To understand the Korea of today, you have to understand its past
and the enormous impact of a single decision.
As World War
Two was winding down, the Soviet Union sent troops
into the northern part of Korea, preparing to invade Japan.
The advance sparked American fears that the Soviets would try to occupy
the entire Korean Peninsula.
After the war, an executive decision was made in Washington D.C.,
two junior officers were given the instructions
to find a map of Korea and find an appropriate dividing line
that could separate the Soviet and the U.S.
occupation zones.
No map of the Korean Peninsula was readily available,
so they found a National Geographic magazine that had a map of the Korean
Peninsula in it, and they found roughly the halfway point,
which was the 38th parallel, the halfway point between the two.
The Soviets agreed to this boundary,
but in the years following the war, the United States and the Soviet Union
could not agree on how their occupation should end
or how a unified Korean government should form.
Eventually the
United States brought the issue up at the United Nations,
which called for free elections to be held on the entire Korean Peninsula.
The Soviet Union resisted stopping
the United Nations from administering elections in the North.
Nevertheless, in May 1948,
the United Nations supervised elections in the South.
Within months, the Republic of Korea was established with U.S.
backed Syngman Rhee as its leader.
Soon after, the Soviets administered separate single-candidate elections
in the North, establishing the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
with Communist Kim Il Sung as its leader.
Now both sides wanted to unify the Korean Peninsula
under their respective governments.
So in 1949, Kim Sung began to lobby
Mao Zedong and Joseph Stalin to help him launch an offensive against the South.
North Korea was stronger militarily,
and Kim thought he could unify the peninsula by force.
Stalin was hesitant, though, because he feared
sparking a war with the United States and its allies.
Mao was more supportive.
He was wary of the Americans as they had aided
his anti-communist rivals during the Chinese Civil War.
And Mao saw Korea as a buffer between his country and U.S.
occupied Japan.
Meanwhile, back in the United States, Secretary of State Dean
Acheson gave a press conference in early 1950 about the U.S.
defensive perimeter in the Pacific.
He included Japan and the Philippines, but excluded Korea.
And some historians believe that this was also a mistake
because that's what led the Chinese and the Soviets and the North Koreans
to believe that they could take the peninsula.
On June 25th, 1950, North Korean
troops flooded into the South, quickly overcoming its defenses.
News of the attack quickly reached New York,
where the Soviet Union was boycotting the U.N.
Security Council due to a disagreement about which government should control
China's sea.
With no communist countries present, the council was able to condemn
the North Korean invasion as a breach of the peace,
and then it called on all member states to assist the South.
President Truman did just that, ordering the U.S.
military to intervene in Korea.
Under the UN's mandate,
he feared that a communist controlled Korea might threaten Japan.
The northern troops advanced much faster than expected, pushing South Korean
forces to the very tip of the peninsula, the Pusan perimeter.
But in September, the U.N.
struck back, landing at Incheon on the western coast of South Korea.
They cut off North Korean supply lines, recaptured Seoul,
and pushed the communist forces back up to the 38th parallel.
Here, a major decision had to be made.
Should U.N. forces cross the 38th parallel?
The Security Council's resolution
that first called for intervention didn't directly address this question.
It called for the removal of North Korean forces from South Korea.
And by this point, that had been achieved.
But it also called on U.N.
members to restore international peace and security in the area.
Some officials in the Truman administration argued
that peace and security could only be achieved
if Korea was unified under a single government.
Other U.S.
officials like George Kennan insisted that advancing past the 38th parallel
could draw China or the Soviet Union into battle.
But those in favor of crossing the 38th parallel disagreed, citing that U.S.
military intelligence suggested China and the Soviet Union would not intervene.
Leaders in 1950 faced a pivotal decision if they crossed the 38th parallel.
They had the potential to unify
the Korean Peninsula, but they could also spark a war with China
or the Soviet Union, or even start World War Three.