also head back to the Gilberts
to cover the bold Raid on Makin Island. If you don’t want to miss any of our episodes,
make sure you are subscribed and have pressed the bell button to see it.
Please, consider liking, commenting, and sharing - it helps immensely. Our videos would be impossible
without our kind patrons and youtube channel members, whose ranks you can join via the links
in the description to know our schedule, get early access to our videos, access our discord,
and much more. This is the Kings and Generals channel, and we will catch you on the next one.